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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus famously proposed the idea that change is
the only constant in the world.1 To a greater or smaller extent, everything in the physical world is
subject to some degree of change in every moment. The French philosopher René Descartes
imaginatively described this process as God re-creating the world at each successive instant.2
The law of torts is subtly, yet strongly, linked to change in the world, particularly to change in
human society. A natural consequence of this link is the inherent dynamism of this area of the
law, which manifests itself twofold: first, the law of torts evolves in time; and second, the theory
of tort law must be structurally dynamic: as a consequence of the fact that tort law is factdependent, tort theory is based on a process of characterizing and arranging facts, and finding
their legal significance—a process which should be intuitively dynamic.
That being said, so far, the law of torts has been explained and theorized using a rather
static approach. Traditional tort theory, in both the common law and the civil law, has been
focused on placing facts into categories and enumerating elements.
There is great value in breaking down elements of torts, or in creating abstract categories.
This is not an attempt to minimize the importance of the traditional approach on tort law,



The author would like to warmly thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his immense patience, full support, and
extraordinary guidance provided throughout the process of writing this study. His thoughts and advice, offered with
the occasion of many discussions, have been absolutely invaluable, and for all these reasons, sufficient words of
gratitude can hardly be found. Also, much appreciation is owed to Professor John Church, Adrian Tamba and Orel
Engelbach, for their help and for the very useful comments. Last but not least, the author would like to thank
Jennifer Lane for all the advice and the help provided in the editing process. This paper is based on the LL.M paper
written by the author while attending the LL.M in Comparative Law program at Louisiana State University.
1
See PLATO, CRATYLUS 19 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Project Gutenberg), available at
http://pinkmonkey.com/dl/library1/cratylus.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
2
This perspective on change is linked to Descartes’ image of time. Descartes believed that objects in the world do
not have the capacity to endure in time, and believed that the nature of time is perpetual “re-creation”. See RENÉ
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 33, 88 (John Cottingham ed. & trans., Cambridge University
Press, 18th prtg. 2012; published as part of CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY series).
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especially since for the greater part of history it seemed to be enough for every practical purpose.
The true problem, identified rather recently in legal doctrine, is the fact that tort theory has been
oriented towards the past for most of its history,3 instead of having a full spectrum on linear time,
which would include the future.
The challenge of exploring the inherent dynamism of the law of torts goes far beyond the
purposes of this paper. In a restricted and controlled manner, from the multiple areas of tort law
that are in need of a dynamic approach, an emerging area—prevention—needs to be further
explored.
The catalyst for the cogitations expressed herein and the topic around which everything
revolves in this study is the proliferation of preventive remedies. This is an area of tort law
which, if properly understood, is bound to change our whole perception on what civil liability is,
what a tort action is supposed to do, and what the goals to be achieved by the law of torts are in
general.
The purpose of this study is to draw the coordinates and identify the main vectors for the
development of a comprehensive theory of prevention in the law of torts. In order to reach that
goal, the study is divided into seven chapters (including the introduction).
Chapter II is focused on a set of definitions which were necessary in order to explain the
choice of terminology used throughout this study. Unavoidably, this chapter is also a brief
reflection on some of the fundamental concepts of tort law. The way we place preventive
remedies within the general theory of civil liability will probably impact our conceptual

3

See Catherine Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, responsabilité de l’avenir, D. 2004 Chron. 577, 580
(hereinafter Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité).
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understanding of tort law more than anything else. Most importantly, the definition of liability
needs to become broader than the traditional definitions focusing on compensation.4
In order to justify the expansive definition offered in Chapter II, Chapter III is tapping
into the fundamental question of what moral responsibility is and how it can operate as a source
for an expanded view on our understanding of civil liability. The recourse to notions of
prospective and retrospective responsibility and their interplay opens up the possibility to
analyze legal responsibility in a prospective way, thus revealing a philosophical foundation for
preventive remedies.
Chapter IV focuses on what the law is today in the area of preventive torts. The focus is
on jurisprudence (case law) from three major legal systems: the French, the English, and legal
systems from the United States.
By no means should the role of courts be overlooked when discussing prevention
because, so far, preventive remedies find support exclusively in jurisprudential development.
Even in the future, the central role in the development of preventive remedies will be attributed
to judges; the legislature will most likely regulate only specific matters. General and default rules
for prevention can only be extracted from jurisprudence (case law), and, for the foreseeable
future, the refinement of such rules and principles will most likely fall on the shoulders of
judges, even if legislatures will consider codifying preventive remedies. A few attempts at
codification have already been made, for example in the Principles of European Tort Law and
the reform project for the law of obligations presented in 2005 by Professor Catala5 or in the
Reform project coordinated by François Terré.6

4

See infra Ch. II Part B.
The European Group on Tort Law made a first step towards a diversification of functions in the law of torts, by
combining prevention with compensation in Art. 2:104: “Expenses incurred to prevent threatened damage amount to
recoverable damage in so far as reasonably incurred.” EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
5

7

Chapter V deals with the evolution of tort theory in the area of prevention. Prevention as
a scope of civil liability has been theorized only recently. A theory of “preventive civil liability”
was proposed in the civilian literature,7 whilst relying on ideas inherent to the precautionary
principle,8 while in the common law, there is abundant case law applying preventive measures,9
but almost no effort of organizing the case law in a general theoretical framework.10
Although there are great dissimilarities between tort theory in civilian legal systems and
common law systems, in such a novel field, the shared experience of the two legal families can
open new horizons.
The study of the preventive function in the law of torts and preventive remedies is
necessarily linked to the coherence of the fundamental framework of tort law. For this purpose, it

TORT LAW, available at http://civil.udg.edu/php//index.php?id=129. The Catala Project for the reform of the law of
obligations in France contains a similar provision. Article 1344 declares that: “The expenses incurred for the
prevention of imminent damage or in order to avoid its aggravation, as well as for the reduction of its consequences,
constitutes recoverable damage when reasonably incurred” (“Les dépenses exposées pour prévenir la réalisation
imminente d'un dommage ou pour éviter son aggravation, ainsi que pour en réduire les conséquences, constituent un
préjudice réparable, dès lors qu'elles ont été raisonnablement engagées”). Rapport à Monsieur Pascal Clément Garde
des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1136 du Code
civil) et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil) at 154 (22 September 2005) available at
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/RAPPORTCATALASEPTEMBRE2005.pdf
6
The Terré reform project, has a similar provision in Article 51 to those presented above, but goes a step further
and, in Article 2, proclaims that “Independently from reparation of damage with might have been sustained, the
court will prescribe reasonable measures, proper for preventing or stopping an illicit disturbance to which the
plaintiff finds himself exposed to” (“Indépendamment de la réparation du dommage éventuellement subi, le juge
prescrit les mesures raisonnables propres à prévenir ou faire cesser le trouble illicite auquel est exposé le
demandeur”). Proposition de textes. Chapitre des délits in POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ
CIVILE 1-15 (François Terré coord., ed. Dalloz, 2011), available at
http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/1_proposition_texte_responsabilite_civile_20111018.pdf
7
Catherine Thibierge, Libres propos sur l’évolution du droit de la responsabilité, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL (hereinafter RTD civ.) 561 (1999) (hereinafter Thibierge, Libres propos); Thibierge, Avenir de la
responsabilité, supra note 3.
8
See Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580-81. The emphasis the author puts on the protection
of collective interests, the application for large scale damages, and the transversal domain of liability demonstrates
that this “preventive liability” seems to draw its characteristics from the essential elements of the precautionary
principle.
9
See infra Ch. IV, Part C.
10
By “general theoretical framework” I mean a set of guiding principles, accompanied by rules, standards, and
element or factor-based tests which would be common to all preventive remedies, as default rules. So far, the
common law has taken a pragmatic approach, having developed doctrines, standards and rules for every particular
remedy, and found no need to bind them all under one theory.
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is necessary to present a brief history of the evolution of tort law in the civil law and in the
common law. The historical presentation is placed in relation with modern evolutions in
philosophy and previous attempts in legal doctrine to introduce prevention into the abovementioned general framework.
The comparison of the way the law of torts evolved in time will show how the dominant
intellectual trend of the two legal traditions finds a correspondent in the emergence of preventive
remedies. Individualism generated highly effective remedies for private individuals in small
claims disputes that involve a very limited number of interests, whereas collectivism gave birth
to the highly-controversial precautionary principle, a principle which applies for catastrophic
damages, and serves to protect interests of entire collectivities. The result is of course a degree of
imbalance within each legal system analyzed in this study. When the emphasis is on
individualism, the precautionary principle is misunderstood. It is seen as unscientific, or
paralyzing.11 Though not the central object of this study, it is important to stress that the
precautionary principle, when properly understood, is in fact incredibly flexible and apt to solve
problems which involve large scale litigation and a great number of interests attached to a large
variety of particular preventive measures (and not just judicial, also legislative). On the other
hand, where the emphasis is on collectivism, the individual is often forgotten, and prevention is
at times confused with the application of the precautionary principle. The need to have individual
rights protected through preventive remedies is just as stringent as the need to protect collective
interests. Assessing risks when the interest is individual will most often fall on courts, and not on
other branches of the government. On the other hand, more often than not, it will be the
administration, or the legislature, who will be in charge of taking preventive measures to
safeguard the population or large communities from major risks, not courts.
11

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003), at 1003.
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There is however, a place for judge-made law and a theoretical and normative basis for
the enforcement of general duties by way of preventive remedies within the law of torts. Chapter
VI is aimed at promoting a dynamic analysis of the law in the area of preventive remedies, in
order to explain the role of a default or gap-filling set of rules for prevention in the law of torts.
Guidelines and standards are proposed, at least in embryonic form, in order to connect the dots
and establish functional unity in this area of tort law. The key for understanding civil liability,
and for the understanding of prevention in this area of the law, has been a reflection on the
nature and perception of time, events and human interaction. Liability will be characterized as
preventive because the decision-making process anticipates injury. The judge's position on a
causation timeline is of immense importance in distinguishing preventive from compensatory
remedies or sanctions. Not only does it dictate what kind of remedy will be made available
(remedies are preventive only when the preventive effect is the direct consequence of an action
in court that anticipates injury), it also mandates transformations in the way a judge has to
perceive the facts and the evidence of a case. In cases of preventive remedies, judges must be
made aware not only of facts which prove events from the past, but also facts and circumstances
that will help them assess risk and anticipate events (through risk assessment techniques).
The shared jurisprudential experience from the common law and the civil law brings a
fresh perspective as to how to assess the jurisprudence and how to adapt our theoretical models
in order to provide real guidance for decision-makers.
The decision-making process of applying preventive remedies has many particularities
which need to be explored. Perhaps the most essential characteristic of these remedies is their
temporal application, since they are applied in order to anticipate damage. Theoretical models
need to introduce time into the equation when discussing preventive remedies. The introduction

10

of time and the dichotomy between prospective and retrospective liability are the key pillars for a
purposive and dynamic theory of prevention in the law of torts. A model focused on the citizen
will reveal the basic architecture for a renewed theory of tort liability which is both prospective
and retrospective, placing prevention and compensation on an equal footing as goals of civil
liability. However, this study is only painting a rough picture of this model. It draws the basic
lines, but leaves many gaps to be filled by a more detailed analysis of the case law.12
The two major western legal families, the civil law and the common law, are now slowly
filling the gap of prevention, each one in a different way and in accordance with their own legal
traditions. The pace, however, is very slow, and therefore there is still immense room for
imagination and innovation in this field. The direction the law will take within each legal system
is in large part unpredictable and can still be influenced (doctrinally, jurisprudentially, and even
through legislative enactment).

12

The basic hope of every theoretician is that the details will fill the gaps rather than collapsing the structure
altogether. Time and experience will be the test for the practical side of the model, and, unless it will remain
completely ignored, doctrinal dialectic will refine or destroy its abstract foundations.
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CHAPTER II
Redefining Liability
A. The preventive function of liability
In theoretical writings, prevention as a function of tort law and preventive remedies as its
direct expressions have been overshadowed by compensation—a function so pervasive that it
had been for a long time almost identified with tort law itself.
While tort law doctrine, both in the civil law and the common law, has always
emphasized the function of compensation,13 prevention has been mentioned only by a handful of
authors,14 but many times it was either cross-dressed as compensation (or reparation15), or

13

Older doctrine or more traditional contemporary authors, particularly French civilians, see compensation as
essential in the law of torts. See, e.g., MAZEAUD & CHABAS, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL. OBLIGATIONS. THÉORIE
GÉNÉRALE 349 (8th ed., François Chabas ed., Montchrestien 1991); MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 6 TRAITÉ
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 639 (2nd ed., Paul Esmain ed., L.G.D.J. 1952). Common law authors,
particularly in the U.S., always analyze compensation as the most important of the functions of liability, but
generally add alongside compensation deterrence, punishment or vengeance, and economic efficiency. See WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 6, 9, 23 (4th ed., West 1971); DAN B. DOBBS, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS 17-21 (3rd reprt.,
West 2004); DOMINICK VETRI, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE, JOAN VOGEL & LUCINDA FINLEY, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE
12 (2nd ed., LexisNexis 2002); VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 7-9 (2nd
ed., Carolina Academic Press 1999).
14
See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND & R. F. V. HEUSTON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS 28 (19th ed., R.F.V. Heuston &
R.A. Buckley ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1987); MICHAEL A. JONES, TEXTBOOK ON TORTS 1 (3rd ed., Blackstone Press
Limited, London 1986). GLANVILLE LLEWELYN WILLIAMS & B. A. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 23
(Butterworths 1976); PERCY HENRY WINFIELD & JOHN ANTHONY JOLOWICZ, ON TORT 3 (10th ed., W. V .H. Rogers
ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1975); Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 579-580; Thibierge, Libres
propos, supra note 7, at 583; MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN, 2 DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS. RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET
QUASI-CONTRATS 42-47 (2d ed., Thémis 2010); Philippe le Tourneau, Responsabilité (en général), at no. 240
(Published as part of the RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, Dalloz, last updated 2012); PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU ET AL.,
DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET DES CONTRATS. RÉGIMES D’INDEMNISATION 879-880 (9th ed., Dalloz 2012-2013).
15
For preventive remedies disguised as reparation in natura, see infra Ch. IV, Part B.2. “Reparation” is a term
which has been used in Scottish law, and sometimes by English authors, and preferred to compensation. See
WILLIAMS & HEPPLE, supra note 14, at 26; MAURICE ALFRED MILLNER, NEGLIGENCE IN MODERN LAW at 231
(Butterworths 1967). The Scottish “reparation” seems to be a synonym to the French réparation. In civilian
language, the term is preferable to “compensation”. It is important to note that there is no perfect equivalence
between the term “compensation” (spelled identically in French) and “reparation” (réparation). The French
réparation is a broader concept. Compensation refers to situations where a sum of money is paid, whereas
reparation includes both remedies in natura (for example, repairing a thing which has been damaged by an illegal
act), and money compensation (réparation par equivalent). GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 803-804 (8th
ed., Quadrige/PUF, 2007). Also, within French law, the term “reparatory function” is definitely preferable to
“compensatory function”, for the same reasons. However, in this study, especially in its comparative sections, or
where the discourse applies for all the legal systems presented, the concepts of “compensation” and “compensatory
function” are used interchangeably with “reparation” or the “reparative function”, both sets of terms being
understood in their broadest meaning.
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limited solely to the idea of deterrence, thus being reduced to a secondary or accessory
function.16 Influential names writing in the area of tort law have taken this conservative stance.
Both the general idea of prevention and especially direct prevention,17 as well as some of its
more specific expressions, like the precautionary principle, have been either ignored (by the
authors who see tort law as solely or mainly compensatory),18 or treated as synonymous with
deterrence.19 It is not uncommon, particularly in French doctrine, for some authors to fear a
potential pollution of the theoretical framework of civil liability (responsabilité civile) if the
preventive function is given its own space in the theory of tort law.20
Although only a few scholars are leading the movement towards a more open, prevention
oriented, general theory of tortious liability,21 courts have been applying preventive remedies for

16

See PROSSER, supra note 13, at 23; GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26-27, 68-129 (Yale University Press 1970) (Deterrence is for Calabresi only a subgoal of the principal
goal of reducing accident costs. Calabresi further divided deterrence into “specific prevention” and “general
prevention”. The former is based on the assumption that individuals can make proper choices based on what the
accidents costs or activities are and letting the market determine which activities are allowed and what are the
degrees of precaution which are reasonable for each particular activity. Id. at 69. The latter is based on the
antithetical assumption that individuals “do not know best”, and society will, at a collective level, make the
decisions regarding which activities will be allowed or regulate some specific activities, based not only on market
considerations, but also non-patrimonial interests and moral considerations. Id. at 96). ANDRÉ TUNC, LA
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 134-35 (Economica, 1981); GENEVIÈVE VINEY, INTRODUCTION À LA RESPONSABILITÉ 87-90
(3rd ed., L.G.D.J. 2008), part of the TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL (Jacques Ghestin coord.). The latter author, however,
does accept that a serious threat of injury can be assimilated to recoverable damage, and acknowledges that a duty of
prevention is intrinsic to fault-based liability. Id. at 156-58.
17
For the distinction between direct prevention and indirect prevention (deterrence) see infra p. 26.
18
See supra note 13.
19
Supra note 16.
20
That is probably why the Catala project rejected at the outset prevention as a function of civil liability, whilst
subordinating it to reparation, with a particular emphasis on reparation in natura. Supra note 5, at 148. Within the
same project, article 1369-1 only allows a judge to take measures to stop an illicit act when damage has occurred,
and threatens to become more serious, to repeat itself or to perpetuate. Supra note 5, at 161. Per a contrario, a judge
cannot intervene in other cases, as, for example, when a future damage is only threatened. Even more progressive
authors, who have been promoting a preventive action which does not require damage for a prima facie case, like
Professor Thibierge, prefer to take a cautionary route when discussing the issue and place prevention somewhere
outside the general theory of civil liability, in order not to disturb the long tradition of compensation-focused tort
theory. Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580.
21
Supra note 14.
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a very long time; only, ever so often, the remedies were deemed procedural, meaning that they
were treated outside substantial law, and definitely not a part of the general law of torts.22
More importantly, the minority of scholars who have been promoting the preventive use
of remedies also seem to have been influential and seem to have impacted recent jurisprudence.
A few lower French courts have started to implement these new doctrinal ideas, focused in
particular on the precautionary principle, in a few recent cases.23
In the common law, concepts of “preventive liability” in the abstract, or the precautionary
principle, are either rejected or not present in tort theory at all. However, the innovation and
flexibility of equitable remedies have been pushing forward prevention in the case law without
theorizing it as such, and with a great deal of success.24
There is, therefore, a discrepancy between the case law and the doctrinal discourse at the
moment. That is why the conceptual framework of prevention in the law of torts needs to pay
more attention to individual cases and preventive remedies which already exist, while
reassessing fundamental notions about the essence of legal responsibility, civil liability and the
application in time of civil remedies in the law of torts.
B. Terminology
There is great merit to be found in the writings of the authors who are still in the
minority,25 and much to gain from elaborating some of the ideas from these recent doctrinal

22

See especially, infra Ch. IV, Part B.3.
The most notorious cases cited in the literature as examples of such a preventive action have little support in
reason and do not convince. I refer here to the “relay antennas” cases, discussed in Ch. IV, Part B.1.
24
See Ch. IV, Part C.
25
Thibierge, supra notes 3 & 7; MATHILDE BOUTONNET, LE PRINCIPE DE PRECAUTION EN DROIT DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE (L.G.D.J. 2005); Cyril Sintez, La sanction préventive en droit de la responsabilité civile.
Contribution à la théorie de l’interprétation et de la misse en effet des normes (Doctoral Thesis, December 2009,
Université de Montréal); Except Cyril Sintez, the other authors focus on the precautionary principle when discussing
direct prevention. If the precautionary principle operates as a behavioral norm, the question arose in French doctrine
as to whether or not a “preventive action” can be introduced as an expression of this principle, in order to proactively intervene and safeguard the essential interests protected through the employment of the principle. This is the
23

14

writings. In civilian scholarship, a few French scholars are promoting a theory for preventive
remedies focused on a concept which they have termed “preventive civil liability” (in French:
responsabilité civile preventive). Professor Catherine Thibierge was the one to propose this
terminology for the first time.26 Inspired by this concept, other authors have later developed new
theories focused on prevention, particularly Professor Mathilde Boutonnet in her doctoral thesis
regarding the precautionary principle,27 and Cyril Sintez in his doctoral thesis about preventive
sanctions.28
While the substance of these scholarly works is extremely valuable, and has inspired
much my own work,29 I believe that such terminology should be avoided because it creates
confusion, at least if preventive liability is understood as a type of liability, to be distinguished
from liability in the traditional sense, which would be “compensatory” or “reparative”. 30 To term
liability as “preventive”, or “compensatory”, means to add an adjective which does not describe
liability, but the consequence of liability, which is the remedy.
It is ever more important to acknowledge the existence of remedies which are preventive
in nature and analyze their place in civilian theoretical construction, since the mere existence of

opinion sustained by Catherine Thibierge and Mathilde Boutonnet. Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra
note 3, at 581. BOUTONNET, supra, at 305, 345 et seq. However, according to Geneviève Viney, the majority of
contemporary French authors have an intermediate approach on the precautionary principle, which means that while
they do accept the normative value of the precautionary principle, they reject its application in a preventive action,
the scope of the principle being limited to fault based liability and the reparation of damage. Geneviève Viney,
Principe de précaution et responsabilité civile des personnes privés, D. 2007 (Dossier: “Principe de précaution”,
Christine Noiville coord.) at 1542, especially n.4.
26
Thibierge, Libres propos, supra note 7, at 562. The concept seems to have been phrased as such within a
workshop, by a student named Benoît, and Professor Thibierge kindly acknowledged the contribution. Id. at 562, n.
3.
27
BOUTONNET, supra note 25.
28
Sintez, supra note 25.
29
My own scholarship and research for the past two years has been a reaction to Professor Thibierge’s cogitations
on responsibility and civil liability, which I have found fascinating. I have been influenced by Professor Thibierge’s
thinking, and have tried to expand on some of her ideas, but I have also substantially deviated from her vision,
particularly with regards to the role of the precautionary principle in the area of direct prevention.
30
Thibierge, Libres propos, supra note 7, at 562.
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such remedies draws attention to a dysfunctional, although well established, definition of civil
liability.
Professor Thibierge shaped this concept, “preventive liability”, in a manner that would
not upset the traditional understanding of civil liability.31 The vast majority of authors writing
about the law of obligations in France have defined civil liability as “the obligation imposed by
the law to repair the damage caused” (by a personal act, something or someone).32 This
definition is almost sacrosanct in civilian literature, and has a well-established place in the
common law literature as well. Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “civil liability” as “the state
of being legally obligated for civil damages.”33
It is not easy to contest this definition, not necessarily because of a lack of convincing
arguments, but because of tradition. The extreme focus on the compensatory function of liability,
and the fact that the usual remedy afforded by the law is in fact the reparation of damage caused
(and usually through money compensation) have made this definition almost uncontestable.
Curiously, “liability” in general is defined in quite different terms. Looking again in
Black’s Law Dictionary, the definition of “liability” (in general) is “the quality or state of being
legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil
remedy or criminal punishment.”
31

Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580.
In the “Vocabulaire Juridique”, coordinated by Gérard Cornu, civil liability (responsabilité civile) is defined as
“the obligation to answer for damage caused to another person […]” (toute obligation de répondre civilement du
dommage que l’on a causé à autrui). CORNU, supra note 15, at 821. In the famous Leçons de droit civil, written by
the Mazeaud brothers and François Chabas, the definition is phrased in the following terms: “A person is civilly
liable when she is bound to repair a damage suffered by another” (Une personne est civilement responsable quand
elle est tenue de réparer un dommage subi par autrui). MAZEAUD & CHABAS, supra note 13, at 349. Other authors
also define civil liability as: “the obligation to repair the damage caused to another person” (La responsabilité civile
est l’obligation de réparer le dommage qu’une personne cause à un autre) PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS,
PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS 9 (Defrénois 2003). General dictionaries offer similar definitions for
the legal usage of the term in the civil law. See, e.g., PETIT LAROUSSE EN COULEURS 802 (Librairie Larousse 1972):
“Obligation to repair damage caused to another . . .”(“Obligation de réparer le dommage causé à autrui . . .”); 3
DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (PR-Z) 3211 (Alain Rey coord., Dictionnaires Le Robert,
2006), providing the same definition.
33
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed., Brian A. Garner ed. in chief, West 2004).
32
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Looking at French civilian terminology, the discrepancy is even more staggering. The
French term for civil liability is “responsabilité civile”. The word “responsabilité” evolved in
time into a polysematic concept.34 Yet, every sense of the word involves an actor who is
“answerable” for something that is within his control.35 That is why the most general
employment of the word is ethical. In ethics, an actor is answerable for all his actions,
irrespective of the positive or negative effects of said actions. Political responsibility and
juridical responsibility are just subcategories of ethical responsibility, if ethical responsibility is
understood in such a broad sense.36 The English language also employs the term “responsability”
with the same etymology and similar ethical overtones.37 The etymology of the word is roman,
as in re-spondere, from the roman word spondeo, which means “to promise”.38 Respondere
means the answer given to a promise.39 That is why a common dictionary definition of
“responsabilité” is “an obligation or moral necessity to answer, to vouch for one’s own acts or
the acts of others”.40 In philosophical works, ethical responsibility (responsabilité) is described

34

The term responsibility does not have a generally accepted meaning in philosophical works. PAUL RICOEUR, THE
JUST 11 (David Pellauer trans., University of Chicago Press 2000). The original philosophical usage of
“responsibility” was political. In modern European languages, “responsibility” comes into use toward the end of the
eighteenth century, within debates about representative government (government which is responsible to the
people). Garrath Williams, Responsibility, http://www.iep.utm.edu/responsi/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). The Oxford
English Dictionary cites the debates on the U.S. constitution in the Federalist Papers (1787), and the Anglo-Irish
political thinker Edmund Burke (1796), when discussing the etymology of the word. 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 742 (2d ed., J. A. Simpson, E.S.C. Weiner coords., Claredon Press 1989). Other thinkers like Stuart
Mill and Max Webber also discuss responsibility in political terms. Williams, supra note 34. The English term
“responsibility” has been employed as early as 1733 and precedes its French equivalent. 3 DICTIONNAIRE
HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (PR-Z), supra note 32, at 3211. The word “responsabilité” entered into the
French language in 1783 is derived from the older French word “responsable”, and influenced by the semantics of
the English equivalent. Id. The word “responsable”, first used as a noun (1284), and then as an adjective (since as
early as 1304) described the person that could be heard in a court of justice. Id. See also FABRE-MAGNAN, supra
note 14, at 34-35. “Responsibilité”, because of this dual influence, became a term of art in political science,
philosophy, and law, and the significance of the word varies according to the specifics of the subject matter.
35
See infra Ch. III Part. A.
36
Id.
37
13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 742; WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1005 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1984).
38
Thibierge, Libres propos, supra note 7, at 573. FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 14, at 34.
39
Thibierge, Libres propos, supra note 7, at 573.
40
http://www.larousse.com/en/dictionnaires/francais/responsabilit%C3%A9/68694 (Last visited Apr. 12, 2013)
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either a reaction of conscience, which operates internally, or a reaction from the outside world
(another person, or society in general), to a certain act.41 The internal or external reaction helps
characterize an act as being praiseworthy or blameworthy, and is always triggered by a choice
made by the actor.42
Civil liability, or responsabilité civile, is nothing else but a part of legal responsibility,
which is the legal expression of responsibility. We will see in a later chapter how moral
responsibility and legal responsibility interplay.43
The English term “tort” also has strong ties to ethics. Tort is derived from the Latin tortus
which means “twisted”, or “wrong”.44 A tort is a civil “wrong”,45 a behavioral deviation for
which someone is legally responsible. In the common law, a “wrong” is a breach of a preexisting
duty, on the one side (the active side), and an infringement of another person’s right on the other
(the passive side).46 Rights and duties precede torts, and a person commits a wrong only when its
behavior deviates from a norm, thus breaching a preexisting duty.47
Going back to the traditional definition of “civil liability”, as defined above—“an
obligation to repair damage”—such a definition creates confusion between the concept of
responsibility and the consequences of responsibility (in the legal sense). To say that civil
liability is the obligation to repair damage is to mistake civil liability with one of its remedies.
Generally, a person is civilly responsible for her personal actions, acts of other persons (liability
of employers for their employees, parents for their minor children), animals, or for the guard of

41

See infra Ch. III, Part A.
Id.
43
Infra Ch. III, Part B.
44
PROSSER, supra note 13, at 2; ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 2 (Oxford University Press 2007).
45
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (13th ed., Stevens and Sons Ltd. 1929).
46
ERIC DESCHEEMAEKER, THE DIVISION OF WRONGS. A HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 2 (Oxford University
Press 2009); STEVENS, supra note 44, at 2.
47
Id. at 19.
42
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one’s things.48 To say that one is responsible for damage is to say that one is responsible for the
consequences of an action, and not for the action itself. We are responsible for what causes
damage, and not for the effect (damage itself).
It is also important to observe how the traditional definition of liability influenced legal
thinking in the law of torts, particularly in France.49 There is more than just logical inconsistency
in a definition that binds tort law to its compensatory remedies to the point where the two
become identical. The flaw goes deeper into the perception French authors have about the
fundamentals of civil liability. Not only does such a definition create confusion between
responsibility and its effects, it goes to the heart of the most basic question of any tort regulation:
any system of civil liability must solve “the conflict between the protection of legal interests and
freedom of action.”50 When discussing compensation only, the solution to this conflict is given
by the interplay between the general rule, which must be that “losses lie where they fall,” and the
exception, which is compensation. The general rule should be the starting point of tort analysis,
even if its field of operation is severely reduced by the exception. Civil liability must be based on
some convincing foundation, “a specific legal basis”,51 be it fault, risk, garantie, or some other
conceivable foundation. The existence of damage is never enough. It is true that this way of

48

At least one French author has identified this finesse in language. Professor Muriel Fabre-Magnan, in a volume on
civil liability and quasi-contracts, begins Part I, dealing with tort liability, with this enlightening sentence: “to be
liable (or civilly responsible) means to assume the consequences of one’s act, one’s choices, and account for such
acts or choices” (être responsable, c’est assumer les conséquences de ses actes, de ses choix, et en rendre compte).
FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 14, at 5.
49
This influence is almost non-existent in the common law. The common law of torts is much more actor-centered
than the French responsabilité civile, and the focus on the compensatory function, where it exists, is driven by
practical purposes (since most tort cases involve money compensation), and not by some theoretical inclination that
favors compensation.
50
K. LARENZ & C.W. CANARIS, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, fragment translated in WALTER VAN GERVEN,
JEREMY LEVER, PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW at 15 (Hart Publishing 2000).
51
Id.
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thinking is not common in the French literature,52 but the principle underlies French law as well
as any western legal system. The French do not ask for reparation, for instance, in cases of
lawful competition, even though the actions of creating competition intentionally generate
damage to the competitors.53 There is also no compensation when, in case of a nuisance, the
disturbance is not abnormal (is tolerable). There is no compensation to be had when a man
marries a woman loved by another.54 There is no foundation to ask for compensation in such
cases, and therefore no liability, although there is damage (a loss).
Going back to the definition of liability, the most important point which needs to be
emphasized is that the obligation to repair damage is the consequence of civil liability, and not
liability itself. The obligation to repair damage is just one of the remedies created by the law for
situations when a legally recognized interest is violated. Underlining the remedy, there is always
another preexisting duty or a set of preexisting duties,55 which are indeed central to the notion of
liability. These duties are infinitely diverse, but there is a way of identifying them: they are
always correlative to legally recognized interests and rights.
The law of torts is as much a law of rights, as it is a law of duties, and a law of wrongs, as
it might be suggested by its terminology.56 The “wrong” is necessarily a moral wrong, in the

52

Olivier Moréteau, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a French Perspective, Chapter I, at 1 (May 13, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
53
TUNC, supra note 16, at 24. In a capitalist economy, losses occurring as a result of lawful competition are actually
desirable, and the law encourages lawful acts of competition. JONES, supra note 14, at 2.
54
A very similar example is given by André Tunc. TUNC, supra note 16, at 24.
55
I avoid using the term “obligations” in this context, since the preexisting duties which exist in the law of torts are
general and there is no determinable active side, an obligee. However, there is at least one great French author that
believed that liability in tort is premised in a preexisting “obligation”, and the breach of said obligation gives rise to
a claim for the reparation of damage. PLANIOL & PIPERT, supra note 13, at 642.
56
STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, 1 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 32-34 (The
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1983); DESCHEEMAEKER, supra note 46, at 2, 17. STEVENS, supra note 44, at
2. Another author has made the argument that the law of torts is becoming more of a law of rights, rather than a law
of wrongs. WARREN A. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 5 (University of Nebraska Press 1954). What the latter
author is trying to emphasize is that rights are being protected with more vigor nowadays than in the past, and the
conditions of liability are often relaxed. That does not mean however, that the law of torts is moving away from the
concept of wrong (moral wrong). The unjustified infringement of a right is always a wrong. Moreover, a theoretical
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deontological sense—a breach of a preexisting duty. Some common law authors embraced this
way of thinking, by arguing that both negligence and strict liability cases are premised upon a
breach of a preexisting duty.57
There is a great variety of rights and interests which are protected by the law of torts, and
specific duties can be identified and attached to each one of these rights. These preexisting duties
are not only identifiable on a case by case basis,58 but the vast majority of them can also be
generically united under one overarching duty: the duty to take precautions (which is the same as
the duty of care, specific for negligence).59 This duty can be found as the correlative of an
indeterminate amount of recognized rights. It will be showed in a future chapter that modern
philosophy is pointing out the fact that responsibility can no longer be limited to what man has
influenced causally.60 Society today must also hold persons responsible for what can be
influenced causally. The duty to take precautions is deeply rooted in the concept of liability and
has been part of fault based liability61 and perhaps can play a part even in explaining strict
liability schemes.62

system where rights are opposed to duties (not wrongs), and a wrong is both a violation of a right and a breach of the
correlative duty, seems to describe the common law of torts in a more logical and consistent manner.
57
See, e.g., JONES, supra note 14, at 231; Professor Robert Keeton described strict liability in terms of “conditional
fault”. Robert Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 418 (1959). Explaining this
concept, he makes the argument that strict liability can be justified as a matter of social morality, that the common
sense of morality would find activities generative of risk blameworthy if the person taking a profit from such
activities would not compensate those who do suffer as a consequence of the risky activity. Id. at 419-20.
58
An exercise which is not of much use in the law of torts, unless the duty has some specific content (like, for
instance, the duty to inform patients about specific risks of a medical procedure).
59
“To take care” and to “act with caution” are conceptually connected with the etymological root of the word
“precaution”. The word is the English equivalent of the French word précaution (12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 309), which, in turn, has a Latin origin. The Latin word precautio means “measure of
prudence”, and the earliest meaning of the French word précaution was “to act with prudence”. 2 DICTIONNAIRE
HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (F-PR) 2898 (Alain Rey coord., Dictionnaires Le Robert 1998).
60
Infra p. 36.
61
Be it based on subjective fault, objective fault, traditional common law breach of duty analysis, or the Hand
formula for negligence.
62
The “best decider” doctrine formulated by then-Professor Guido Calabresi is quite a good example on how to base
theories of strict liability on the duty to take precautions. According to his theory, the best decider is held strictly
liable not only in cases where he could have taken reasonable precautions but didn’t, but also in cases where he
could not have taken reasonable precautions or the required precautions were not feasible or economically

21

Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this study, the general duty to take
precautions is essential for the imposition of preventive remedies; it is an a priori premise for a
preventive remedy.
The term “precautions” needs to be understood in its broadest sense. In this broad sense it
is overlapping substantially with the general duty of care and can be seen both as an affirmative
and a negative duty. The duty to take precautions in its negative formulation is the correspondent
of the roman principle neminem laedere, in the sense that one must refrain from conduct which
might harm the legally protected interests of another. On the other side, the duty to take
precautions in the affirmative mandates the actor to act in order to minimize a risk either created
by him or a risk that is under his control.
Compensatory and preventive remedies come into play when a person is found in breach
of this duty to take precautions. The obligation to take precautions can be found more or less
intense depending on the factual circumstances, or depending on the legal system that is being
analyzed. If under traditional tort analysis the breach of a preexisting obligation was remedied by
way of imposing a new obligation (to repair the damage caused) the case law shows that the
breach of a legally imposed duty to take precautions can be remedied even before damage occurs
(ex ante). That is what must be understood by “preventive remedies”.

advantageous. This would create an incentive on the“best decider” to develop an effective precautionary measure in
the future. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward A Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1071
(1972).
The content of the duty to take precautions is future-oriented and that allows such a theory to infer that one would
have not only the obligation to take precautions in the present, but also to devise a more effective way of preventing
harm in the future (a duty to come up with efficient precautions in the future). Taking Calabresi’s best decider rule,
coupled with the duty to take precautions, to a more general level might explain the choice to move towards strict
liability regimes in the French legal system in cases that involve accidents. Thus, liability for things under one’s
guard, or the liability of employers for the acts of their employees, can be explained on the basis of an obligation to
take precautions in the future, itself an expression of a sort of general “best decider rule” (the foundation being the
power to control the risk in these examples).
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Based on the considerations presented above, an alternative tentative definition for civil
liability could be offered in order to encompass both preventive and compensatory remedies: 63
Civil liability can be defined as legal responsibility for the breach of a preexisting duty,
imposed by the law and enforceable by way of civil remedies (sanctions).
This definition encompasses under the term “civil remedy” compensation, reparation in
natura of damage64 and, in the legal systems where they exist, even punitive damages, and, of
course, preventive remedies. It is a definition that promotes functional diversity; compensation,
prevention and punishment are all encompassed in such a definition.
Of course, an objection that can be raised against such a definition is the fact that it does
not encompass the whole area that is today described as “civil liability”, particularly in France.
There are many situations in which the French legal system prescribes that compensation is to be
granted even though no moral wrong can be identified, and the actor cannot be expected to take
the required precautions in order to fulfill his legal duties (as it is in the case of responsibility of
minors and interdicts for their own acts65) or in which compensation will be granted without
looking into the illicit character of an act or by stretching the conditions of liability beyond the
limits of individual responsibility (as it is in the case of liability for accidents caused by motor
vehicles66 or, more recently, when the Court of Cassation decided that the defect of a vaccine can

63

And in the common law, punitive remedies (punitive damages).
At French law, the remedy is actually the creation of a credit-right in the patrimony of the victim the moment all
elements of a tort action are present. The credit right is correlative to a new obligation, which replaces the
preexisting obligation to take precautions—the obligation to repair the damage caused to the victim. The action in
court is in fact recognizing the existence of the obligation to repair damage, which at the end of the trial becomes
liquidated (when the judge evaluates and establishes the amount of damages), and can be enforced by ordinary
means of execution. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES EFFETS DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ 140 (2nd ed.,
L.G.D.J. 2001), part of the TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL (Jacques Ghestin coord.).
65
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 414-3 (Fr.) (former art. 489-2), as interpreted by the Court of Cassation in Cour de
Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] ass. plén., May 9, 1984, D. 1984 Jurisp. 525 (note François
Chabas); RTD. Civ. 1984, at 508 (obs. Jérôme Huet); JCP 1984, II, 20255 (note N. Dejean de la Bâtie); JCP 1984,
II, 20256 (note Patrice Jourdain); JCP 1984, II, 20291 (rapport Fédou).
66
Loi 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l'amélioration de la situation des victimes d'accidents de la circulation et à
l'accélération des procédures d'indemnisation [Law nr. 85-677 of July 5, 1985, aimed at improving the situations of
64
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be inferred from presumptions, presumptions which at the same time serve to establish the
causation element67). It should be clear that these situations no longer have anything to do with
liability, or responsabilité. French jurists seem to have developed an “ideology of reparation”68
(compensation), and the situations described above have gone so far from the concept of liability
or civil responsability, that now these circumstances give rise to a veritable obligation to repair
damage, irrespective of responsibility. It is compensation without responsibility (compensation
sans responsabilité).69
Having defined civil liability and having distinguished it from compensation, the next
step is to define preventive remedies:
Preventive remedies can be defined in the law of torts as coercive mechanisms designed
to reduce or avoid future harm, created by the law for the protection of legally recognized
interests and directed against a person who is civilly liable for failing to take the required
precautions in order to safeguard legally recognized interests of another.

victims of traffic accidents and the acceleration of compensation procedures], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 6, 1985, p. 7584.
67
Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1 e civ., Sept. 26, 2012, D. 2012 Somm. 2853 (note
Jean-Sébastien Borghetti); D. 2012 Actualités 2304 (obs. I. Gallmeister); See also Olivier Moréteau & AlexandruDaniel On, France (report), in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2013 (forthcoming, Ken Oliphant & Barbara C. Steininger
eds., De Gruyter 2013). See also Christophe Radé, Causalité juridique et causalité scientifique: de la distinction à la
dialectique, D. 2012 Chron. 112.
68
FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS 679 (9th ed., Dalloz
2005), part of the PRÉCIS Series, citing Louis Cadiet and Denis Mazeaud for this phrase.
69
There are even a few cases where the Court of Cassation went beyond the limits and conditions of civil liability in
order to force the hand of the legislator to intervene and create a compensation scheme, usually based on national
solidarity, a famous example being the Perruche case. Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters],
ass. plén., Nov.17, 2000, D. 2001 Jurisp. 332 (note Denis Mazeaud & Patrice Jourdain); D. 2001 Somm. 2796 (obs.
Fanny Vasseur-Lambry); See also D. 2001, at 316 (concl. orales Jerry Sainte-Rose); and subsequently, the Law
of March 4, 2002 (Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du système de santé
[Law nr. 2002-303 of March 4, 2002, regarding the rights of patients and the quality of the healthcare system],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 5, 2002, p. 4118).
Also, before the law of July 15, 1985 (supra note 66), the Court of Cassation forced the hand of the legislature for an
intervention in the area of traffic accidents through its decision in the Desmares case. Cour de Cassation
[Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e Civ., July 21, 1982, D. 1982 Jurisp. 449 (with conclusions by Jean
Carbonnier & note by Christian Larroumet). See also Jean-Luc Aubert, L’arrêt Desmares: une provocation… à
quelles réformes?, D. 1983 Chron. 1.
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Preventive remedies are an expression of the preventive function of civil liability, but
need not be confused with it. They are means of protecting legally recognized interests and,
sometimes, appear as a form of coercion, preventive in nature, designed to eliminate or reduce
the effects of an act which infringes upon those legally recognized interests.
The preventive function of liability is a more general and abstract notion. Preventive
remedies are only one of many expressions of the preventive function of tort law. Compensatory
liability (in the form of damages) can also function preventively, through its deterrent effect. The
threat of liability inhibits tortfeasors from committing torts in the future. Generally, all actions in
tort, including those aimed at compensation or punishment, have the purpose of preventing
future harm, only most of the time this goal is achieved indirectly, through the fear of future
liability. From this standpoint, what distinguishes preventive remedies from remedies which are
compensatory in nature is the fact that the coercive apparatus of the state intervenes a priori to
the occurrence of harm, and thus prevention is not mediated. This can be called direct
prevention, as opposed to deterrence (indirect prevention).70

70

Cyril Sintez uses similar terminology to express the same idea. He employs the terms “mesures de prévention
directe” and “mesures de prévention indirecte”. Sintez, supra note 25, at 51-55. A good translation of this would be
“measures of direct prevention” and “measures of indirect prevention”. What differentiates them, in the author’s
view, is the fact that direct measures of prevention are directed against the fact which can potentially generate
damage, whereas indirect measures of prevention operate on the situation that can generate the fact which can
potentially generate damage. Id. at 51. Therefore “direct” and “indirect” describe how preventive measures operate
on the facts which generate liability. Direct prevention measures can also be analyzed as mechanisms of enforcing
the duty to take precautions in a more direct manner (the duty to take precautions becomes an obligation to take
precautions, with a determined active and passive side, which becomes liquidated when the court makes its
decision), as opposed to deterrence (where the sanction is aimed at correcting the effects of breaching the duty to
take precautions, i.e., the breach of the duty to take precautions creates an obligation to repair the damage caused
which is enforced by coercion, and not an obligation to take precautions; it is the fear of liability that creates a
preventive effect, by providing an incentive to take preventive measures privately).
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CHAPTER III
Responsibility,
Freedom and Human Power
A. Moral responsibility
Having previously seen how etymologically the civilian concept of “civil liability” and
the common law term “tort” both have ethical overtones and are expressions of a more general
concept—that of “responsibility”—it is worth exploring its potential for expansion, as well as its
conceptual limitations.
The law of “torts” or “civil liability” deals with the legal responsibility of individuals,
within the civil law (as opposed to criminal law).71
In order to justify the aforementioned proposition for a new definition of civil liability72
and include preventive remedies in the realm of tort law, two things must be verified: first,
whether the concept of liability has within itself the potential for such an extensive domain; and
second, if preventive remedies exist, or could exist, in jurisprudence.
This chapter deals only with the first condition. The second condition is quite easily
demonstrated since such remedies have existed in the jurisprudence for quite some time.73
Responsibility is a fundamental ethical concept. Moral responsibility is an incredibly
complex issue and the philosophical questions which can arise have been exciting the minds of
many thinkers throughout history. What is it to be responsible? What does responsibility mean?

71

Responsibility can be moral (ethical), political, or legal. When addressing the legal responsibility of individuals
the term that is used is liability. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 1338. In this third sense, of legal
responsibility or liability, the concept is further divided into criminal and civil responsibility. MALAURIE, AYNÈS &
STOFFEL-MUNCK, supra note 32, at 9. Civil liability deals with liability imposed under the civil law, as opposed to
the criminal law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 933.
72
Supra p. 23.
73
For preventive remedies in jurisprudence see infra Ch. IV.
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Who can be considered a responsible person?74 What ought one be considered responsible for?
To whom must one answer?
It is important to note that some of the answers provided by moral philosophers have
been extremely influential on legal doctrine, especially when the central topic was prevention
and preventive remedies.75
First and foremost, in order to understand the connection between prevention and
responsibility, the questions which need an answer are “what is responsibility?” and “what is one
responsible (answerable) for?”
Even though the term “responsibility” is relatively and surprisingly modern,76
philosophers have been concerned with issues of responsibility throughout history. The concept
of responsibility is so closely connected to the issues of human condition, right and wrong,
consciousness, and individual freedom. Therefore, invariably, philosophers discussing these
issues, either directly or indirectly, struggle with questions of responsibility, perhaps even
without defining the issue as such.
It is also quite difficult to find common ground in philosophical thinking for a generally
accepted definition of moral responsibility since this concept is influenced so much by the
74

Commonly described as the issue of “moral agency”; Williams, supra note 34.
For instance, Catherine Thibierge relies on the writings of Paul Ricoeur, Friederich Nietzsche and Hans Jonas.
These philosophers are cited in Catherine Thiberge’s leading articles on preventive tort liability, alongside other
books and articles analyzing the moral concept of responsibility. Thibierge, Libres propos.., supra note 7, at 563,
footnote 5; Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 577-78. Professor Thibierge connected these
philosophical ideas to the need of reforming tort theory and expanding it in order to encompass prevention. It is
worth mentioning that for Professor Thibierge, the intellectual source for preventive tort liability is the concept of
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subjective views taken by philosophers over the subject of morality as a whole. However, this
does not render the concept of responsibility completely elusive. One can identify a common
architecture and the coordinates for what moral responsibility is. In accordance with its
etymology, a person is considered responsible when he or she has to answer for his or her
actions.77 In order to answer for an act, a person must first assume the act as his own, which
means that an a priori condition of responsibility is freedom, or the possibility to make a choice
between different courses of action.78
What is perhaps less obvious is the fact that freedom, defined this way, is synonymous
with power. The possibility to make a choice implies the power to causally influence events.
Freedom and power are thus the a priori coordinates of responsibility. Modern philosophy tends
to emphasize the element of power, while freedom was at the center of classical works and the
philosophy of the enlightenment. That does not mean that this would create a dissociative
approach, because the two concepts can be used interchangeably and differ only based on the
perspective used to look upon the problem. Freedom is an internal element, it is actor-based.
Power is external and relational—it puts the actor in relation with the rest of the world.
On the second question (“what are we responsible for?”), a classification regarding the
concept of responsibility is also essential to the understanding of its potential scope: the
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dichotomy

between

“retrospective

responsibility”

and

“prospective

responsibility.”79

Retrospective responsibility describes ex-post assumption or assignment of responsibility.80
Human actions are analyzed retrospectively in order to determine their qualities as “good” or
“bad”, “praiseworthy” or “blameworthy”.81 Prospective responsibility, on the other hand,
precedes the act under analysis, or operates ex ante. It deals not with what should have been
done, but what has to be done.82 Retrospective responsibility operates uno ictu, in the sense that
it is analyzed on a case by case basis, whereas prospective responsibility is generic, describing a
“sphere of responsibility,”83 or the set of duties which rest upon the shoulders of the actor.
Again, these two notions seem to be two sides of the same coin, or different perspectives of the
same reality, since they converge at the moment when an act is performed. If the act is in
accordance to the preexisting duties, it will be praised as good, but if it is found in breach of a
preexisting duty, blame will be assigned. One recognizes the retrospective outlook on
responsibility when actions are described as good or bad, blameworthy or praiseworthy, and the
foundation for responsibility is described in terms of freedom. Prospective responsibility tends to
emphasize the sphere of duties, what people ought to do, and, most often, philosophical
discourse on prospective responsibility emphasizes power as its foundation.
A few words regarding some of the most influential thinkers speculating on the nature
and scope of moral responsibility and the systems which they have proposed is necessary.
Unfortunately, a truly elaborate discussion that would do justice to the great philosophers writing
about moral responsibility would not be feasible for the purposes of this study. A limited number
79
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of conclusions and reference to just a few of the great minds which have shone light on these
problems hopefully will suffice. All the authors mentioned below (Aristotle, Immanuel Kant,
David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Hans Jonas and Paul Ricoeur) have a key feature in common
which justifies the choice of presenting the traits of their moral philosophy: they have been
immensely influential philosophers, but they have also influenced legal science. 84 Also, within
their philosophical systems one can trace the fundamental doctrines of retrospective and
prospective responsibility.
Aristotle’s philosophical inquiries regarding the human condition and ethical behavior
from the Nicomachean Ethics have been both enduring and influential over the course of time.
Although the term responsibility was unknown at the time when he was writing, Aristotle was
trying to find answers to the questions “what makes a man good or bad?” and “what makes an
action good?” He believed the former question to be more fundamental since that “which makes
a man good”85 will also make him “do his own work well.”86 He believed a man becomes good
or bad according to certain states of character which are virtues (the good) and vices (the bad).87
It is within the very subtle connections between the states of character, on the one side, and
actions and passions, on the other, that one can trace a discussion on the nature and conditions of
responsibility in the works of Aristotle. The subject’s possibility and capacity to make choices as
to the passions he indulges in and the actions he performs is considered essential.88 After a
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choice is made by the actor, an action will be considered either blameworthy or praiseworthy. 89
This is precisely “retrospective responsibility”, as defined before.90 Aristotle built the
foundations of the theory of retrospective responsibility without ever naming it as such. And
there is more: notions of prospective responsibility are not absent from his analysis either.
Aristotle also states in the Nicomachean Ethics that “choice involves a rational principle and
thought,”91 or a “previous deliberation,”92 and the object of such deliberation are the “things that
are in our power and can be done” (emphasis added).93
With the risk of skipping more than two thousand years of philosophical thinking, within
the 18th century two brilliant philosophers, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, in very different
ways, and based on apparently contradictory systems of ethics, offered new insight into the
fundamentals of responsibility. Their theories marked a scission in the theory of action and
responsibility, because of the different outlook they had on responsibility: Hume—a naturalistic
and external perspective, whereas Kant—a rationalistic and internal perspective.94
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For David Hume, to hold a person responsible for an action is equated with what he
describes as the feelings of approving or blaming that person for performing a particular action.95
The nature of approval or blame is a very important point in Hume’s system of ethical
responsibility. In his words, “approbation or blame . . . is nothing but a fainter and more
imperceptible love or hatred.”96 To be responsible is therefore a matter of how another person
feels about the actions of the actor; it is a judgment from the exterior.97 However, Hume
considers that an act alone is not enough to trigger passions such as love or hatred, and therefore
there is something more which needs to be read into these actions, and that is intent, which
demonstrates a durable quality in a person—a trait of character:
“[It] is not enough, that the action arise from the person, and have him for its
immediate cause and author. This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be
a foundation for these passions. It reaches not the sensible and thinking part, and
neither proceeds from anything durable in him, nor leaves any thing behind it; but
passes in a moment, and as if it had never been. On the other hand, an intention
shews certain qualities, which, remaining after the action is perform’d, connect it
with the person, and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other.”98
Hume dismissed reason as a source for the human conscience and as a basis for morality,
through his famous phrase “Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a
principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.”99 He also recognized that duty is an element of
morality which cannot be disregarded, as men often act according to what they consider to be
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their duty,100 but did not give any real importance to it. For him, duty was not an imperative, nor
was it eternal,101 and he considered it too feeble to withstand the passions of a human being.102
Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, built a theory of morality which had completely
opposite starting points from Hume’s. For Kant, a morally responsible person is first and
foremost a human being equipped with reason, although, as he developed his theory over the
course of time, he accepted a place in his system for the sentient side of human beings.103 The
rational being, with an autonomous free will,104 he considered equipped to discover the moral
law, a set of principles of action which are abstract, identical for all human beings, and
discoverable by way of reason.105 He expresses this idea in a beautiful metaphor: “two things fill
the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe . . . the starry heavens above and the
moral law within.”106
As opposed to Aristotle and Hume, Kant’s theory of morality is centered on actions in
themselves, and not on human character, thus finding the question “when is an action good or
bad?” more fundamental than “when a person is good or bad?” Once again, his general principle
of action, called “the categorical imperative,”107 is masterfully phrased: “. . . act as if the maxim
of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.”108
Therefore the two pylons of Kant’s theory of morality are the individual, on the one side,
in the sense that it is focused on the person committing an act, as a rational and sentient being,
100
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and the action itself, which can be judged as good or bad. That is why Kant’s theory of morality
is apt to answer a fundamental question of responsibility with great implications for legal
responsibility as well: when is a person responsible for a particular action? In retrospective form,
Kant’s theory of morality reveals a responsibility which is centered on the subjective state of
mind of the individual performing an action. Kant believes that an action is not supposed to be
judged according to the consequences of the act, but according to the internal state of mind of the
person performing it.109 Kant thus develops the concept of (moral) imputability,110 which in the
legal domain would find an equivalent in the concept of fault. However, Kant’s theory has much
to do with the prospective side of responsibility, perhaps even more than his retrospective
analysis. He considers an action good or bad based on its relationship with the moral law. Moral
law establishes a set of absolute duties, and for that reason Kant’s entire theory is centered on
duty, on what a person ought to do.111 His views on retrospective responsibility must be read in
close connection with his deontological views. Kant considers that any state of mind and any
other purpose for an action other than the sense of duty (the awareness that a duty needs to be
respected and performed simply because it is a duty) will devoid the act of any moral worth.112
Kant was also preoccupied with the relationship of his deontological theory with the law.
He distinguished between moral duties and legal duties based on the source that imposes the duty
to an actor. Moral duties are self-imposed, are imposed by every rational and autonomous human
being to himself through reason, whereas legal duties are imposed from the outside by a
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legislator.113 But it is important to note that Kant saw law as coercive order, and for that reason,
the duties the legislator will proscribe and enforce externally are also in essence moral duties or
categorical imperatives, only they take legal form. Kant believed that all laws must find their
justification in reason.114 Kant’s moral law, just like natural law, is absolute and discoverable by
reason.115
Modern philosophers have been putting a stronger emphasis on the power element as an a
priori condition of responsibility.116 This allowed for the relational analysis of responsibility,
which is reflected in the philosophy of Hans Jonas and Paul Ricoeur. Both philosophers maintain
deontological and rationalistic views on responsibility, but detach themselves from Kant’s
individualism by adding solidarity and cooperation into the equation of responsibility.
Hans Jonas defined responsibility as “solicitude, accepted as a duty,”117 the object of
which is something that, because of its vulnerability, becomes worrisome for a human being. He
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believed that responsibility arises out of man's capacity to casually influence events.118 Also, his
theory is focused on the catastrophic occurrence, particularly if it is caused by human
intervention. He emphasized that under the pressure of the irreversibility of some processes and
the unprecedented speed of technological advancement, the essence of the human response to
this reality must also change,119 and he believed that a new science is needed in order to study all
the interdependencies of the modern world, based on a morality that focuses on prudence as a
value.120 Man’s capacity to influence the world around him has reached a point where he must be
responsible not only towards present persons, but also towards future generations and our planet
as a whole.121 Under such a theory, man is made responsible not only for his behavior, for what
he has influenced casually, but equally responsible for what requires his action,122 what he can
influence causally.
Paul Ricoeur goes further, and explicitly argues for a substitution of the retrospective
view on responsibility with one that is deliberately prospective, with the effect in the legal realm
of adding the idea of prevention for future harm to that of reparation for harm already done.123
Ricoeur noticed that the Kantian concept of responsibility, based on imputation of acts to their
authors comes under heavy attack in the modern age, both in the law and in ethics. 124 Moreover,
the concept of imputation has been displaced, according to Ricoeur, through a process which
began with the Critique of Practical Reason, with retribution (for fault).125 This allowed for the
proposition in legal doctrine that one is responsible for the effects of the action, not the action
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itself (for instance, in the much used phrase “responsibility for the damage caused”). 126 Other
developments in the law of civil liability, like theories of strict liability, eroded the idea of
imputation, although they further an important moral value—that of solidarity.127 But the most
important displacement took place in philosophical theory, where theories like the one advanced
by Hans Jonas promote a responsibility for others, not a responsibility for actions.128 Under this
view, an actor is responsible for “what is fragile”, something that is handed over to the “care” of
the agent.129 This extends the object of responsibility, but also its scope, since everything that is
in the agent’s power is subject to his duty of care, and once he acts, all the effects of the act
could be imputed to him (even if they stretch over future generations).130 True enough, if, as
Ricoeur hypothesizes, the phenomenology of initiative and intervention is based on
“interweaving” free causality with natural causality, 131 every action can be imputed to its author.
However, to impute every effect of the action, both in time and space, to the same, “would make
action impossible.”132 That is why he proposes a middle-of-the-road ethical responsibility:
“human action is possible only on the condition of a concrete arbitration between the short-term
vision of a responsibility limited to foreseeable and controllable effects of an action to the longterm vision of an unlimited responsibility.”133
The ideas reflective of retrospective and prospective responsibility, as they arise out of
the thinking of the abovementioned philosophers, ought not to be read out of the context from
which they arose (in the eyes of each philosopher they are parts of a complex ethical system,
each one distinguishable from the other). However, the fact that responsibility can be discussed
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both in retrospective and in prospective terms is a common occurrence which must not be
ignored. Finding that this dichotomy can be traced in philosophical writings all the way back to
the ancient Greeks (and Aristotle was a perfect example for this), then in the writings of the
enlightenment (Kant and Hume), and finally in modern philosophy (Nietzsche, Jonas and
Ricoeur), shows that the domain of ethics never lacked a forward-looking approach on
responsibility. That opens up the prospective avenue for those who find legal responsibility an
object for refection. There is tremendous potential for an expansive and forward-looking theory
in the law of torts.
B. The relationship between moral responsibility and civil liability
That being said, in order to transition to the second condition, and in order to place
preventive remedies within the ambit of tort law, as expressions of legal responsibility, it is
important to first see how moral responsibility and legal responsibility interplay, and how they
differ.
The interplay between law and morality in general, and between tort law and morality in
particular, is one that has divided doctrine for quite some time.134 The views shared throughout
this paper are that the law of civil liability is deeply rooted into moral law, which acts as a
primordial source, feeding the law of torts with its most valuable nutrients: the rules of right
conduct. Moreover, the body of knowledge developed within rational ethics can serve as an
epistemological source for a deeper understanding of the law of torts.135
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Although connected, law and morality need not occupy the same space. If responsibility
as an ethical concept deals with how a person is answerable for his/her actions in general—that
is, for all actions based on a choice—legal responsibility has a much narrower scope. First, legal
responsibility deals only with how a person is answerable in the eyes of the law. A person can be
morally responsible as a matter of internal conscience, in the eyes of society, or of God. 136
Second, legal responsibility deals with wrongful behavior, as a rule,137 whereas in ethics one is
responsible for every action based on choice, whether good or bad.
A further distinction comes into play when from the more general notion of legal
responsibility one moves to the particular subject of civil liability. Civil liability is opposed to
criminal liability, where the wrongful behavior, the offense, is directed against a social value of
great interest, and consequently the state itself.138 Civil liability deals only with a wrong directed
against other persons, against a value which pertains to the private sphere, be it individual or
collective. Therefore, civil liability is relational; it is based on a relation between persons. Ethical
responsibility can be non-relational; an action which is without consequence to state or particular
interests can be morally judged, but not legally.
Since the law of torts deals with relations between persons, both retrospective
responsibility and prospective responsibility need to be analyzed by way of relational language
and relational conditions. This has always been the case in the area of retrospective-reparative
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liability. The basic elements for a tort, as a general rule, both in the common law and in the civil
law, are a wrongful act, causation and damage.139 The cause is to be found in the act of the
tortfeasor, whereas the effect is suffered by the victim. Tort analysis is thus based on the relation
between the tortfeasor and the victim. On the other hand, in the area of prospective
responsibility, its relational character is not as obvious because it is only potential. If prospective
responsibility deals with the sphere of duties of an individual,140 the sphere of legal duties would
have to correlate with a sphere of rights. The problem is that the person holding the sphere of
rights is not determinable until the moment the tortious act occurs. One can, at best, determine a
set of potential victims, whose rights are under threat.
The size of the sphere of duties is determined by the power of the actor. We have seen
that the sphere of duties of a person in ethics is dependent upon the freedom and power of the
actor.141 Tort liability, just like responsibility in ethics, can be characterized as being in an
ontological relationship of direct proportionality with human power. 142 As the power of a certain
person or category of persons grows, its sphere of duties grows as well, either by taking on new
duties (a matter of quantity), or by having previous duties become more strict (a matter of
quality). There may be a need to re-emphasize that power in this context means the capability to
causally influence events based on a rational choice, and in this sense it is synonymous with
freedom of choice.

139

Negligence, or fault based liability, have the greatest level of generality, in both the common law and the civil
law. For the French civil law see, e.g., FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 14, at 85 et seq.; For a presentation of
negligence in the common law see, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 13, at 139 et seq.
140
Supra p. 29.
141
Supra Ch. III, Part A.
142
The latter is much broader and serves as a fundamental source for the former. See Thibierge, Libres propos,
supra note 7, at 575.

40

Understanding that the engine fueling the permanent expansion of liability is the
ontological direct proportionality relationship between human power and responsibility,143 both
ethical and juridical, brings about this very important realization: preventive remedies are not a
worthless sophistication in the law; their existence is a real necessity in today’s society. The
decisions taken by man (his rational choices), in today’s world, influence the lives of others in an
unprecedented manner. Many human actions today can have far-reaching effects, influencing the
life or health of many others, as well as the environment and our planet as a whole, and even
future generations.144
Power unfettered by responsibility would create within the legal system a severe
imbalance (between persons). In the law, ascribing responsibility to match the power of each
actor is, on the one side, equivalent to recognizing each person’s freedom, since true freedom
implies responsibility,145 and on the other hand, an expression of equality between men, as each
man’s duties must be proportional with his own power. If all men are unequal in power from the
moment of birth until their last breath, responsibility brings balance and acts as an egalitarian
counterforce. Responsibility is, even etymologically, a “response”.146 For every morally relevant
action, there must be an equal moral reaction.
The necessity to match responsibility with power already triggered a reaction, not only in
philosophy and legal doctrine, but also in the way the law evolved. Thus, the relationship
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RICOEUR, supra note 34, at 29: “Stated in terms of its scope, responsibility extends as far as our powers do in
space and time.” This relationship goes even further than the scope of responsibility. The mere existence of
responsibility is also dependent on the existence of power. If one were to accept the Kantian maxim (which, by the
way, is in consonance with Aristotle’s views on ethical behavior, at least as far as the requirement for freedom of
choice is concerned) that only a person endowed with a free will which expresses itself through its choices can be
made answerable for his/her acts, and if power is the capacity to causally influence events based on rational choice,
and responsibility can be assigned only to those who have freedom of choice, then responsibility will follow every
free choice.
144
Thibierge, Libres propos, supra note 7, at 566-68.
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As one author said: “Under conditions of a total lack of responsibility, there is no other limit than the law of the
jungle” (“Il n’y aura . . . dans une condition d’irresponsabilité, d’autre limite que celle de la loi de la jungle”).
SCHWARZ-LIEBERMANN VON WAHLENDORF, supra note 136, at 82.
146
See supra Ch. II, Part B.
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between human power and responsibility can be proven empirically, or at least can be inferred
from solid facts. Tort liability went through periods of rapid expansion after the industrial
revolution of the 19th century and the technological revolution of the 20th, in the sense that the
number of tort actions and actionable wrongs grew significantly. For instance, shifts from faultbased liability to strict liability in the French legal system considerably enhanced the domain of
actionable torts.147 In the common law the domain of strict liability remained rather narrow148 in
comparison to the French system, but the domain of actionable wrongs grew in other ways, by
recognizing new causes of action, like intentional infliction of emotional distress,149 or by
broadening the scope of existing causes of action.150 The reaction of course was not only
jurisprudential, but also legislative, with numerous statutes being adopted. In the U.S., such
examples of legislation adopted to respond to increased power include workers compensation
statutes, as well as numerous products liability statutes, or the Tort Claims Act and the Civil
Rights Act.151 In France—and other European states have done the same—many special laws
have been passed in order to cover the particularities of aeronautical accidents,152 nuclear
accidents,153 traffic accidents,154 products liability,155 etc. Also, the precautionary principle
147

Strict liability torts require no proof of fault, which means that recovery becomes easier for the victim by
comparison with fault based liability. For an in extenso presentation of the movement replacing fault with strict
liability in various areas of tort law in France see VINEY, supra note 16, at 33-42. For strict liability in U.S. law see
PROSSER, supra note 13, at 492 et seq. For English law, see JONES, supra note 14, at 231 et seq.
148
And with considerable differences between the United States and England. In England, the case law applying
strict liability rules is much more narrow, as it is the case, for instance, with abnormally dangerous activities, where
the courts have been very careful not to expand the ruling from Rylands v. Fletcher, as opposed to the United States,
where strict liability rules for abnormally dangerous activities are more general. Donal Nolan, Rylands v. Fletcher
and Fire in THE LAW OF TORT 979-80 (Andrew Grubb ed., Butterworths 2002).
149
MARSHAL A. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 29 (Oxford University Press 2012)
150
One good example is the evolution of products liability in the state of New York. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER,
JOHN B, OAKLEY & JEAN C. LOVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM. READINGS AND
CASES 124-139 (4th ed., West 2004).
151
See SHAPO, supra note 149, at 25-35. Professor Shapo makes a more detailed presentation on how increased
power of certain actors has influenced the development of tort law.
152
Art. L. 321-3 and L. 322-3 of the French Code of Civil Aviation (Code de l’aviation civile).
153
Nuclear accidents law in France is extremely complex and a series of legislative acts regulate the matter. For an
enumeration of these special laws see Viney, supra note 16, at 36, n. 50.
154
Loi 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985, supra note 66.
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received normative value in all the European Union member states after its implementation in the
Maastricht Treaty,156 and even constitutional value in France.157 These movements in the law are
all reactions to the need for the law to adapt to increased power.
C. Finding a domain for preventive remedies
If indeed civil liability can be seen both as retrospective (as it has been traditionally
viewed) and prospective, and if a general duty to take precautions can be seen as a general
preexisting duty imposed by the law to all persons capable of legal responsibility, then
preventive remedies would be mechanisms which are put in place in order to enforce this duty to
take precautions. They are coercive mechanisms and for that reason can be qualified as civil
sanctions.158 But, since even prospective liability is relational,159 whenever the duty to take
precautions is breached, a correlative right becomes determinable, and for that reason the above
mentioned sanctions can also be characterized as civil remedies.
A new question thus would arise. What are the consequences of this qualification? If
preventive remedies are coercive in nature that means that their application can only proceed
after the imperative of prevention is put in balance with the imperative of preserving the
individual freedom of the actor subject to sanction. The actor’s freedom of choice gives rise to
his responsibility, but his own personal freedom will also justify limits being put on the effects of
his responsibility. In other words, the law must find a right measure for the effects of
155

Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, O.J. (L 210 , 07 August 1985);
implemented in France through Loi 98-389 du 19 mai 1998 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits
défectueux [Law nr. 98-389 of May 19, 1998, regarding liability for defective products], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 21, 1998, p. 7744.
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Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, O. J. (C 325/5; 24
December 2002).
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Loi constitutionnelle 2005-205 du 1 mars 2005 Loi constitutionnelle relative à la Charte de l'environnement
[Constitutional Law nr. 2005-205 of March 1, 2005, Constitutional law regarding the Environmental Charter],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 2, 2005, p. 3697.
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See also Sintez, supra note 25, at 237-46.
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Supra p. 39.
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responsibility. Precaution for the sake of precaution simply will not do in the world we live in. A
risk-free world is an illusion, and a very paralyzing one. That is why a nuance is necessary when
discussing the duty to take precautions. One’s duty to take precautions is not a duty to take all
possible precautions, but only to take reasonable precautions. There is unity and a connection
with reparative liability when looking at things from this perspective: the duty of care, as it is
presented by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson,160 as well as the duty to act like a bonus
pater familias (essential, in French law, to the notion of fault161), is fundamentally the same with
the duty to take reasonable precautions.162
This is, true enough, a return to fault based liability, 163 only this time stripped of the
damage element, or at least redefined so as to correspond to the purpose of anticipating damage
and reducing risks of damage. Liability based on the duty to take precautions would be triggered,
as a rule, whenever an actor fails to take reasonable precautions, thus generating an unreasonable
risk to somebody else’s rights, even if such a risk did not yet materialize into actual damages.
The scope of the preventive remedy sought would be to anticipate damage, and find the best
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Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] All ER Rep 1, 11, 18, 19; [1932] AC 562, 579, 580, 596 (per Lord Atkins);
HENRI MAZEAUD, LÉON MAZEAUD & ANDRÉ TUNC, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ
CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 494-495 (6th ed., Montchrestien 1965). The bonus pater familias standard
is, by its own language, more forward-looking than that of “a reasonable man”, as it projects a relationship between
generations. See Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law making in a Global World: From Human Rights to a Law
of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2007).
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Moreover, the duty of care and the standards of the reasonable man and the bonus pater familias are inherently
forward looking (perspective). The existence of the duty and/or its breach is determined by mentally transposing into
the actor’s shoes, so as to judge the reasonableness of his action and the foreseeability of said action’s effects. This
sort of judgment can only be made through an effort of imagination and empathy, an effort to gaze into the future,
the same way the actor should have, in the circumstances with which he was faced.
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Contra, see Sintez, supra note 25, at 454. Sintez believes that preventive sanctions can be applied irrespective of
fault, but one must be mindful that the sum of cases he analyses and which he considers examples of the application
of preventive sanctions, by including compensatory sanctions or punitive damages which act as a deterrent (indirect
prevention), go far beyond what I have qualified as a preventive remedy in this paper. Sintez, supra note 25, at 89137. If, as I believe is necessary, preventive remedies (sanctions) are narrowed down to those remedies which have
primarily a preventive purpose and do not operate indirectly, then there is no proof in the jurisprudence that liability
in these cases would ever be devoid of fault (or moral imputability, for that manner).
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means to avoid it by reducing the risk of harm back within reasonable limits or at least reduce the
amount of damages, when they cannot be prevented altogether.
The question that would remain is how can strict liability be explained if the general duty
in the law of torts is one to take reasonable precautions? In strict liability torts, since fault is not
an element, a person will be liable no matter how diligent such a person has been at the time
when the act causing damage occurred. The traditional justification was to base strict liability
torts on a presumption of fault, and thus reverse the burden of proof for fault. 164 Despite its
appeal, this explanation cannot stand if courts will not allow the plaintiff to prove that he has
taken all reasonable precautions (which would defeat the presumption).165 Strict liability theories
can have, however, a solid justification based on notions of prospective liability, and that is how
legal theory eventually evolved. Theories like professional risk, developed by Salleiles, 166 risk of
activity, developed by Josserand,167 or more modern theories based on control168 or “conditional
fault”169 take the emphasis away from the act which generates damage and puts it on the activity
creating the risk of damage as a whole.
What all the cases of strict liability have in common is the fact that the actor has power
over a complex activity which generates risks and assumes responsibility for these risks a
priori—when he initiates the activity. The actor is not responsible for the act which produces
damage individually, but for the activity as a whole, because he has assumed such a
responsibility as a condition for running the activity (the policy of the law being that the costs of
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As it is the case, for example, in France for liability for things after the Jand’heur case. FABRE-MAGNAN, supra
note 14, at 207-208.
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Id. at 111.
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liability will be internalized by him, and perhaps redistributed). Now, just because liability for
damages caused is assumed a priori, does not mean that in this case, the actor does not still have
a duty to take precautions. His obligation to repair damage which results from the created risks
does not exclude the general duty to take precautions; the two obligations coexist! The risk
generated by the activity must be kept at a reasonable level, and that is why preventive remedies
can be applied even in cases where strict liability reigns.170 Quite exceptionally, the law allows
unreasonably risky activities to run their course when, socially and economically, they produce
more benefit than harm.171 In those situations, the duty to take precautions has a very limited
scope, the prevailing duty being the duty to make compensation to every person injured as a
result of the activity.172 Strict liability schemes are essentially schemes of compensation, based
on an a priori assumption of a duty to compensate persons harmed by an activity. The duty to
take precautions is inherent to fault-based liability, but a person can cumulate the duty to repair
damage, assumed with the inception of the activity, with the general duty to take precautions,
although the latter is not as intensively enforced when a strict liability scheme is applicable.173
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WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 14, at 586; Contra see Ken Oliphant, The Nature of Tortious Liability in THE
LAW OF TORT 23 (Andrew Grubb ed., Butterworths 2002); Ken Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies in THE
LAW OF TORT 302 (Andrew Grubb ed., Butterworths 2002). Ken Oliphant is making the argument that when liability
is premised not on a wrong done, but on the actor’s wholly legitimate pursuit of a socially-desirable activity,
injunctions should not be imposed. While this is true for a prohibitory injunction that forbids the defendant to
continue the activity or severely impairs his capacity to operate or to continue the activity, or a mandatory injunction
with the same effect, the statement should not be generalized. A duty to take precautions subsists even if the activity
is one which is subject to a strict liability regime based on considerations of burden and benefit. While courts cannot
forbid the activity or severely impair its operation, they can use injunctions which would have the purpose of
bringing the risk created by the activity within reasonable limits. While it is true that a smart agent will take all
reasonable precautions in order to minimize the risk, thus reducing his operational costs, the hypothesis of an
unreasonable agent is not unfathomable, and in that case, coercion can be used in order to bring the activity within
the proper risk levels. Therefore, direct prevention and compensation are not wholly incompatible in strict liability
cases.
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should bear the cost of any resulting damage . . . .” Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E. 2d 31, 34 (N.Y. 1969).
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PROSSER, supra note 13, at 517.
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The duty to take reasonable precautions is normally in alignment with the economic interest of the actor, who is,
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Chapter IV
Preventive Remedies

A. Introduction
Preventive remedies174 can be found in the law today in a series of seemingly disparate
cases. Most of them have been used by courts for quite some time, without drawing much
attention from legal doctrine in the law of torts. Being employed more often and in many new
areas as we move further into the 21st century, preventive remedies are drawing increased
attention from legal scholarship, and the reasoning employed by courts when applying such
remedies is becoming more and more sophisticated.
Mapping the remedies and drawing a few parallels is a necessary step in order to see the
state of preventive jurisprudence in the law of torts today.
This chapter is organized in such a manner so as to reflect the categories and partial
generalizations which already exist in the common law. The risk that springs with the
employment of common law categories throughout this chapter is that the presentation of
preventive remedies from the French legal system might seem rather bizarre for the continental
reader. However, because the re-arrangement of the French cases is reflective of classifications
made within the common law, the present chapter partially satisfies175 the requirements of a
modern comparative approach based on functional equivalence.176

of doing business, provided, of course, that the cost of precautions is lower than the cost associated with the risk of
harm.
174
Defined supra (Ch. II Part B) as: “coercive mechanisms designed to reduce or avoid future harm, created by the
law for the protection of legally recognized interests and directed against a person who is civilly liable for failing to
take the required precautions in order to safeguard legally recognized interests of another.”
175
Partially, because at no point was this chapter intended to present all the preventive remedies from within the
three legal systems which have been selected. Some preventive remedies are not presented in this chapter at all, like
estoppel, which can work preventively when a court estops one of the parties from doing something that would be
damaging to the other. Also, there might be other remedies which might fit into some of the categories presented in
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Within the headings of “preventive action” and “reparation in natura of damage” are
included cases where a preventive measure is taken after a full trial and a complete record, thus
analyzing functional equivalents to permanent injunctions. What distinguishes the “preventive
action” from traditional reparation of damage in this respect is the fact that in the case of
preventive actions, there is no damage to be repaired, whereas in the case of reparation in natura,
the judgment aims both at repairing past damage and preventing future harm.
The procedure of référé is a functional equivalent of interim injunctions.
L’action déclaratoire is the functional equivalent of declaratory judgments (declarations
of right).
Under the heading of “private preventive expenses” the functional equivalents for selfhelp are analyzed, whenever self-help is used in order to avoid future damage.
What distinguishes injunctions and their equivalents on the one hand, and declaratory
judgments and self-help and their functional equivalents on the other, is the fact that in applying
this chapter and might have been overlooked—from property law, successions, civil procedure, or other areas of
private law. There are also many preventive remedies to be found in administrative decisions or in decisions taken
by administrative courts in France, which would be equivalent to some decisions taken as a matter of tort law in the
English or American common law. Since the purpose of this chapter is only to map the most important preventive
remedies in the law of torts and extract rules and standards from some of the most important cases, which will serve
as the basis for a theoretical a model for prevention (proposed in a future chapter), I hope the reader will excuse this
somewhat lack of thoroughness. On the other hand, the exposition of preventive remedies in this chapter might also
be seen as too broad, because later it will be demonstrated (Infra pp. 122-123) that only some of the preventive
remedies presented herein are mechanisms of direct prevention. Declarations of right are mechanisms of indirect
prevention, and self-help is, strictly speaking, not a preventive remedy at all. That being said, it does not follow that
these remedies ought to be, from the outset, removed from the practical analysis, since the way declarations of right
and self-help operate will give substantial insight as to who should be the default decision-maker, as well as the
methods used for the enforcement of the duty to take precautions, or as to the use of retrospective and prospective
notions regarding liability, and provides examples for the key distinction between preventive remedies and
compensatory remedies.
176
On equivalence functionalism see Konrad Zweigert, Des solutions identiques par des voies différentes (Quelques
observations en matière de droit comparé), 18 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ [hereinafter R.I.D.C.] 5
(1966); Béatrice Jaluzot, Méthodologie du droit comparé. Bilan et perspective, 57 R.I.D.C. 29, 39-41 (2005); John
C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 622-23 (1998); Günter Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 411, 428-29, 434-40 (1985); Mathias Reimann,
The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671,
679 (2002); James Gordley, The Functional Method in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Pier Giuseppe Monateri
ed., Edward Elgar 2012). See also Olivier Moréteau, Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits in
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS 419 (Jean-Claude Gémar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., Thémis 2005).
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injunctions the court order creates an obligation for the defendant if the plaintiff wins, but in
cases of declaratory judgments and self-help, court intervention is only declarative.
In France, as well as in England and the United States, many of the remedies presented
herein are well established in the law, only they have not been traditionally analyzed as part of
the bigger picture, as part of a cohesive theory on direct prevention in the law of torts. The
choice of selecting the common law as a model for the structure and organization of this chapter
was influenced by the inherent pragmatism which permeated this domain in English and
American legal thinking. The common law seems to have expended much more effort in regard
to categorizing preventive remedies, and trying to find unified standards within the categories
created. In France, the process of categorizing the law of torts has always been focused on
substance, on abstract concepts, such as subjective177 and objective liability,178 or on the nature
of the rights which are being protected, and the division between substantive law and procedure
seems to be more strict, at least when it comes to theoretical endeavors. Also, the doctrinal focus
on the precautionary principle, which is a rather specialized area of prevention, might have
hindered the search for general rules and common standards.
The categories created around preventive remedies may look like puzzle pieces for a
theory of prevention in the law of torts. Going through these cases presented herein, one would
only get a sneak peek into the general picture of prevention in the law of torts. However, there is
much to learn about the application of preventive remedies when going through the
particularities of each category of preventive remedies, as well as from the differences which
exist between the three legal systems under scrutiny.

177
178

Subjective liability (responsabilité subjective) is a synonym for fault-based liability.
Responsabilité objective, commonly translated as strict liability.
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That being said, an exhaustive presentation of all the cases would be both impossible and
counter-productive. As much as possible, I have indicated other jurisprudential rulings and have
tried to offer a few words on the general directions taken in the law with regard to preventive
remedies. Nevertheless, within each subheading, from the multitude of cases, some have been
singled out, but not necessarily because they give a feel of the legal system as a whole, but rather
because a valuable lesson can be extracted from each particular case selected. The important
differences between France, England and the United States, in this particular field, do not
necessarily regard the substantial rules or the pragmatic results, but the institutions, techniques
and specific ideologies.179 For example, the relay antenna cases must be seen as exceptions, even
within the French legal system. In France, in the bigger picture and most of the time, “preventive
actions” produce the same results as permanent injunctions. Singling out those cases was not
intended to be presented as a feature of how the French judiciary analyzes permanent preventive
measures in general. Valuable lessons can be learned from the relay antenna cases and the
jurisprudential evolution regarding those cases. Also, they are reflective of a certain mindset and
a philosophical approach on prevention which is peculiar when compared to what is happening
in U.S. or English law.
The case presentations were needed in order to discover the best way to bind preventive
remedies under common standards, with a common mathematics, and with common principles.
The scope of this chapter is not merely to catalog the remedies according to existent patterns and
categories (created or revealed already by legal doctrine or jurisprudence),180 but also place a
179

Professor Reimann pointed out that this is actually a general feature, and that comparativists generally are aware
that “the most fundamental differences (between legal systems—A/N) do not exist between substantive rules but
between institutions, procedures, and techniques.” Reimann, supra note 176, at 677.
180
For a more extensive presentation on the jurisprudence regarding prevention in the civil law see especially Sintez,
supra note 25. For English law see Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170. For U.S. law, the
Second Restatement of the Law of Torts offers a good overview on the case law applying injunctive relief.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW. TORTS 2d, at 556-628 (§ 933- 951).
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critical eye on some of the most important issues which come up in cases where preventive
remedies are sought.
B. Preventive remedies at French law
1. The preventive action (l’action préventive)
In France, the practical implementation of a philosophy of prevention in the law of torts
finds a peculiar expression in a series of highly controversial decisions based on the
precautionary principle. Again, that does not mean that preventive actions are founded solely on
the precautionary principle in the French legal system. There are many examples of preventive
measures being taken by courts in various areas, like nuisance,181 defamation182 and privacy
torts,183 protection of image rights,184,185 or unfair competition.186 Other preventive measures can
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Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., February 24, 2005, nr. 04-10362, JurisData
2005-027086; JCP 2005. II. 10100, (note François-Guy Trébulle).
182
Cour d’appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Paris, January 5, 1972, D. 1972 Jur. 445 (note Jacques Dutertre);
RTD. Civ. 1973, at 358 (G. Durry). In this case, the court ordered that a scene from a movie created by the
defendant be eliminated, and the title be modified, because it was defamatory and an infringement of the right to
respect the honor (droit à l’honneur) of some of the soldiers who fought during the second world war, due to a
confusion which likely would have been created between said soldiers and some of the characters portrayed in the
movie.
183
A very interesting example is Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI][ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris,
May 14, 1985, D. 1986 I.R. 52—where the court ordered the suppression of certain passages from a book which
were infringing upon the right to privacy of a former President of the French Republic. Generally, French law seems
to be more protective of personality rights when in conflict with the freedom of expression than other western
countries, particularly the United States. For a more detailed presentation of the case law and the clash between the
freedom of expression and the right to privacy in France, see Jean-Pierre Gridel, Liberté de la presse et protection
civile des droits modernes de la personnalité en droit positif français, D. 2005 Chron. 391; Cristophe Bigot,
Protection des droits de la personnalité et liberté de l’information, D. 1998 Chron. 235; Pierre Kayser, Les pouvoirs
du juge des référés civil à l’égard de la liberté de communication et d’expression, D. 1989 Chron. 11.
184
Cour d’appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Paris, June 14, 1983, D. 1984 Jur. 75 (note Raymond Lindon)—
ordering the destruction of posters with the image of Jhonny Halliday, Alain Delon, Romy Schneider, Julien Clerc,
Michel Sardou, Maxime le Forestier and Gérard Depardieu; Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI][ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Paris, 1e ch., October 2, 1996, in ANDRÉ BERTRAND, DROIT À LA VIE PRIVÉE ET DROIT À
L’IMAGE 154 (Litec 1999)—enjoining the plaintiffs from selling a lighter imprinted with the image of a famous
comedian; Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 16, 1998, D. 1998 I.R. 210—
creating an interdiction on the sale of floppy disks with a video game because it infringed upon the image rights of
the plaintiff.
185
Article 9 of the French Civil Code expressly recognizes the possibility for courts to intervene by any measure
deemed appropriate in order to stop an infringement on the right to privacy and image rights, even by way of référé
(equivalent to the English interim injunction).
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Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., March 5, 1991, nr. 88-19745, JurisData
1991-000308—enjoining a television station from broadcasting a movie the same day it premiered in the cinema.
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be obtained through the use of the possessory action.187 Taken as a whole, these cases seem to be
decided in a similar manner with cases that fall under the heading of permanent injunctions in the
common law. However, the common law does not have any jurisprudence applying the
precautionary principle, and for that reason it is worth exploring some of these cases in extenso.
It was a group of some lower French courts who have made the bold step of applying the
precautionary principle in order to impose preventive measures, within the ambit of traditional
tort actions. This was done particularly under the guise of nuisance law in cases where the
plaintiffs were seeking to have relay antennas removed from their neighborhood for fear that the
electro-magnetic emissions of the antennas would have a negative impact on the health of the
community.
The factual pattern in these decisions is almost identical. One of the first decisions
applying the precautionary principle and employing a preventive remedy on this foundation in a
tort action was given by a lower court from the city of Grasse188 (and later approved by the Court
of Appeals of Aix-En-Provence).189 The parties to the dispute were the municipality of the city
and a mobile phone company.190 The mobile phone company installed a relay antenna at a short
distance from a school, 36 meters from the actual classrooms.191 The fear that damage caused by
exposure to radiation emitted by these relay antennas would harm the children influenced a
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Of particular interest are the possessory actions which are placed in the category of denunciation de la nouvelle
oevre, which recognizes to the possessor of immovable property the possibility to ask for a suspension of a work
done on a different property which creates a probable future disturbance. Jamel Djoudi, Action possessoire, at nos.
52-54 (Published as part of the RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, Dalloz, last updated 2012). This sort of possessory
action is described as a “preventive action” (action préventive). Id. at nr. 54. The more general possessory action
(complainte) can be used in similar situations, but only if the work on the neighboring land is finished, in which case
the court can proceed to more drastic measures, like demolition. Id.
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number of parents to take action. They decided to transfer their children to other schools and, as
a consequence, the municipality sued the company for nuisance in order to have the relay
antennas removed.192 The lower court ordered the removal of the antenna, and based its decision
on the precautionary principle.193 The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeals upheld the judgment,
but based its decision on the law of nuisance, omitting to mention the precautionary principle.194
Just a few years later, a similar case arose under the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
of Versailles.195 In 2005, a telecommunications company installed a relay antenna in a town
named Tassin La Demi-Lune, in order to provide mobile phone reception to its customers in the
surrounding areas.196 The residents living in the vicinity of the antenna sued the company,
complaining that the presence of the antenna constitutes a private nuisance generating risk for the
health of the community, and that it depreciated the value of their property.197 The Tribunal de
Grande Instance of Nanterre, in a judgment made on the 18th of September 2008, ordered the
removal of the relay antenna by the mobile phone company, under the pressure of a penalty of
100 Euros for every day of delay.198 The court also decided to compensate the plaintiffs with
3000 Euros each for their damages resulting from exposure to health risks.199 The court based its
decision both on the precautionary principle and the French theory of private nuisance (trouble
anormal de voisinage). The Versailles Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision, and
even increased the daily penalty to 500 Euros and the compensation for each plaintiff to 7000
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Euros.200 The Court of Appeals did not mention the precautionary principle in the decision, and
relied solely on principles of nuisance law in its motivation of the decision.201
Mobile phone companies have not taken the chance of appealing these judgments to the
Court of Cassation, fearing that a decision from the Court of Cassation upholding such decisions
would disrupt their operations of providing coverage to their customers, and preferred to have
some antennas dismantled here and there,202 especially since other lower courts have gone the
other way, and refused to grant orders obliging telephone companies to dismantle their
antennas.203
The great benefit brought by the decisions discussed above is the incredible attention they
received in the legal literature.204 But, although these decisions made a lot of noise and definitely
attracted attention, in the jurisprudence they served no other purpose than to bring confusion into
an area which is in need of direction and a solid foundation. Through the feeble arguments
presented, I believe these decisions have put the anathema of irrationality on the precautionary
principle. Not without merit, these decisions have been criticized for the “circuitous”,205 “poor
and incoherent” 206 reasoning used, which challenges common sense and logic.207 Particularly the
second decision, rendered by the Court of Appeals of Versailles, has been highly criticized, and
for good reason. The court refused to quantify the risk created by the telephone companies or
weigh in any way the evidence presented. After taking into consideration the fact that the
installation of the relay antennas was done with the authorization of administrative authorities
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and the emissions of radiation are well below the threshold established by the administration, the
court of appeals qualified the risk as hypothetical,208 as opposed to the lower court which
concluded that “the risk is certain.”209 Saying that a risk is certain is a contradiction in terms
(contradiction in adjecto). Risk (risque in French) is defined as “a potential danger, more or less
predictable.”210 The concept of risk is therefore inseparable from uncertainty, and a risk, while
quantifiable (higher risk, lower risk), can be said to exist or not to exist, but it is never certain.
Also, the court did not analyze the existence of a risk, but only the proof of risk. The only
argument brought for the existence of health risks was the diversity of scientific opinions, and
the court, by reversing the burden of proof, required from the defendant proof of non-existence
of any risk. Since on the record some studies indicated that relay antennas are dangerous, while
others suggested the contrary, the court found that the uncertainty as to whether or not it is safe
to be exposed to the magnetic field of the antennas is enough in order to order the removal of the
antennas.
In cases such as this one, the parties are bound to bring contradictory studies, and the
mere existence of studies indicating that a risk exists is not enough, they must also be reliable
and backed by scientific data. Asking for the defendant to prove that there is no risk, and
quantify the existence of the risk not by the substance of the scientific data, but merely by
acknowledging that one or more studies exist which posit that the risk is real and substantial, is
simply absurd. Moreover, asking the defendant to prove a “zero risk” to an activity is virtually
impossible. Any human activity implies a certain amount of risk.
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The court’s reliance on the theory of private nuisance in this case can also be questioned,
since nuisance presupposes that the disturbance created not only exist, but also must reach a
certain level so as to become more than a mere inconvenience; or, in one word, it must be
abnormal.211 In general, a preventive approach and the precautionary principle can be used in
conjunction with the theory of private nuisance,212 but only if the court actually engages in a
decent level or risk assessment.213 The court must identify the risk and move the procedure so as
to have sufficient facts to quantify the risk, either by approximation,214 or by way of maxmin
intervals215 (the interval created between the best case and the worst case scenario), and if the
approximation or the interval falls within the ambit of what could be described as an “abnormal”
disturbance, a preventive remedy can be imposed. A correct application of the precautionary
principle implies its application only after every effort to scientifically identify and quantify the
risk is exhausted.216
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Another question that should be addressed is the applicability of the precautionary
principle in such cases.217 Civil courts should not only apply the precautionary principle after a
correct assessment of risk, but must also do so with the awareness that jurisdictional bodies have
considerably reduced resources and manpower to conduct risk assessment in very delicate
matters. The exact same problem was brought in front of administrative courts, and
administrative judges, particularly from the Conseil D’Etat, have been wise enough to trust the
regulatory bodies that had the resources to conduct risk assessment and establish procedures and
conditions to be satisfied by mobile phone companies when installing relay antennas, while
acknowledging that the precautionary principle could be applied in these types of cases. 218 A
number of lower courts have also recognized that the judiciary cannot intervene in such cases
because the administration has taken the charge to assess the risks implied by the installation of
such devices, created norms and standards to be applied, and therefore it would not be
appropriate for courts to second guess the administration when it comes to such matters.219
Considering this state of affairs, a conflict of jurisdiction was generated between the
courts charged with civil matters and administrative courts. In France, administrative courts are
the sole venue for cases involving acts and facts of the administration, and these courts are not
under the supervision of the Court of Cassation, the highest administrative court being the
Conseil d’Etat. When conflicts between different jurisdictions appear these jurisdiction disputes
are sent to the Tribunal des Conflits. The Tribunal des Conflits recently had to decide whether
the issue regarding the relay antennas installed in proximity of residential areas can be decided
by civil courts or administrative courts. In its decision, rendered in the 14th of May of 2012, the
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Tribunal des Conflits decided that ordinary judges cannot decide claims which have “the effect
of interrupting the emission, forbidding the installation, ordering the removal or the relocation of
a relay antenna regularly authorized by the administration.”220 The basis for this decision was the
principle of separation of powers, the intervention of the judiciary in these matters being
considered in breach of this principle. Administrative courts can verify the legality of the
administrative acts authorizing the installment of the relay antennas and certifying the level of
emissions, but the executive power is given a great amount of deference when it comes to the
means of implementing certain national policies. This is perhaps why the Conseil d’Etat does not
sanction the way in which the administration is making use of the precautionary principle in
cases of relay antennas. The decision of the Tribunal des Conflits does not strip the judiciary of
all power in regards to the matter of relay antennas. Civil courts now have jurisdiction in cases
involving relay antennas only if:
“(1) the claim is for damages and stems from the lawful installation or operation
of the relay antenna, provided it is not a public work (ouvrage public), subject to
the possibility of a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction; or (2) the claim is to order
the cessation of nuisance (trouble anormal de voisinage) caused (i) by installation
or operation which does not comply with administrative regulations, or (ii) by
regular installation or operation, but where the interest harmed is not related to
public health or interference of the radio-waves.”221
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Most importantly, the Tribunal des Conflits is saying that courts can still apply general
civilian doctrines as long as they don’t second guess decisions made in administrative acts which
are not illegal.
Soon after the decision of the Tribunal des Conflits was made public, in a series of three
decisions, the Court of Cassation followed the directives laid down by the Tribunal des Conflits,
and declined competence in relay antenna cases.222
Based on this recent jurisprudence, it seems as though the jurisprudence we have
criticized from these appellate courts is coming to an end. The truly unsettling problem which
sprang out of these decisions, however, remains unsolved. How are we supposed to understand
and apply the precautionary principle in the context of preventive remedies? The Court of
Appeals of Versailles gave no reasons as to why the court felt that the protection offered through
administrative regulation was insufficient, or why the studies presented as evidence were
unsatisfactory or unreliable. This court applied the precautionary principle blindly and discarded
the problem with no real analysis. The simple fact of contradictory evidence was considered
enough to find uncertainty, and therefore no effort of quantifying the risk was made. The law of
nuisance was used as a tool to mask a certain level of ignorance on the issue and solve the
problem without getting into the substance of the matter.
The precautionary principle should be applied more like a tie-breaker in cases of
uncertainty. The decision-maker must expend all efforts in order to minimize the level of
uncertainty through scientific discovery and evidence, and only when risk assessment
calculations do not point towards a more likely result, should the precautionary principle be
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used.223 When these conditions are met, and only then, the decision-maker must “err on the side
of caution,”224 and must give more weight to interests that are essential to humanity, like a clean
environment and human health.
2. Preventive remedies disguised as reparation in kind.
The concept of reparation (réparation) in the civil law implies the existence of harm or
damage.225 As a rule, in French law, when repairing damage a court first looks at methods of
compensation in kind or reparation in natura (réparation en nature). It is seen as the best method
for repairing harm, and whenever it is possible the victim can request it and the court will be
inclined to grant it.226 If compensation in kind is not possible, the victim will have to contend
herself with methods of compensation by equivalent.227 The reason for this rule is that the victim
must be brought as close as possible to her situation before the injury occurred. Many of the
methods of reparation are, however, not compensatory in nature, but preventive. The examples
are more numerous than one would expect, and include those particular situations where the
mere infringement of a right is considered sufficient in order to render a decision without
analyzing the damage element. The vast majority of these cases fall under what Cyril Bloch
described as manifestations of the function of “cessation of illicit acts”.228 This qualification
emphasizes the retrospective and actor-based outlook on liability. From this point of view, the
remedies are repressive (they repress illicit acts).229 At the same time, from a prospective and
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victim oriented point of view, the same remedies can be described as preventive, because the
suppression of the illicit act also prevents damage directly.
It is not unusual for courts to combine preventive remedies with compensatory ones. For
instance, in a case decided in 2003, the Court of Cassation upheld a decision where the plaintiffs
were awarded, besides damages, the negative of some photographs which were taken without
their agreement and in violation of their image rights.230
The fact that many cases involve some form of damage is probably why these remedies
have been traditionally categorized as reparative. However, since in many cases where a right is
infringed, the courts do not actually look into the damage element (actual damage does not need
to be proved), and every once in a while, situations come up when the damage is merely
potential (virtuel).231
Some remedies can even be cataloged as having a dual nature, in the sense that they can
be simultaneously compensatory and preventive. For instance, when a court offers the plaintiff a
right to respond to an allegation published in the defendant’s paper (which the court considers
defamatory), or decides that the defendant must publish the decision of condemnation,232 the
order at the same time repairs the damage created, at least in part, and prevents the perpetuation
of the inaccurate and defamatory information. Such a response prevents the spread of false
defamatory information in the future, thus preventing future harm.
Combining compensatory remedies with preventive remedies is a great example of
harmony in the application of compensation and prevention in the law of torts. These kinds of
cases are set in situations where decision-makers have to look both ways, in the past and in the
230
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future, and act to correct wrongful consequences of torts with this holistic vision in mind. It is
not unusual for damage to have been generated in the past, and yet for the consequences to be
felt for a long time after the generating facts.
Intervention to stop the occurrence of future damage, while compensating for the past,
can have numerous advantages, including mitigation of damages or avoidance of future litigation
and, therefore, lower judicial and social costs.
3. Le référé and l’action déclaratoire
There is an intensive focus on preventive actions applying the precautionary principle in
the legal literature,233 and this needs to be contrasted with the reality and the dynamics of the
French judicial system, which had to respond to needs of everyday life, and has done so with
quite a great deal of ingenuity. A good place to look for preventive remedies at French law is
also in areas dealt with more often than not within the subject of civil procedure. French judges
aptly made use of injunctions,234 either in the context of ordinary actions, or in preliminary
proceedings (le référé), with the purpose of preventing future damage.
The procedure of référé is not a modern creation, having been developed prior to the
French Revolution.235 From the beginning this procedure had a preventive character having been
designed to prevent irreparable loss.236 According to article 484 from the French civil code of
procedure, the référé is meant to provide only interlocutory relief, pending a decision on the
merits of the case.237 This provisional character might have been the reason why the imposition
of an injunction through the référé was never analyzed as part of the substantial law of torts, as a
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preventive remedy. It is seen as a rather exceptional remedy, because it is deviating from the
traditional procedural rules.238 It is a simple and rapid procedure, intended only for those
situations when time is really pressing and a judgment is needed urgently. There is even a variety
of référé called référé d’heure à heure,239 which besides being exceptionally expedient, allows
the judge to give a remedy even on days that are public holidays or outside of the regular work
days.240
During the 20th century, the procedure of référé expanded considerably.241 The
requirement of urgency was interpreted less strictly,242 first by presuming the existence of
urgency in some cases,243 and later by eliminating the requirement for some limited
hypothesis.244 Also, a great number of disputes are solved definitively by courts by using this
procedure, despite the provisional character attached to its foundation. There are many cases in
which the parties never go through with the definitive action after the court pronounced a
decision in référé, either because the damage was avoided or because the party requesting it does
not follow up with an action because she feel that she can’t win at trial. There are also a few
situations in which the plaintiff has an interest only in the preventive and expedient remedy. 245
Having lost some its urgent and provisional nature, even though theoretically only in
cases of exception, the procedure of référé has become a promising area where prevention might
blossom further within the French legal system. Over the past few decades, the jurisprudence
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demonstrated the efficiency of this remedy. Prevention can be obtained through this mechanism
in various areas, like protection of privacy,246 image rights,247 unfair competition,248 or
defamation,249 etc.
Another procedural mechanism used for preventive purposes is the declaratory action
(l’action déclaratoire). Actions are declaratory when their purpose is to obtain a judicial
declaration of the existence or non-existence of facts which produce juridical effects, or the
legality or illegality of an act, without having the benefit of enforcing justice through any
coercive mechanism.250
Declaratory judgments have been created by jurisprudence. There is no article in the
Code of Civil Procedure regulating this type of action in general, but some articles describe
particular applications of declaratory judgments [for example art. 285 (2) and 296 of the French
Code of Civil Procedure, and article L. 615-9 from the Code of Intellectual Property].251
A person seeking declaratory judgment in a French court must prove, like in all other
actions in justice, that her claim is based on a legitimate and serious interest. French courts have
made it very clear that a plaintiff cannot demand a declaratory judgment every time he is unsure
whether or not an act or fact is illegal.252 However, it would be hard to argue that a plaintiff does
not have an interest in cases where actual harm did not yet occur, but it would be very probable
to happen, unless the defendant is made aware of the illegality of his actions or the legality of the
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plaintiff’s actions. Ex-ante declaratory judgments are not favored in French law. The fear is that
declaratory judgments operating ex-ante will create situations where the judge is asked for a
decision even though there is no actual controversy, the petitioner seeking legal advice or trying
to obtain the judicial stamp in order to legitimize an activity and avoid future liability.253
4. The problem of private preventive expenses
In French law, preventive remedies are generally dependent upon an exercise of
authority, and the consequence of such exercise of authority is the imposition of preventive
measures. As a rule, courts have the central role in the administration of preventive measures.
French law does not generally recognize self-help as a remedy,254 and that is why
preventive remedies cannot be either private, or recognitive.255
That being said, this does not mean that private persons are just supposed to stay idle in
the face of danger and only act with the approval of the state. Every person is entitled to a
proportional defense when facing threats of danger, and this translates into doctrines like selfdefense or necessity. Although recognized as valid private means of protecting oneself from
injury, self-defense and necessity are not seen as remedies. They are merely defenses (causes de
justification) in tort actions.256 As a rule, an actor will not be held liable in tort in case of a
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necessary and proportional exercise of self-defense,257 or in cases where he acts out of
necessity.258
A strong argument can be made for going even further. Not only can an actor defend
himself in the face of immediate danger and avoid liability for doing so, through the defenses of
self-help and necessity; in cases where no other reasonable alternative exists he may also protect
his interests by taking on his own initiative preventive steps, and, as a consequence, have an
action in order to be compensated for the expenses incurred by taking these preventive measures.
French jurisprudence is starting to recognize this possibility, but the cases are confusing
and contradictory. The two chambers of the Court of Cassation seem to be divided on this issue.
The First Chamber of the Court of Cassation was first to decide the problem of
compensating preventive expenses in 2006.259 The case was brought by a heart patient who had
decided to remove at his own cost a pacemaker which ran the risk of being defective. 260 The
model he had implanted proved to cause problems in the past, patients having died or suffered
severe heart injury because a wire connecting an articular probe to the peacemaker broke. 261
Because of these problems, the company decided to stop marketing the model and recommended
that heart patients be subject to more frequent check-ups.262 A number of patients, including the
plaintiff, could not live with the constant fear of such an accident and decided to remove, at their
own cost, the pacemaker, and subsequently filed claims in order to recover their costs. 263 Some
judges from the Appellate Court in Lyon had ruled that compensation should be granted, while
257
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others have dismissed such claims.264 The case that reached the Court of Cassation was one of
those where compensation was not allowed by the Court of Appeals.265 The Court of Cassation,
on the one side, upheld the judgment on the issue of compensating the expenses incurred as a
consequence of removing the pacemakers, but remanded the decision because the appellate court
did not offer compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the plaintiff, caused by the
anxiety of having the defective probe implanted.266 The reactions to this decision within French
legal doctrine were critical. Some authors argued that the decision could not stand because there
was no illicit act (there was no fait générateur),267 while others have been critical because the
court should have analyzed the issue as one of causation and not as one pertaining to the damage
element.268 The second line of arguments criticizing this opinion seems to be more
compelling.269 The Court of Cassation refused to compensate the plaintiff because the damage he
invoked was merely hypothetical, and not a damage which was certain. The Court of Cassation
lost sight of the facts of the case and confused one set of damages with another. To some extent,
this case did involve at one point damages which were hypothetical, not materialized, and not
certain to occur in the future. The risk of such damages existed prior to the second medical
intervention, when the pacemakers were taken out. However, no one could possibly argue that
such damage did not exist at the time of the trial. The damages sought by the plaintiff were
neither future, nor hypothetical, and definitely not uncertain. In order to remove the pacemakers,
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the plaintiffs suffered actual harm with the subsequent surgery and had to pay for the procedure.
Saying that such damage is hypothetical and uncertain is tantamount to denying the facts and is
insulting to the victims. Surgery is both costly and painful. The legal problem in this case has
nothing to do with the characteristics of the damage element. The real problem is one of
causation.270 French law analyzes causation as a straight line, which connects the fait générateur
(generating act) with the damage, and the intervention of the victim (the victim’s own acts) may
break the chain of causation, or at least lead to partial exoneration.271 The key to solving this case
was therefore not the characteristics of the damage, but the existence or non-existence of
causation. An act of the victim which is arbitrary, capricious, or abnormal, in the sense that it is
not a normal consequence of the fait générateur, would break the chain of causation, whereas if
the victim acted reasonably under the circumstances, the causation link is not affected.272
Commenting on the reasonableness of the heart patients when confronted with the risk of having
their pacemakers fail, Patrice Jourdain stated that “common sense would dictate not to make the
victims wait until they are dead in order to invoke a damage which is certain”.273
The consequence of this first decision was that it did not allow the victim to recover the
preventive expenses incurred.
Just two years later, the Court of Cassation, this time through the second chamber,
reached the exact opposite conclusion.274 In this case, the plaintiff asked for compensation after
incurring expenses to prevent the risk of landslide, after the defendant had done works on his
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property which endangered plaintiff’s property.275 Both the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Cassation decided in this case that the plaintiff could recover his expenses.276
The latter decision brings much promise for the future, and might mark a point from
which the Court of Cassation began recognizing preventive expenses as compensable damage.277
For our purposes, the issues described in this chapter are functionally equivalent to the common
law remedy of self-help, which is indeed seen as a remedy.278 However, it should be emphasized
that the cases presented above, while promoting the preventive function of tort law, are not cases
of preventive remedies, because the victims in this case did not seek to prevent future loss. The
purpose of the victims’ actions in court was to obtain compensation for past expenses, and not a
preventive remedy. The idea of prevention or the preventive function of tort law is not, however,
out of place in such cases, because one of the effects of satisfying the victims’ claim for
compensation is to indirectly recognize the reasonability of their preventive intervention.
Preventive intervention is, in such cases, in the hands of a private person, other than the one
generating the risk, and not in the hand of courts of justice. The above-mentioned private person
engages both in risk-assessment and the decision-making process. The court analyzes ex-post the
decision reached, and either will recognize it as reasonable, thus allowing compensation, or
sanction it for being arbitrary, or wrongful, and refuse compensation.
Besides these cases which have clearly been analyzed as part of the law of torts in the
French literature and in jurisprudence, cases applying measures that would qualify as self-help in
the common law can be found within the ambit of property law. The French civil code allows,
for instance, the owner of a parcel of land to cut the roots, brambles and brushwood sticking out
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from an adjacent lot onto his property.279 In the French tradition, however, this is not seen as
self-help. The cited text is situated in the code in a chapter discussing “legal servitudes”. The law
explicitly recognizes this right for the owner, and when such authorization from the law is
lacking, the recourse can only be judicial in order to obtain satisfaction.280
C. Preventive remedies in English and American Law
1. A general overview
The arrangement of the remedies provided in the previous chapter might seem odd to the
French civilian, yet very familiar to a common law lawyer. French scholars dealing with
substantive law tend to focus on rights, causes of action and the general elements of civil
liability. That is why many of the remedies are not discussed in the law of torts. Référé for
instance, one of the most important preventive remedies, is left to the realm of civil procedure.
Common law scholarship, on the other hand, attentive to the needs of practitioners and abhorrent
of classificatory rigidity, has a broader way of looking at remedies in the law of torts. Although,
as we have already seen, compensation plays a central role, just like in the civil law, the common
law is not oblivious to other remedies and their functions.
There is a long history of express recognition of preventive remedies in the common law.
Both courts of equity and courts of common law have been applying preventive remedies from
early on. There are accounts of preventive measures ordered through the writs Quia Timet, De
Minis, or writs of prohibition, which date to as early as the 13th century.281
This tradition of prevention was later transplanted and continued in the United States. In
the 19th century, Cristopher Colombus Langdell described equitable relief as primarily
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preventive in American law.282 The law of equitable remedies is highly developed in the
common law family, and although the law of torts has been traditionally a common law subject
(where the only remedies at law were in the form of damages or self-help), through the use of
injunctions, a substantial part of the law developed by equity found its way into the field of
torts.283
Because of the attention received in legal scholarship and court opinions, and because of
the effectiveness of these remedies in their actual application to daily disputes, the preventive
remedies of the common law form an invaluable repository for the study of prevention in the law
of torts. Whether equitable, or legal, common law remedies have been tested by time, and have
proven to be highly effective means of protecting legal rights. From this point of view, it can be
said that remedies from common law systems are more developed and more effective than their
civilian counterparts. As proof for this assertion, the most staggering display of effectiveness is
noticeable in the area of enforcement of injunctions in common law jurisdictions. The party
refusing to obey to the court order will be held in contempt, and can be imprisoned for this
reason.284 In the civil law, the injunctive order can be put into execution only through ordinary
means of enforcement, and when such enforcement proceedings fail, the non-performing party is
usually not liable for any criminal offense.285
However, the solutions and the methodology employed by courts of equity, particularly
in regard to injunctive relief, grew out of a way of thinking that has many points of contact with
the civilian tradition.
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First, the case-by-case approach and the discretionary nature of injunctions in the
common law hide a very intricate classificatory system where injunctions are classified in a
civilian manner according to their object (prohibitory or mandatory), their function (preventive
or reparative) or the nature of the court order (permanent or interlocutory). The legal effects
given to an injunction and the requirements for its application depend on the category where it
fits.
In addition, doctrines which seem to have much in common with the civilian concepts of
good faith286 or nemo audtitur propriam suam turpitudinem allegans,287 balancing rights or
balancing the equities, or proportionality tests, permeate the body of law and the doctrines
created by equitable remedies.
Laches, for instance, is a reason to refuse an injunction,288 or at least a factor to be taken
under consideration, which can be used by the defendant when the plaintiff brings the action for
injunctive relief with unreasonable delay, and the delay has operated to the prejudice of the
defendant or has weakened the court’s facility of administration.289 This defense shows that the
common law encourages taking preventive steps, through judicial proceedings, at an early
stage,290 and sanctions plaintiffs who act unreasonably or in bad faith. The good faith element is
central to laches, as shown not only by the situations when this defense is applicable (or when
this factor weighs the balance in favor of dismissing the claim), but also when it is not. English
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courts have decided that a claimant will not be penalized when the delay was caused by
negotiations which were continued in order to settle the case, or where the plaintiff did not
initially have sufficient information in order to demonstrate that the defendant was responsible
for his injury.291
The defense of unclean hands, or “the doctrine of clean hands”, also has overtones of a
“good faith principle”, or another more obscure, yet very old civilian principle: nemo audtitur
propriam turpitudinem allegans. This doctrine, of “unclean hands”, will bar the defendant from
obtaining his remedy when misconduct on his part makes the issuance of the injunction
inappropriate in the eyes of the court.292 Cases where this doctrine was used involved plaintiffs
who deliberately misled the defendant or the court, orchestrated fraud, or used deplorable means
to protect their interests.293
In addition, the whole body of law regarding preventive remedies, which is not limited to
injunctions, works in accordance with an overriding general principle, which can be named “the
principle of proportionality”. The cases where preventive measures are sought are usually
decided on the basis of a proportionality calculation which operates on at least three levels.
First of all, the court must determine if preventive measures are at all required, and this
means that the court measures the interests of both parties and the result of this balancing test
determines if the coercive apparatus of the state should intervene preventively. It is not possible
to prevent all harm, and not all risks of harm are unacceptable for society. Some acts are so
unpredictable that any preventive measure is futile. Not everything can be anticipated. A large
number of negligence cases fall into this category: where the sole cause of an accident is the
inadvertent act of a person, there is not much to be done by way of prevention. Unless the
291

Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170, at 308.
Id.
293
Id. at 309. See also 4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW. TORTS 2d, at 576 (§ 940, comment b.).
292

73

underlying case of the accident is constant, like some company policy, the mere accidental
occurrence is hard to anticipate. Also, torts which have a short temporal span, most of the time,
cannot be prevented (there might not be any time between the introduction of the risk and the
occurrence of damage to take a preventive measure because damage occurred immediately after
the risk was generated). Other preventive remedies will not be issued because of their paralyzing
effects. This is particularly true in cases where the acts complained of by the plaintiff produce
benefits which clearly outweigh the losses. A large number of cases of strict liability fall into this
category. If an act or activity is valuable to society as a whole, policy considerations demand that
it be allowed to run its course and prevention will be allowed only exceptionally. 294 However,
when damages have already been caused, the one making profits out of the respective act or
activity is usually liable for damages. The intervention in such cases is only ex-post.
Second, the selection of the remedy, and the intensity of the preventive action required by
the court is also dependent on proportionality. The more serious the consequences and the more
probable the occurrence of harm in the future, the more intense the remedy will be. Some
activities need to be banned for good (for instance a trespass), others just limited to acceptable
limits (especially applicable in cases of nuisance). For some, the court can only order
provisional,295 partial,296 conditional,297 or experimental relief,298 or delay a permanent remedy
and simply order new evidence to be produced (especially scientific studies).299 Also, preventive
remedies might be suspended.300 Finally, in some cases a simple declaration from the court will
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suffice to end a conflict before any harm ensues (this is the typical case for a declaration of right
proceeding).
Finally, there is a proportion to be found in the application of preventive remedies in
time. Preventive remedies which are far removed from the moment when the damage is likely to
occur tend to be less energetic, experimental, or provisional, whereas proximity to the moment
when negative consequences occur (or urgency) empowers the court to take more energetic
measures.
The next section opens the discussion with the most effective preventive remedies—
injunctions. Subsequent sections address alternative, less energetic measures, like self-help and
declaratory judgments. The many similarities between the English and American legal systems
permit the use of the English model as a default, and emphasize, where necessary, the solutions
where the American states have departed from the English common law.
The outline of common law remedies from this chapter is intended to be in approximate
symmetry with the former, which analyzes similar mechanisms from the perspective of French
law.
2. Injunctions
a. Injunctions in general
Injunctions are defined as court orders “prohibiting a person from doing something or
requiring a person to do something.”301
Injunctions are commonly referred to as equitable remedies, because they have been
developed by the chancellor in equity proceedings. In fact, for a long time, these remedies were
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allowed only in equitable proceedings, and courts of common law did not have the power to
grant equitable relief until 1854.302 Nowadays, the power of the High Court of England to grant
injunctive relief is encapsulated in section 37 (1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, which offers
this remedy to the High Court without any restraint (“in all cases in which it appears to the court
to be just and convenient to do so”).303 However, a county court can only issue an injunction if it
is subordinate to a claim for damages.304 In the United States, most states have merged common
law and equity courts, and therefore ordinary courts can grant the full range of remedies
available either from equity or common law.305 A few states have kept the division between
common law courts and equity courts until today, and in such jurisdictions, many of the
distinctions and requirements imposed before the merger of common law and equity in England
still apply.306
Although the procedural distinction between common law and equity is now history,
much of the substantial law that governs injunctions still has the equitable imprint. This is
noticeable when we analyze the requirements of injunctions; the discretionary nature of the
remedy and its subsidiary application in relation to other remedies available, especially common
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law remedies, are not mere ghosts from the past, and they still characterize injunctive relief in
almost all common law jurisdictions. While English law is still very close to the traditional
approach, American law has been making a strong effort to move the law of remedies away from
rigid old tests, and the requirements have been largely reshaped in order to meet the requirements
of justice in a unified court system.307
It must be noted that injunctions are applied not only in matters regarding tort law. They
are issued in a variety of situations, covering all areas of the law. Injunctions have been used, for
instance, in constitutional law in order to enjoin public officers to enforce an unconstitutional
statute; in the law of property in order to solve questions regarding waste or easements; or in
disputes regarding wrongful trade practices, infringement of patents, copyrights, trademarks,
labor disputes, etc. 308
Injunctions are remedies of general applicability in the law of torts.309 That means that, as
a rule, a remedy in the form of injunction is available for every category of torts, 310 especially
when there is a threat of repetition or continuation of the tort.311 Injunctions are available when a
legal right has been violated, even in the absence of any proof of damage. 312 Moreover, in Quia
Timet form, injunctions are available even when there is a mere threat of harm and a right has not
been violated stricto sensu, but there is a high probability that it will be in the future.313 Looking
at how injunctions operate, the general applicability of injunctive relief is tied to the
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infringement of rights and not the commission of a category or another of designated torts. This
is proof that injunctive relief goes far beyond the scope of redressing wrongs and compensating
victims when a wrong was committed. It is an indicator that the starting point in the law of torts
is no longer the identification of a predetermined actionable category of wrongs. The law of torts
begins with the more general goal of protecting rights and assuring the respect of legal duties.314
Traditionally, injunctions have been considered discretionary remedies.315 This does not
mean however that injunctions are left to the whim of judges,316 and the administration of justice
is arbitrary. Courts of equity have always been very careful in their decisions regarding
injunctive relief, and have shown throughout history incredible self-restraint. Traditionally, this
remedy was considered harsh and extraordinary, and could have only been issued when legal
remedies were considered inadequate.317 Today, even though the applicability of injunctions is
much enlarged in scope, the conditions are still relatively restrictive and based on very solid
principles. It is rather fascinating how common law jurisdictions managed to balance this
cautious approach with the increasing demand in practice for injunctions, and have kept the
remedy flexible enough in order to apply injunctions whenever the need arose.
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The ingenuity behind keeping the law of injunctions flexible can be attributed to the
rejection, by courts, of a check-list test for injunctive relief. The English have preferred to create
flexible standards applicable to various categories of injunctions, and keep on analyzing the
details on a case by case basis (for instance, the standard for a interlocutory and mandatory
injunction is a lot higher than the standard for permanent and prohibitory injunction, but the final
determination of the court might rest on just one or several factors which the court finds
compelling either for granting the injunction or refusing it).318
American courts seem to favor a list of factors which ought to be taken into consideration
as a whole in order to make a case for injunctive relief compelling, and on which the court
decisions will be based, as opposed to English courts who tend to focus on the factor or factors
with special incidence in the case which needs to be decided.319
The Second Restatement of Torts enumerates a list of factors which should be analyzed,
as a whole, by courts when granting injunctions. These factors are:
a) The nature of the interest to be protected;
b) The relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies;
c) Any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit;
d) Any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff;
e) The relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to the
plaintiff if it is denied;
f) The interests of third persons and of the public; and
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g) The practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment;320
A very interesting case applying both the general principles of equity and the factors test
detailed by the Restatement is Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., decided by the
Supreme Court of Illinois.321 In this case, the village of Wilsonville, joined later by Macoupin
County and Macoupin County Farm Bureau, sought injunctive relief against SCA Services, a
company operating a chemical waste disposal site neighboring the village.322 The plaintiffs
argued that the site constituted a public nuisance and a hazard to the health of the citizens of the
village, the county, and the state.323 The defendant brought the waste in from different clients
and, after delivery in Wilsonville, tested the chemical waste and then deposited it in trenches.324
95% of all the waste was being kept in 55 gallon steel drums, while 5% was kept in double-wall
paper bags.325 Amongst the dangerous substances, the court enumerated solid cyanide, paint
sludge, asbestos, pesticides, mercury, arsenic, and PCBs.326 The record showed that the
containers were in a poor shape and some were leaking during transport and on the site. The
plaintiffs complained about the existing odors and the dust coming from the plant, as well as the
danger of future harm due to infiltrations of toxic waste in the water supply and in the soil,
because of high permeability of the soil327 and because the site was located above an abandoned
coal mine, which created a risk of pillar failure of the mine due to readjustment of stress. 328 The
defendant took precautions against potential underground infiltrations by using 14 monitoring
wells around the site in order to detect infiltrations, and tested the samples quarterly at a private
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laboratory.329 The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) conducted an inspection on
the site, and granted an operational permit to the defendant.330 Also, each transport of waste
needed to be accompanied by a permit from the IEPA. In total, the IEPA granted 185 permits to
the defendant before the trial commenced.331
The trial court decided in this case to grant both a mandatory and a prohibitory
injunction, enjoining the defendant from operating the hazardous-waste landfill in the vicinity of
the village and ordered the defendant to remove all the waste buried there and transport it to a
different location, and then restore and reclaim the site.332 The decision was upheld on appeal
unanimously.333
The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed in a lengthy and well-motivated decision. The
court focused its arguments on a few of the factors from the restatement, but clearly had the
whole factors test in mind, having cited both the Restatement Second of Torts and Prosser on
multiple occasions.334 The court focused its arguments on the existence of a nuisance, not only at
present, but also prospectively,335 making the remedy in this case both reparative and preventive.
What makes this case very special is the fact that the preventive scope proved to be essential.
The court noted that the present damages would not have warranted the issuance of such a drastic
remedy, but the threat of future damage, added to the existing disturbance, made it permissible to
order the complete removal of the waste site.336 The standard used by the court in determining
that a prospective nuisance existed was based only on a probability assessment—“a dangerous
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probability”.337 The court also reviewed the balancing of equities factor which was emphasized
by the trial court, and concluded that in this case the rights of the citizens who live nearby
outweigh the interests of the defendant.338 The court found that banning all waste activity in the
area was reasonable under the circumstances, particularly because of the high probability of
serious damage occurring.339
Finally, a very interesting issue discussed by the court in this case is the relevance of the
inspection and the permits issued by the IEPA. In the American legal system, courts tend to defer
to the administration when it comes to the establishment of standards for environmental pollution
or health hazards. Whenever the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or state
agencies like the IEPA issue an order which regulates the manner in which an activity is to be
performed, or intervenes in order to prevent or repair the effects of an activity, injunctions which
are incompatible with the administrative regulation will not be issued,340 or the remedy will be
tailored in order to assure both deference to the administration and protection of individual rights
and interests.341 In this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois argued very convincingly against
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deferring to the IEPA in this case based on the particular facts of this case. The IEPA relied on
studies conducted by the defendant when issuing the permits,342 and studies presented at trial,
even by the expert from the defendant showed that the permeability of the soil was greater than
the minimum standard imposed the IEPA.343 The plaintiffs in this case were able to effectively
prove that the IEPA was in error when issuing these permits, and that the actual scientific data
shows a higher risk to the environment than what the IEPA relied on when issuing the permits.
The total record consisted of more than 13,000 pages,344 which proves just how difficult it is to
build a case in court in order to prove that a state agency’s determination was erroneous. This
decision is a wonderful example of efficient administration of justice, culminating with a well
written opinion. Continental lawyers most probably would be in awe in reading that the duration
of the trial, considering the lengthy record, was only 104 days.345
The days of flexible remedies might, however, come to an end soon. A recent Supreme
Court decision in the area of patent law might well challenge for the future settled law both at
Federal and State level,346 with the undesirable effect of replacing the very flexible test from the
Restatement with an apparently more restrictive check-lists or elements test.

and appellant has been issued a permit to so use the property. After careful and continued tests by
reputable experts as well as public officials, appellant's operation has met all the required
standards. Under these circumstances . . . the appellant cannot be prevented from continuing to
engage in the operation of its shredding.” Id. at 1125.
The court however pointed out that if some irregularities are found in the way the activity is run, a reasonable period
should be given for the company to redress all the defects which do not generate imminent or substantial harm, and
also damages may be awarded if the activity caused any damage to property. Id.
342
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343
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In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,347 the Supreme Court of the United States, while
affirming that it is upholding “traditional principles”,348 created a “four-prong” 349 test, according
to which the movant in an injunction case must show:
a) That he has suffered irreparable injury;
b) That remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury;
c) That, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and
d) That the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.350
This Supreme Court decision has been criticized elsewhere for (1) the redundant mention
of both irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages, (2) the elimination or at least the reduction
of other factors to second-class status, and (3) for the substitution of a factor-based test with a
check-list test.351 The danger is not just that of sweeping aside settled law, in the name of
tradition.352 This proves to actually be a case of innovation which threatens to bring the law of
injunctions back to medieval times, when the key determination in such cases was whether or not
the remedy at law (damages) was available and adequate. Irreparable injury, as well as
availability and adequacy of remedies at law are terms of art which were replaced by the Second
Restatement of Torts with a flexible test, coupled with a determination of “the relative
adequacy”353 of the injunction. This shift was based on strong arguments and backed up by both
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older and modern case law.354 The older formulas were restraining courts from issuing
injunctions in cases where injunctions were needed and adequate in relation to all other remedies
(not just damages), for no other reason than the respect of tradition. 355 After the merger of law
and equity, the lack of tension between common law and equity jurisdiction disappeared.
Because the same court has the power to impose any remedy, a medium was created where the
law could rationally reconcile any conflict between the multiple remedies (which previously
existed separately) in order to best serve the citizens and protect their rights and interests.
Curiously, the Court itself did not believe it made any change in the law and has
explicitly said that equitable remedies are still left at the discretion of district courts. 356 However,
a great number of lower federal courts have applied the test in order to operate changes in other
areas of the law, like government regulation, constitutional law, state contract law, and expanded
it for other cases of intellectual property, and even state tort law.357
b. Taxonomy of injunctions
Besides general principles, the taxonomy of injunctions also influences the applicable
legal regime. Courts generally distinguish between permanent and interim injunctions (a), and
also mandatory and prohibitory injunctions (b). Aside from these general classifications, there is
also a particular type of injunction which is exclusively preventive in nature: the Quia Timet
injunction (c).
a) Permanent and interim injunctions358
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Injunctions are named permanent when they are issued at the conclusion of a trial upon
the merits.359 This type of injunction is named permanent because the decision of the court is
definitive, as opposed to interim (also called preliminary, interlocutory or temporary) injunctions
which are temporary in the sense that they will be revised by the court after a full hearing. 360 It is
said that permanent injunctions usually have a perpetual effect. 361 While this is generally true, it
is not the factor that characterizes the injunction as permanent. In some situations, a permanent
injunction can be limited in time, or conditional,362 and even a potentially perpetual injunction
may be subject to an application by the person bound by it to modify its terms or discharge it. 363
Permanent injunctions are simply intended to be a final solution to the dispute.364 Their effects
can be temporary, and need not operate ad infinitum.
Since permanent injunctions are decided after a full hearing, the court can weigh all the
factors according to the totality of evidence and make an informed decision after careful
consideration. The factors taken into consideration are all intended to help the court answer an
adequacy question: is the injunction sought an adequate remedy to the case at hand? This
adequacy determination is today basically identical to the three manifestations of the principle of
proportionality, described above,365 at least in England366 and American jurisdictions following

plaintiff must also prove that his need for relief is so urgent that notice to the defendant and an adversary hearing are
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still the “adequacy” test. See Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170, at 306-07.
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the Restatement.367 Hopefully, the future of injunctions will lie in the refinement of this
adequacy or proportionality test, and not in the implementation of a check-list of elements, as
introduced by the Supreme Court, in the name of tradition.368
Like all preventive remedies, in case of perpetual injunctions, the judges’ decision is
made in a climate of uncertainty, but permanent injunctions are instruments of lesser danger, at
least in comparison to interim injunctions, temporary restraining orders, or Quia Timet
injunctions, because the judge has both time and a complete record on which to rely in making a
decision.
Injunctions are called interim (interlocutory, preliminary, or temporary) when they are
ordered before the conclusion of the trial, and have, in principle, provisional effects, pending a
final decision.369 These injunctions are issued based on an incomplete record and after a limited
hearing.370 In England, interim injunctions are usually conditional upon the claimant’s
undertaking to pay if he loses at trial.371 In the U.S., the issuance of an injunction can sometimes
be made conditional upon the posting of a bond.372
The interim injunction can sometimes be sufficient to resolve a dispute, just like the
référé is in France.373 Questions of law can be decided definitively (like a final trial) at interim
stage, but questions of fact cannot, due to the fact that the record is incomplete.374 A
pronunciation of the law and an early assessment of the interests at hand can prove sufficient to
convince the parties not to continue the dispute. Time might work to the same effect. Sometimes
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redress is needed urgently and only the interim order can be efficient, a final trial becoming moot
after the issuance (or not) of the injunction.
The interim injunction is a powerful tool, but also a very dangerous one, due to the risk of
making wrong choices based on a limited record. That is why a great deal of effort has been
expended in order to develop mechanisms and standards aiming to strike a balance between
allowing interim injunctions to be used with flexibility and minimizing the risk of error in
awarding or refusing such a remedy.
For that reason there are at least four approaches on interim injunctions within the two
great legal systems of the common law (the English and the American).
In England, interim injunctions are traditionally considered discretionary, and a court can
award such an injunction whenever it considers it “just and convenient.”375 However, courts
generally follow a test which has been proposed by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords decision
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.376 The test consists of a set of four questions, each of
which should be addressed only if the answer to the previous question is favorable to the
plaintiff. These questions are:
1) Does the plaintiff have a serious question to be tried?
2) Would the plaintiff be adequately compensated by an award of damages at the
conclusion of the trial?
3) If the plaintiff would be awarded the injunction, but at trial this would prove to have
been wrong, would the defendant be adequately compensated under the plaintiffs
undertaking to pay damages?
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4) Does the balance of convenience favor the award of an injunction?377
Although this test is considered the default test in England today, 378 it is not followed
religiously, and English courts distinguish new cases from American Cyanamid whenever they
feel that the test might not produce an equitable result. For example, in De Falco v. Crawley
Borough Council, Lord Denning distinguished American Cyanamid because in that case the
plaintiffs could not give any worthwhile undertaking in damages because of inability to pay, and
therefore allowed a showing of a very strong arguable case, which would compensate for failing
the third element of the American Cyanamid test.379
In the United States, the Restatement of Torts subjects interlocutory injunctions to the
same general analysis based on factors, the same as with permanent injunctions. All the factors
which are taken under consideration for permanent injunction remain relevant for interlocutory
injunctions. The comments to the Restatement, however, clarify the standard by adding and
emphasizing four special factors which are essential in cases of interlocutory relief:
1) The character and the extent of the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s
interests as they are at the time of the application;
2) The seriousness of the consequences that temporary restraint will impose on the
defendant;
3) The probabilities then discernible as to the ultimate outcome of the trial; and
4) Diverse policy considerations.380
The list of factors listed in Section 936 and the comments to the Restatement is not
limitative, and other factors may be analyzed by courts in addition to the ones presented above.
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The Restatement once more favored flexibility over strict rules like the British American
Cyanamid in-cascade test.
Another approach which is becoming more and more popular is the “Leubsdorf-Posner
formulation”.381 Professor John Leubsdorf laid down the fundamentals of this approach in a
study published in 1978.382 For Leubsdorf, the most important goal of a test for preliminary
injunctions is minimizing errors, by predicting the final outcome of the trial.383 This prediction is
based on comparing the probability of each party to prevail at trial.
“The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights an
injunction would cause by multiplying the probability that the defendant will
prevail by the amount of the irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if
enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal right. It should then make
a similar calculation of the probable irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from
denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the smaller probable loss
should be adopted.”384
Judge Posner later translated this formulation into mathematical form in American
Hospital Supply Corporation v. Hospital Products Limited:385
𝑃 × 𝐻𝑝 > (1 − 𝑃) × 𝐻𝑑,
where P is the probability that the plaintiff will win at trial, Hp is the harm suffered by the
plaintiff if the injunction is denied, and Hd is the harm suffered by the defendant if the injunction
is grated to the plaintiff.386
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Finally, a forth method, developed by Professors Richard Brooks and Warren Schwartz
emphasizes a different goal: promoting efficient behavior.387 Under their formulation, courts
would grant interlocutory relief to any plaintiff willing to incur liability for defendant’s
compliance costs (preferably ex-ante, through a bond), or alternatively would grant relief only if
that would be the most efficient allocation of the resources in dispute. 388 The emphasis is on the
liability rule, which is considered preferable because it obliges the parties to select the behavior
which is most efficient during litigation: a plaintiff knowing his claim is weak will not pursue an
injunction because it will prove more costly to him, whereas a defendant who knows his actions
are wrongful will try to minimize his compliance costs (and the reverse is true when the parties
are confident of their chances).389
b) Mandatory and prohibitory injunctions
More common in practice, prohibitory injunctions are orders which are negative in form,
and named as such because, when granted, their effect is to prohibit a certain act or activity. The
prohibition can be absolute or total, or it can be only partial.390 The legal regime of prohibitory
injunctions is practically the general regime discussed above.
Mandatory injunctions, on the other hand, are subject to special rules, at least in England,
and in American jurisdictions still faithful to the old rules developed in equity. They are orders to
carry out positive works.391 In comparison to prohibitory injunctions, these orders seem more
drastic, and therefore, all things being equal, it is more difficult to obtain a mandatory injunction
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than it is to obtain one in prohibitory form.392 In England today, while in theory mandatory
injunctions remain discretionary, the courts tend to follow the test laid down by Lord Upjohn in
Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris.393 The test is a four-element test, all four of which need to be met
in order for the injunction to be issued. These elements are:
1) A very strong probability that grave damage will accrue to the plaintiff in the future if
the injunction is not issued;
2) Damages would not be a sufficient or adequate remedy;
3) The cost of compliance to the order by the defendant must be balanced with the
probable damage to the plaintiff; and
4) The injunction must be able to be phrased in clear terms, in order for the defendant to
be aware of precisely what is requested of him; an injunction which is phrased in too
general terms and without any guidelines for the defendant would not be issued in
mandatory form.394
In the U.S., under the Restatement, there is no real distinction drawn between mandatory
and prohibitory injunctions. One of the comments to the restatement says that “all injunctions are
mandatory in the sense of requiring compliance with the orders contained in the decree.”395 And
indeed, the flexibility of the factors enumerated in section 936 allows for a common legal
regime. The fact that mandatory injunctions are more harsh in effects can be taken into
consideration when analyzing the relative hardship factor [§936 (1) e)].396
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c. Quia Timet injunctions
Injunctions are named Quia Timet when the party asking for relief does not meet the
requirements of an actionable tort and seeks an injunction in order to prevent the occurrence of a
legal wrong.397 Usually, injunctions are issued when a tort has already been committed and, in
case of torts where damage is an element, this means that before the occurrence of damage, as a
rule, there is no cause of action.398 Injunctions in Quia Timet form are the exception to this rule.
Quia Timet injunctions are exclusively preventive by design. Both the etymology and the history
of this category of injunctions points to its exclusive preventive application. Black’s Law
Dictionary translates “Quia Timet” as meaning literally “because he fears”399 and, according to
Joseph Story, Quia Timet was a generic term used in the old common law for six writs called
brevia anticipatia, or writs of prevention (the Writ of Mesne, Warrantia Chartae, Monstraverunt,
Audita Querea, Curia Claudenda, a Ne injuste Vexes).400 Today the old writs are obsolete, but
the generic term for injunctions issued in order to prevent the occurrence of future torts survived.
In the law of torts, injunctions issued in Quia Timet form are rather rare, both in
England401 and in the U.S.402 The reason for this is the fact that traditionally courts requested
either a probability “almost amounting to moral certainty” that the wrong will occur,403
irreparable harm,404 or the existence of imminent danger of substantial damage to the plaintiff, 405
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or “a strong probability that injury will result”406 in order to grant injunctions in Quia Timet
form.
English cases also show a certain degree of reticence to apply injunctive relief in Quia
Timet form even when the conditions are met. Hooper v. Rogers, a case decided by the English
Court of Appeal in 1975,407 is a great example in this regard. The plaintiff and the defendant in
this case were adjacent landowners. The defendant bulldozed a substantial quantity of soil below
the plaintiff’s house, exposing it to soil erosion which might lead to the eventual collapse of the
plaintiff’s house. Although in this case, Justice Russell apparently relaxed the requirements of
Quia Timet injunctions by explaining the term “imminent damage” as referring to circumstances
when the remedy sought is not premature,408 the court went on affirm the decision of the lower
court where specific relief was substituted with damages (damages in lieu of injunction).409
U.S courts use standards which are similarly stringent to the ones developed by English
courts for Quia Timet injunctions, but it seems that they are less likely to replace injunctive relief
with an award of damages when there is a high probability of harm. The case of Village of
Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., discussed at length above,410 is a great example of a more
modern and flexible approach on Quia Timet relief, though one explanation for the court’s more
careful consideration of the requirements of Quia Timet injunctions in this case might be the fact
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that the threatened harm was environmental and could have potentially affected a great number
of citizens. The standard used by this court was apparently based on a very high probability (“a
dangerous probability”411), yet the whole argument of the court seemed to be centered not on this
standard, but on weighing the interests of all the persons involved in that case (the balancing of
equities).
Considering the heightened standards for Quia Timet injunctions, one thing is certain:
fear alone is not enough in order to obtain injunctive relief!412 The defendant must prove the
existence of a risk and make an effort to quantify that risk, because only a high risk of future
harm will open the door for Quia Timet relief.
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their fellow men, viewed by all with superstitious dread, wandered about the open country, naked
and starving. Hospitals for the relief of those smitten with the terrible malady seem to have been
unknown in antiquity. The sufferers were eventually isolated in villages occupied by them
exclusively. With the tide of emigration westward during the decline of the Roman empire,
leprosy was spread over Europe, and in the Middle Ages it prevailed to an alarming extent; its
principal ravages dating from the first crusades. The influence of Christianity tempered the rigor
of the affliction, and as early as 583 the third council of Lyons directed the bishops of each city to
feed and support the lepers at the expense of the church. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
hospitals and asylums were numbered by hundreds in almost every country. But, whether isolated
in villages in the East, or segregated in hospitals in the West, the leper was completely and forever
an outcast, being considered both legally and politically dead. The advance of civilization, while
in a measure ameliorating his condition, and checking the spread of the pestilence, stripped the
disease of none of the dread with which it had always been regarded by the great majority of
mankind. The horror of its contagion is as deep-seated to-day as it was more than 2,000 years ago
in Palestine. There are modern theories and opinions of medical experts that the contagion is
remote, and by no means dangerous; but the popular belief of its perils, founded on the Biblical
narrative, on the stringent provisions of the Mosaic law that show how dreadful were its ravages,
and how great the terror which it excited, and an almost universal sentiment, the result of a
common concurrence of thought for centuries, cannot, in this day, be shaken or dispelled by mere
scientific asseveration or conjecture.” (emphasis added).
City of Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 39 A. 1081, 1084 (1898). For more details on this period when fear alone
was considered sufficient by some courts to order injunctive relief, see Larry D. Silver, The Common Law of
Environmental Risk and Some Recent Applications, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, at 81-84.
412
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3. Self-help
As opposed to the French civil law, which does not recognize self-help as a remedy, the
common law formally recognizes it as such, and has done so for a very long time.413 In most
situations, self-help is exercised in the form of private action which amounts to self-defense or
private measures which can be defended under necessity.414 Measures taken under the cover of
self-defense or necessity might be preventive, when the commission of a tort is threatened and
the apprehension of harm is immediate. They usually involve drastic measures taken in cases of
grave danger and in close temporal proximity to the harm. These situations can rarely be
analyzed as preventive measures because they are so extreme as to usually constitute a prima
facie case for a tort on their own, only the commission of such a tort is tolerated by the law,
given that it was the only reasonable escape from the apprehended harm.415
It is more adequate to characterize self-help as a preventive remedy in cases of nuisance
or trespass by encroachment. In some situations the law recognizes a right to the plaintiff to take
steps in order to eliminate the nuisance or the trespass by doing works on his own land, and
exceptionally—and only if it can be done peacefully—eliminate the cause of the nuisance or
trespass even from his neighbor’s land.416 This is called a right of abatement.417
There are quite a few practical examples of cases of abatement of nuisance, and they vary
from the very trivial, like trimming the overhanging branches of trees, 418 to very extreme, like
demolition of residential premises because they are causing a serious nuisance.419

413

See WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 14, at 585.
Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170, at 346.
415
For that reason it is also described as a “privilege” of self-defense. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 108.
416
Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170, at 346.
417
Abatement means in this context “to remove”. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 14, at 585.
418
Lemmon v. Webb, (1895) AC 1.
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Davies v. Williams (1851) 16 QB 546.
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4. Declarations of right
Similarly to the functional equivalent from the French Civil Law,420 declarations of right
(UK) or declaratory judgments (U.S.) can be obtained at common law, in order to establish the
existence of a right, or to demonstrate the lawful or unlawful nature of an activity.
The preventive effect of this remedy is obvious,421 since the remedy is usually used in
order to obtain an adjudication which would extinguish the conflict between the parties before a
tortious activity or actual harm would ensue.422
It is important to note that declarations of right are sometimes used in situations where
the court does not feel that an energetic remedy like an injunction should be issued, but wants to
affirm the claimant’s right.423

420

Supra Ch. IV, Part B.3.
This effect, however, is indirect, and not the result of a legal sanction. See infra p. 122-123.
422
See, e.g., Marsh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 760 F. Supp. 2d 701, 709 (N.D. Tex. 2011): “[d]eclaratory judgment
actions are intended to determine the rights of parties when a controversy has arisen, before any wrong has actually
been committed, and are preventative in nature”.
423
Oliphant, Injunctions and Other Remedies, supra note 170, at 345.
421
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CHAPTER V
The Perception of Direct Prevention
In Legal Literature

A. Introduction
Inroads into the legal culture of France, England and the United States are very useful for
explaining how core concepts like “preventive remedies”, “the preventive function” or “the
precautionary principle” came to life, and why they have a place in the law of torts. Looking into
the evolution of tort law in the French legal system and the perception scholars have about tort
liability can explain the jurisprudence applying preventive remedies in its cultural medium. The
same reasoning applies for common law systems. Common law doctrine might not have
theorized the metaphysics and the foundations of the practical remedies created, but the
evolution of the law shows that within the common law systems there is a very intense
preoccupation to systematically arrange preventive remedies and explain their application in the
case law. Because of their practical importance, common law doctrine has done much towards
the purpose of categorizing, documenting and finding the best standards and rules for the
application of preventive remedies.
This chapter contains a description of important theoretical attempts to place the theory
of prevention within the law of torts and of the progress made within legal literature in France,
England and the United States on this issue. It then tries to place these attempts into perspective,
by showing how the structure of each legal system and its culture influenced these theoretical
endeavors.
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B. France
1. Theoretical systems proposed for prevention by French doctrine
It is a feature of the civil law in general, and of French law in particular, for doctrine to
be at the origin of major evolutions in the law of torts. Throughout the past two centuries, French
scholars have been dedicated to the adaptation of the wonderfully simple tort system laid down
by the Code Civil of 1804 to the growing needs of an ever-changing society.
Civilian scholars always had an eye out for changes in society, as well as scientific,
philosophical and anthropological developments. Major theoretical advancements in the law of
torts have been "reactionary", meaning that they were a response to some growing need in
human society.424 Preventive tort liability exhibits this feature: it is a reaction to fundamental
changes in society and it springs out of necessity: the rapid technological development of the
20th and 21st centuries provided the necessary incentive to intensify the debate on prevention
within French doctrine.
There are two main lines of thought regarding the issue of prevention, one which can be
characterized as traditional, and another more progressive.
The first line of thought, for which Professor Geneviève Viney can be seen as a principal
exponent,425 is conservative, in the sense that the arguments which are presented are aimed at
preserving the French retrospective theoretical system. The duty to take precautions is seen as
inherent to fault based liability426 and any change to the traditional fault-based analysis is looked
upon with suspicion. The notion that liability could exist in the absence of damage is found to be
424

There has been a strong response in French doctrine to the societal changes following the industrial revolution
(theories of risk, developed by Saleilles and Josserand), as well as after the second world war (when the protection
of individual rights, particularly human rights and human dignity became a special concern). VINEY, supra note 16,
at 109-27.
425
A good majority of French authors support this line of argument or have similar views. See Viney, supra note 25,
at 1542, n.4.
426
VINEY, supra note 16, at 122, 156; Viney, supra note 25, at 1542.
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particularly troubling.427 The precautionary principle is not ignored, but the focus is placed on
retrospective liability (compensation), and the effects the precautionary principle has on
traditional negligence law.428
Toward the more progressive line, Cyril Bloch’s thesis about the “cessation of illicit
acts”429 marks an important step toward theorizing prevention. The author opened the door for
functional diversity by proving in his study that there are cases where courts intervene by way of
sanctions which are not retrospective (reparatory), but rather prospective in nature.430 He
concluded that courts apply these sanctions or remedies in order to stop activities which are illicit
in nature, based on an autonomous function of civil liability, that of cessation of illicit activities,
which complements the function of compensation.431
More along the progressive line of argument, with Professors Catherine Thibierge,
Mathilde Boutonnet, and Cyril Sintez as principal proponents, the main argument is directed
towards a substantial reassessment of what one ought to understand by “civil liability”, in light of
the philosophical movement of the 20th century and the practical demand for new legal solutions
aimed at avoiding catastrophic and irreversible harm. The precautionary principle is set forth by
these authors as a foundation for “preventive liability”432 and as the normative support for a
“preventive action” (an action which would have the exclusive scope of preventing damage
before it occurs, autonomous from the usual compensatory action).433

427

Viney, supra note 25, at 1542; Rapport à Monsieur Pascal Clément Garde des Sceaux, supra note 5, at 146.
In order to have a veritable preventive action in French law which can be applied generally (and not just for the
protection of particular rights), the intervention of the legislature is considered necessary. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra
note 64, at 21.
429
CYRIL BLOCH, supra note 228.
430
Id. at 132-40.
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Id. at 265, 613.
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Thibierge, supra note 3, at 580;
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BOUTONNET, supra note 25, at 341-45.
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Cyril Sintez’s thesis is probably the most recent on this issue, and he takes this line of
argument to the next level, by showing that, in the jurisprudence, preventive mechanisms have
been employed by courts, and most of the time not on the basis of the precautionary principle,
but in more mundane cases where the principle does not apply.434 The author reunites all the
preventive mechanisms in the law of torts under the concept of “preventive sanction”, which
operates in judicial actions where the court order issued aims either at avoiding damage,
reducing the consequences of damage, or deterring future harmful behavior.435 Therefore, the
jurisprudence he presents proves that the existence of damage is not a necessary condition for an
action in tort.436 Cyril Sintez’s thesis is very broad in scope and thus very original. He is
analyzing all the preventive effects of tort actions, including the ones which fall under the
concept of deterrence, like private penalties and punitive damages.437 His expansive views and
the rejection of fault as an element in or a foundation for a preventive tort action

438

clearly

differentiate his thesis from the traditional line of thought. However, the same broad scope led
the author to go further than the other authors mentioned above, by expanding the domain of
preventive actions beyond that of the precautionary principle, through the concept of preventive
sanction.
A short outline of the evolution of the French law of torts and an introduction to the
precautionary principle, as it appears in the French legal system, can help put these theories into
perspective.

434

See Sintez, supra note 25, at 39-87.
Id. at 29, 242.
436
Id. at 36.
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Id. at 115-35.
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Id. at 454.
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2. A short outline of the evolution of tort law in France
The gist of the French tort law system is to be found in just five civil code articles: 13821386. At their origin these articles were intended to create a universal system of civil liability
inspired by the individualism and moralism of the natural law school,439 having one, and only
one, foundation: the fault principle.440 Every action in tort was supposed to be triggered by three
cumulative elements: fault, damage and causation.441 Through these articles, French law
abandoned medieval forms of actions,442 and the codal system had the great advantage of
concentrating only on the substance of a tort claim. The concept of "fault" was the one and only
foundation for the imposition of civil liability.
This approach endured until the end of the nineteenth century. The development of
industry and the use of machines for various activities proved to be a challenge for a tort system
based solely on fault, especially in a legal system that gives lesser importance to discovery
devices (as opposed to common law systems).443 It became increasingly difficult for victims to
prove fault when industrial or labor accidents occurred or when damage resulted from the use of
machines or vehicles. French doctrine was quick to react, and an alternative foundation was
found in the idea of risk,444 later garantie,445 and nowadays under the idea of control.446 French
tort law opened itself up to a new form of liability no longer dependent on fault: strict liability,
thus creating a broader basis for recovery.
439

The French code civil was largely inspired in this regard from the doctrinal texts of Jean Domat. VINEY, supra
note 16, at 21. See also JEAN DOMAT, 1 LES LOIS CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL; LE DROIT PUBLIC ET LEGUM
DELECTUS 205-212 (1777); For a translation in English of Domat's treatise see J EAN DOMAT, 1 THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS
NATURAL ORDER (Cuther S. Cushing trans., Little, Brown & Co. 1853).
440
VINEY, supra note 16, at 23.
441
These are the three elements of fault based liability even today. FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 14, at 85.
442
VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 50, at 2.
443
See JOHN HENRY MERRIMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1015 (The Michie Company 1994).
444
VINEY, supra note 16, at 110-11;
445
BORIS STARCK, ESSAI D'UNE THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DE LA RÉSPONSABILITÉ CIVILE, CONSIDÉRÉE EN SA DOUBLE
FONCTION DE GARANTIE ET DE PEINE PRIVÉE (L. Rodstein 1947).
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LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 14, at 1809.
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It is important to mention that strict liability did not take over, and never replaced fault
based liability completely. The new theories of strict liability were accepted and applied
successfully based on an extensive interpretation of existing codal provisions to those areas of
tort law where the problem arose (mainly for accidents—liability for things under one's guard,
animals and the ruin of buildings, as well as for vicarious liability).447 However, strict liability
was rejected by courts as a general rule. Fault survived, but had to share its reign with strict
liability.448
The next step was for the law of torts to develop outside the Code Civil. These extraneous
texts followed the general trend. Various new laws introduced a series of strict liability schemes
during the 20th century.449 Some legislative acts went even beyond strict liability, allowing
compensation even for cases of force majeure (act of god).450
The role played by legal doctrine in this process was essential, not only because of a
diversification of foundations of liability, but also because after the first world war, authors like
Boris Stark and André Tunc argued forcefully for a new approach in the area of tort
compensation, which is mindful of the interests of victims.451 The result was a shift from
emphasizing the importance of sanctioning wrongful behavior of the tortfeasor (the normative
function, understood as sanctioning morally wrong behavior452), towards a focus on individual
rights and the interests of victims. That is why French tort law became more and more "victimfriendly" and “victim-oriented”, and the legal discourse focused so much on compensation.453
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VINEY, supra note 16, at 121.
Id.
449
See supra notes 152, 153 & 155.
450
E.g., Loi 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985, supra note 66.
451
VINEY, supra note 16, at 116-19.
452
And consequently, at changing the behavior of persons in order to conform to socially acceptable standards.
VINEY, supra note 16, at 86.
453
France is a jurisdiction where many compensation schemes, usually accompanied by comprehensive mandatory
insurance schemes, are based on national solidarity. Examples include compensation funds created for medical
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3. The road towards functional diversity
The great challenge for prevention-oriented authors in the context of the French tradition
is to escape the exclusivity of the compensatory function. Looking at the functions of civil
liability, Professor Thibierge pointed out that although compensation is commonly regarded as
the sole or the principal function of tort liability today, it was not always so.454 Taking a step
back and looking at things in a historical perspective, French law has been going through a
dynamic process that implies the diversification of the functions of liability, although this
process is not readily apparent. In order to understand this process one ought to look at the law of
torts in France from an earlier starting point—prior to the French Civil Code. Liability in general,
civil and criminal, historically went through a maturing process.455 This maturing process looks
very much like cell division in biology.456 The predominant function of tort law in the beginning
of the middle age has been the punitive function,457 which at those early stages of societal
evolution seemed sufficient, civil and criminal law coexisting in the law of torts. Gradually, from
within the punitive function, compensation grew as an accessory function, matured through time,
and finally the two functions were permanently separated.458 Liability in general can be said to
have reached a certain level of maturity when compensation separated from punishment. In
France, the scission between the punitive function and the compensatory function coincides with

accidents, crimes and acts of terrorism, contamination due to blood transfusions, asbestos-related injuries, or damage
generated by hunting activities. See LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 14, at nos. 724, 763, 8334, 8490, 8508, 8545,
8571.
454
Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580.
455
Id.
456
Cell division is a process which involves the distribution of identical genetic material, the DNA, from an initial
cell to two or more daughter cells.
http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/genetics/vgec/highereducation/topics/cellcycle-mitosis-meiosis/ (Last visited May
11, 2013).
457
VINEY, supra note 16, at 12, 162.
458
Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580.
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the division between criminal liability and civil liability459—one centered on punishment of
unlawful behavior, and the other on compensation of damage.
Now separated, these new cells—civil liability and criminal liability—started evolving on
their own, and continued the maturing process. Criminal law is no longer exclusively punitive,
having accessory functions of disgorgement,460 re-education and rehabilitation,461 or
incapacitation.462 Civil liability is adding on new functions as well, such as disgorgement463 and,
of course, prevention.
That is why Professor Thibierge anticipated a new division,464 triggered by the fact that
compensatory function has reached its peak,465 where the preventive function would grow from
the compensatory function into an autonomous function. Thus, a new form of liability would

459

The exact moment when this scission occurred in legal thinking and in practice is not very clear. What is a
certain, however, is the fact that by the time of Domat there was a distinction, although not always very clear,
between civil law and criminal law. VINEY, supra note 16, at 15-16, 162.
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deterrent effect. HARVEY WALLACE & CLIFFORD ROBERSON, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2nd ed., Allyn and
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Council, Proceeds of organized crime. Ensuring that “crime does not pay”, at 3 (Brussels, 20 Nov. 2008, COM
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Id.
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emerge—called “preventive liability”— which, unlike its progenitor, would not require damage
as an element, the whole point of preventive liability being to have the possibility to intervene
prior to the occurrence of any injury. 466
However compelling and logical this may seem, there are still many reasons to keep
preventive remedies within the civil law, and simply diversify the functions of civil liability,
instead of creating a new form of liability. Preventive liability and compensatory liability have
more things in common than things that set them apart, and for that reason, a separation does not
seem necessary. Perhaps the only essential difference is the position of the decision-maker in
time. But, having previously seen that liability intrinsically has a retrospective and a prospective
side which not only coexist, but are interdependent,467 a scission between preventive and
compensatory liability would make it harder to approach the interdependencies between the two
perspectives on liability. Civil liability and criminal liability, on the other hand, are bridged by a
great number of differences which explain why it was necessary to separate them. It is clear that
distinctions between civil liability and criminal liability, as well as between compensatory
liability and preventive liability, should be based on the characteristics of the legal effects
attached to liability and not liability itself. Criminal liability is distinguished from civil liability
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Thibierge, Avenir de la responsabilité, supra note 3, at 580. The way the author describes this new, prospective
form of liability makes it seem like a form of liability based on the precautionary principle. Id. From this point of
view, this model seems to be too narrow, since there are many cases where preventive action is necessary without
having to deal with catastrophic harm or scientific uncertainty. On the other hand, the model is too broad, because
the author sees it as a form of liability that transcends the civil law, or even national law, having a transversal
domain. Id. at 580-81. A general and default system of direct prevention needs to be developed in the civil law,
because prevention involves first and foremost inter-personal relations. At a national level, of course, the
administration can take special measures for special circumstances, especially the ones envisaged by the
precautionary principle, where the interest of large collectivities or the nation as a whole is at stake. At international
level, the cooperation between states and the development of international institutions is apt to find solutions for
situations that involve the interests of many states, or humanity as a whole. Of course, the precautionary principle
can be present at all these levels and be applied in the decision-making process, and at a national and international
level problems of liability will need to be addressed, but they would have their specificity and there is nothing to
gain from uniting the rules that are applied in the private law with the ones applied in public law and international
law.
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See supra p. 29.
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because of its different function(s), but also because the legal relationship generated by criminal
liability is between the state and the accused, as opposed to civil liability, where the legal
relationship is between two private persons.468 That is why a different procedure is attached to
criminal liability,469 with different guarantees. Also, criminal sanctions are of a different nature
and are based on the violation of a behavioral norm expressly incriminated by the law. The
incrimination texts in the criminal law also refer to particular types of fault, whereas in the civil
law, any type of fault, even the culpa levissima, gives rise to liability.470 By contrast, “preventive
liability” creates relationships between persons, just like “compensatory liability”. 471 Also, both
preventive remedies and compensation are triggered by the breach of a pre-existing legal duty,
and the general duty of care which operates in the realm of compensation can act as a basis for
preventive remedies as well (when the actor fails to take reasonable precautions). Compensatory
(reparatory) and preventive remedies do not have to violate specific texts in the law in order to
apply or to dictate their content. The general field of application of preventive remedies, and the
generality of the duty to take reasonable precautions, would warrant keeping them in the private
law and, more specifically, in the civil law. The law can, of course, create preventive
mechanisms and special preventive remedies for particular rights, and this can be done in other
areas of the law or within the civil law. Administrative law has much to do with the regulation of
preventive and precautionary measures. Special provisions can be enacted for the protection of
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The legal action is also brought by the state in case of criminal liability, whereas in case of civil liability, the
action is introduced by a private person (the victim). VINEY, supra note 16, at 164.
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particular rights, which require special attention.472 The question is: can or should there be a set
of default rules for preventive remedies in the law, and if so, in what part of the law should they
be developed? The author of this study believes that a set of default rules for direct prevention
can and should be developed within the civil law, and more precisely within the area of tort
law,473 and there is enough jurisprudential support for such a conclusion.474 If direct prevention
deals with legal relationships between private persons and a set of general default rules can be
devised for the application of such remedies, then the default place for direct prevention is also
going to be the civil law of torts.
4. The emergence of new species of damages and the precautionary principle
For the author advancing it, the new concept of “preventive liability” seems intrinsically
linked with the precautionary principle.475 The necessity for prevention is seen as a consequence
of two realities: the dangers of catastrophic harm generated by new levels of power attained by
man, mainly due to the use of modern technology; and the realization that many of the modern
risks are generated in activities where a high degree of scientific uncertainty makes their
assessment extremely difficult. It is in large part a reflection of the philosophical ideas laid down
by Hans Jonas.476 For Jonas and for the authors who embraced his philosophy, the emergence of
new species of damages, triggered by the use of modern technology, 477 mandate a transformation
in our understanding of key ethical and juridical concepts. The premise is that the technological
era, besides transforming our lives for the better, has exposed mankind to unprecedented danger.
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Code).
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A tool was required in order to safeguard collective interests in a climate of scientific
uncertainty.
The precautionary principle was mentioned in a number of international conferences
regarding pollution,478 before finally receiving universal recognition within the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development.479 European countries and the European Union were quick to
adopt the principle. The European Union introduced the precautionary principle in Article 130r
(2) of the Maastricht treaty,480 and then again in art. 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (Lisbon treaty).481 The member states are obliged to follow this policy and are
directly bound by article 191 of the Lisbon treaty after ratification. Subsequent EU legislation
related to environmental and health issues, particularly Directives482 and Regulations,483 is also
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See Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Declaration of Ministers (London, 24-25
Nov. 1987), at VII: "Accepting that, in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such
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based on the precautionary principle. The topics range from environmental issues in general,484
pollution,485 movement of chemical substances,486 and genetically modified micro-organisms.487
Other documents make the precautionary principle a guiding principle in the Union's food
policy,488 or recommend it in the area of consumer protection.489
In France, the precautionary principle was first introduced into ordinary legislation,490
and in 2005 it was introduced in the French Constitution through the Environmental Charter.491
Courts, whether administrative,492 or civil,493 have clearly been influenced by the precautionary
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principle in their analysis and decisions. A number of lower courts and courts of appeal have
even imposed preventive remedies based on the precautionary principle, 494 but this practice is
likely to stop after a recent decision from the Tribunal de Conflits, which severely curtailed the
jurisdiction of civil courts.495
Applying the precautionary principle means to give more weight to safety, in the sense of
securing the essential rights of human beings and humanity as a whole: the rights to life, health
and a clean environment, as opposed to the interests of industry.
What must always be kept in mind is the fact that the precautionary principle is rather
specialized and should have a narrow scope. In order to apply the principle, the situation must be
one where:
(1) The risk is major, and has to be both catastrophic and irreversible; and
(2) There is scientific uncertainty influencing the assessment of the risks involved.
Only when these cumulative conditions are fulfilled, can the precautionary principle be
applied. It is important to emphasize the two conditions for the application of the precautionary
principle because they also reveal the steps which need to be taken before reaching the
conclusion that the situation is of the sort which requires a decision based on the principle.
Particularly the second condition, regarding scientific uncertainty, must never be ignored. The
decision-maker must make best efforts to scientifically assess the risks of a situation before

case involving the installment of relay antennas. Conseil d’État [CE] [highest administrative court], July 19, 2010,
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reaching the conclusion that recourse to the precautionary principle is necessary. 496 The
precautionary principle works as a “tie-breaker”, when the scientific evidence can only produce
approximations which do not incline the balance one way or the other. Also, it is not enough just
to show that there are contradictory studies. If on one side there are studies which are great in
number and reputable, and on the other a few studies which suffer in credibility, there is contrary
proof, but hardly any true scientific uncertainty. It might, however, be necessary to rethink and
reimagine the measures taken in order to assure that scientific investigation is not biased, and
perhaps more weight should be given to studies produced by independent and objective
scientists.
The precautionary principle needs to be understood as a “principle of action,”497 not as a
paralyzing one, and as an expression of a humanistic498 approach for the 21st century. The
present generation seems to be living at the expense of future generations and the world faces
serious environmental problems which require special attention. We find ourselves today in a
position where in order to preserve our future, we must practice some form of self-restraint, and
it might be the moment to resurrect an idea exposed by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to James
Madison: “that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”499 We should not forget that we are
mortal, and that this world is not ours to keep. The precautionary principle, in its moral
dimension, transmits a wake-up call to a generation that is sacrificing the future of its children
and the generations to come. In its technical dimension, however, it is often misunderstood as
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economically paralyzing,500 while in truth it is a principle which encourages action, only it has to
be “action accompanied by wisdom.”501 Applied correctly, the precautionary principle serves the
higher interests of society and even promotes both large scale and long term economic efficiency
and scientific discovery and innovation.502 The precautionary principle implies a particular way
of acting, which has to be rigorous, in the sense that the lack of certainty does not excuse
decision-makers from analyzing and managing risks strictly503 and with great attention to detail,
employing all available data, and flexible, in the sense that the measures must be subject to
revision,504 since more scientific data can come in the future and change the results of the risk
analysis, or new technology can help control the risks better.
C. England and the United States. A brief survey on the evolution of tort law and
the preventive function in the common law
If prevention is likely to grow in the civil law as an extension of tort liability, just like a
new branch grows in a tree, in the common law, prevention looks more like an entirely different
tree, having been developed mainly by the chancellor in equity, and not by common law courts.
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In the common law, the law of torts never reached the level of generality encountered in
the French civil law. Such a generalization was not considered desirable 505 and would come into
conflict with the cautious,506 stratified507 way in which the law of torts evolved in the common
law. Tort law developed on a case-by-case basis, with an emphasis on the facts of each particular
case. Large classifications founded on the substantive abstractions are relatively foreign to the
common law. Historically, the law of torts began not with authentic general principles, but with
an enumeration of particular remedies.508 That is why the whole classificatory logic of the law of
torts, or the lack of it,509 is grounded in the old common law procedure, which was based on the
causes of action. Each cause of action was associated to a specific fact pattern, and a wrong was
actionable only if it fit the cause of action attached to it. Even though procedural law is no longer
dependent on the old causes of action, substantive tort law kept the old structure. 510 Today, the
law of torts still looks like a “miscellaneous group of civil wrongs.”511
Some torts are, however, more general than others. The highest level of generality was
reached by the tort of negligence, which seized a substantial portion of the territory occupied by
tort law.512 Based on a general duty of care, negligence triggered in common law theory a
505
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reaction against the “pigeonhole”513 approach, and attempts were made to replace the
classification based on the old causes of action with classifications based on general
principles.514 Although courts have accepted the generality of negligence, other more narrow
torts, which were based on the old causes of action, endured (such as battery, conversion,
trespass to land, etc.). Consequently, the “pigeonhole” approach was never fully abandoned.
This does not mean that the common law is in any way rigid or that the list of torts and
protected interests are set in stone.515 Both in American and English law, torts need not be
nominate, and the mere fact that a claim is novel should not, of itself, operate as a bar to the
remedy.516 New torts are constantly being created by courts.517
A series of similarities can be found between common law and civil law systems, when it
comes to the development of the law of torts. The same phenomenon of expansion of liability
that we have previously analyzed in the civil law was experienced in an almost equal measure
within the common law.518 However, in the common law, the expansion of liability materialized
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through the judicial creation of new causes of action,519 as opposed to the civil law, where the
enlargement of tort law was based primarily on the interpretation of codal provisions.
Also similarly to the civil law, a direct relation between the changes in the law and the
evolution and sophistication of society has been proven by experience. In the words of Justice
Miller from the Supreme Court of West Virginia: “the history of the common law is one of
gradual judicial development and adjustment of the case law to fit to changing conditions of
society.” 520
Generally, the civil law and the common law systems deal largely with the same types of
problems, and that is why it is normal for them to move towards similar solutions.521 The ways in
which the law reaches these solutions, however, is quite different, in the sense that the concepts
and the techniques employed are different. Also, the doctrinal speech is distinct. As opposed to
the civil law, where doctrine generally sees the law of torts as a mono-function subject matter, in
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the common law, a great majority of legal doctrine characterizes tort law today as being
functionally diverse.522 The use of punitive damages shows that the punitive function still has a
great impact on the law of torts in the common law, and this is acknowledged in doctrine as
well.523 A few authors mention even the preventive function of tort law.524 It is true that some
identify the preventive function with the concept of deterrence,525 but there are also others who
attach it to the special remedies created by the courts of equity, with a particular emphasis on
injunctions.526
Although there is no theoretical equivalent to the abstract notion of “preventive liability”
in the common law, preventive remedies do operate directly in the case law. Injunctions,
declaration of rights, self-help, or estoppel,527 have been used to prevent the occurrence of harm
for a very long time in the common law. It would not be wrong to say that these remedies
actually have primarily a preventive purpose, being often applied prior to any manifestation of
injury, and sometimes even before a wrongful act is completed.528 The pragmatism of the
common law led to a very sophisticated classification of preventive remedies, generally accepted
in doctrine and in the case law.
The principles and rules regarding preventive remedies are almost identical in English
and American law. However, there are great differences when it comes to a more specialized
522
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application of the preventive function: the precautionary principle. Although, as of yet, we found
no evidence that the precautionary principle penetrated the law of torts in English law, as a
regulatory principle, it seems as though in England, both in theory and in practice, the
precautionary principle is widely used by the Government in the regulatory process. 529 England
fully embraced the principles set forth in the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development530 and the guidelines set forth by the European Commission.531 It is doubtful that
the principle has any direct normative value, but it is applied as a guide for the enactment of
specialized legislation or administrative regulations.532 On the other side of the Atlantic,
American law shows a high degree of reticence when it comes to the precautionary principle.
Influential American scholars consider the precautionary principle “paralyzing—forbidding
inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between,”533 and the principle is not mentioned
in legislation or administrative regulations. That does not mean that the U.S. does not employ
precautionary measures, particularly when it comes to administrative regulations. Governmental
policy is ambivalent in this respect. Although the phrase “precautionary principle” as such is
virtually non-existent, there is evidence that some regulatory schemes follow a precautionary
approach. For instance, the Clean Air Act,534 talks about an “adequate margin of safety” when
regulating air quality standards. There are also some voices that support a careful implementation
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of the precautionary principle in the American legal system,535 but so far, there is no sign that the
U.S. is going to take this step. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that no trace of a direct
application of the precautionary principle in a tort action in the United States can be found.
D. Individualism and collectivism in the law of torts
After contrasting doctrinal perceptions in French law with their equivalents in English
and American law, the end result is rather fascinating, but not at all surprising. The dominant
intellectual and political trends permeate the way the area of prevention has been approached. In
France, the emphasis on collectivism and solidarity created a medium where the precautionary
principle flourished. The precautionary principle is, of course, well adapted to deal with
collective interests. It is a safeguard against catastrophic harm, and ideal for the purpose of
avoiding damage to large classes or groups of persons, and large scale application (perhaps even
trans-nationally). There can be no doubt that that the precautionary principle had fertile ground
for development. Generally, the philosophical shift from individualism to collectivism produced
positive consequences, by assuring that victims have a broader base for compensation, by
distributing major risks into society through insurance, and—why not?—by applying the
precautionary principle. But one can get the feeling that somewhere along this process, human
beings as individuals are being forgotten. French law provides certain preventive remedies for
individuals, but the conditions are very stringent, and the remedies are weak in application, at
least in comparison to their functional equivalents from the common law.536 The consequence in
the law of torts is that some influential theoreticians have associated the preventive function of
the law particularly with the precautionary principle.537 The common law, on the other hand, has
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remained in large part individualistic (although England is moving closer to the continental
trend). The consequence is, of course, a dose of reticence towards the precautionary principle, if
not its total rejection. This does not mean that the common law has made little progress in
adapting the law of torts to the realities of modern society, only that the path has been different.
The common law focused not on the challenges faced by collectivities in the modern world, but
on the challenges that the individual is faced with.
The development of preventive remedies in the common law was triggered by the need to
best serve individuals and protect their rights and interests. As opposed to the civilian preventive
remedies, the remedies developed by the common law have more flexible requirements, are
expedient and more effective, but only address risks which are local and individual, easy to
identify and easy to quantify.538
The need to develop preventive remedies serving human beings as individuals, and which
are based on conventional risk assessment, is just as stringent as the need to respond to
uncertainty and catastrophic harm. The same societal changes linked to technological
developments, growing interconnectivity and population growth also trigger the need to secure
individual rights more effectively than before. Property rights, the right to privacy, human
dignity, as well as a great number of individual liberties,539 are under heavy attack in the 21st
century. The vital interests of the individual must not be ignored, and the law must find ways to
defend these rights and liberties in conjunction with collective interests.
That is why a general theory of prevention can draw inspiration from both common law
and civil law theory, and the idea of a hybrid might be appealing. A balanced practical system
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must take into consideration collective, as well as individual interests, and must combine
traditional risk assessment with modern models based on uncertainty.
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Chapter VI
Analytical Tools for a Dynamic Theory of Direct Prevention
The Fault Based Standard and Risk Assessment Techniques

A. Towards a gap filling theory of prevention?
What is the law of torts if not the set of default rules for legal liability? Other forms of
liability encountered in the law cannot take up the charge of devising default rules. Criminal law
is specialized and premised on the principle of legality: nulla poena sine lege,540 the maxim says.
A special provision in the law is needed in order to incriminate a particular type of behavior
abhorrent in the eyes of the legislator. The law of contractual liability is also specialized.
Contractual liability cannot deal with behavior generally because the premise for this type of
liability is the breach of a contractual obligation.541 In both the civil law and the common law,
tort liability is described as that area of civil liability that is left after contractual liability is
subtracted.542
If tort liability is the default law of liability, within it one ought to find a set of default
rules. Finding such rules might seem an easy endeavor in the area of compensation. Even there
however, outside the law of negligence, which indeed is general, there are many special regimes
(examples would include strict liability schemes or intentional torts in the common law) which
follow slightly different rules. Notwithstanding, there is a strong cohesiveness to civil liability
when analyzed from the standpoint of compensation. The rules regarding compensation in the
law of torts seem to cover the gaps whenever it is necessary.
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“No punishment without the law authorizing it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 1098.
E.g., FABRE-MAGNAN, supra note 14, at 15 ; PROSSER, supra note 13, at 2;
542
Id.
541
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The law of prevention on the other hand, might leave the impression that it operates ad
hoc and with no real structure. It looks as if generalization so far was limited to the division of
sanctions (remedies) based on their procedural effects. These has been no attempt as of yet to
bind preventive remedies under a common standard, common mathematics, common elements or
any determined foundation. It can hardly even be said that all preventive remedies have been
accounted for so far in the literature.543
Even without a full map of preventive remedies, what is beyond all doubt proven already
is the fact that there are some coercive mechanisms used in the law in order to anticipate future
damage and prevent it. That much is obvious from the case law.544
Taking the list of remedies analyzed herein, however, when looking at their nature, the
only ones which can be characterized as preventive remedies, as expressions of direct
prevention,545 are injunctions (and their functional equivalents).
Declarations of right are remedies, even though they are not coercive in the sense that
force can be used in order to put them into execution. Declarations of right only recognize the
existence of a right or characterize a situation as licit or illicit. There is no real coercion in case
of declaratory remedies, since the desired effects of such a judgment are not accomplished by
force; the authority of the judgment itself provides its effectiveness. In this regard, declaratory
judgments are probably the most civilized and elegant remedies which can be used for preventive
purposes, even though they are the least energetic. However, declarations of right are not
preventive, in the sense of direct prevention. Declarations of right do not bind the defendant for
an alternative course of action than the one he is engaged in; they have merely a deterrent effect,
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Although the effort expended by some scholars in this respect needs to be recognized. Cyril Bloch and Cyril
Sintez have brought an immense contribution towards this end. See Bloch, supra note 228; Sintez, supra note 25.
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See supra Ch. IV.
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See definition of “direct prevention” supra at p. 25.
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and therefore prevention is mediated. The direct effect of declarations of right is simply the
judicial affirmation of the rights and duties of the parties. The court does not decide what course
of action would be in violation of the law, and that is why prevention is achieved indirectly—the
decision-making process is still in the hands of the actor, not the court.
Self-help is also not a preventive remedy, stricto sensu. The possibility given to a party to
intervene preventively is based on his right or liberty to intervene, according to the
circumstances. The court decision, if the case would eventually go to court because of a dispute,
is either merely declaratory (recognizing that the potential victim was right or wrong to
intervene), or compensatory (the case of private preventive expenses). The potential victim,
using self-help for preventive purposes, is not using the coercive apparatus of the state.
That is why the default rules for direct prevention need to be extracted from the
jurisprudence regarding injunctions and other similar mechanisms.
B. Methodology and the importance of time in the law of preventive torts
Imagine the law of torts as a coin, with compensation on one side of it, and prevention on
the other. A coin has two sides, but it is just one object and it serves its purpose as a whole.
Similarly, prevention and compensation should be understood as a comprehensive whole in the
law of torts. Of course there are differences between the two types of remedies, but they do serve
a common purpose: the recognition and safeguard of rights and protected interests, and the
enforcement of the correlative duties that come with these rights.
The key difference between compensation and prevention is the temporal position of the
decision-maker.
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On the one side of tortious liability, judges do their best to paint a clear image of a past
event. They act in many respects like historians, or detectives, looking into whatever evidence
the present still preserved of the past, in order to retrace steps and paint the picture of past events.
On the other side of the coin, judges must paint something that looks more like a puzzle
with missing pieces. They are looking at evidence gathered from the past and from the present,
and try to calculate and anticipate future events, struggling to imagine what the future might hold
based on accessible information from the present.
The reality that time opens up in both directions—the past and the future—needs to be
acknowledged accordingly in legal science. Any theoretical model for the law of torts which
does not take time into consideration would ignore the inherent dynamism which characterizes
the a priori conditions of the decision-making process in an area of the law which is inescapably
fact dependent.
It is the way we think and the way we design models of reasoning in the law of torts that
has to integrate time. In this area of the law, the dependence on factual considerations condemns
any system of practical reasoning which is a-temporal and based on absolute certainty.
Generally, the science of the 20th and the 21st century is no longer a science of certainties. The
study of uncertainty has brought about immense progress in other fields of study, like physics
(quantum physics to be more exact).546 It is the moment for legal science to take up the challenge
of understanding uncertainty and build theories of liability apt to respond to the challenges of the
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E.g., “the uncertainty principle” developed by Werner Heisenberg. See Jan Hilgevoord & Jos Uffink, The
Uncertainty Principle in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2012 ed.),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/#Hei (Last visited May 20, 2013).
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unknown.547 Anticipating the future is no less scientific than uncovering the past—it is perhaps
even more so.
It is probable that the separation between procedure and substantial law has perpetuated
the illusion that when dealing with the past, the decision-making process is based on certainties.
The truth is that there is some degree of uncertainty in every tort action, only usually the
uncertainty is dealt with by procedural law. It has been the role of civil procedure to minimize or
eliminate uncertainty as to past events. Standards of proof like “more probable than not” are
based on a probabilistic approach, yet, once the standard is met, uncertainty is ignored.548 So far,
substantive tort law cared little about uncertainty or probabilities. The reason for this is the
employment of “check-list tests” for liability. In order to make such a system workable, every
element in a tort action so far had to be finite and determinable. An element either had to exist or
not to exist.
“Check-list” systems are applied for the determination of liability throughout the law of
torts, and these theoretical models are not just the fancy of scholars. The influence on
jurisprudence is more than obvious. Almost every conceivable tort is analyzed, theoretically and
practically, on the basis of a static sequence of elements, which compose the prima facie case
(i.e., the sets of facts which need to be proved by the plaintiff in order to obtain relief).549 The
test itself implies that once the burden of proof was met for an element, any nuance introducing
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The parallel with physics is not drawn randomly. Preventive remedies can be applied only after using the facts of
the present in order to anticipate the future. In 2004, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Physics, David Gross,
described physics as a science where, given the past, the future is predicted. See Bradley Dowden, Time, at §3-f,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/time/ (Last visited May 20, 2013).
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See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs in FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
124, 125 (Saul Levmore coord., Oxford University Press 1994).
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E.g., (In the common law) for battery: an act causing harmful or offensive contact and intent to cause harmful or
offensive contact; for negligence: duty and breach, causation, and damage; etc.; (In the French civil law) for fault
based liability: fault, causation and damage; and for strict liability: the fait générateur, causation and damage.
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uncertainty into the element must necessarily be ignored, and therefore the facts for which the
burden proof is satisfied need to be treated as absolutes (the absolute truth).550
Moreover, the fact that tort liability focuses on the compensatory function, and has done
so for such a long time, generated a system which, from procedure to substance, is reactive,
rather than proactive.551 Integrating preventive remedies in the law of torts generates the need to
renew the methodology and the mathematics employed in this field.
The static representations and the exact mathematics that supported the traditional,
compensatory approach on civil liability need not be condemned. They are the result of legal
thinking that stretches over hundreds of years. However, the models of reasoning used for
compensatory remedies are insufficient for preventive remedies.
What is meant by static representations is the analysis based on breaking down the facts
into disjunctive elements: a check-list approach. If all the elements of the tort action are met, the
plaintiff would receive his compensation. If just one was absent, the action would be defeated
and the defendant would win. Typically,552 these elements are based on three factual
determinations: an act susceptible of generating liability,553 damage, and causation.554
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Levmore, supra note 548, at 125.
Or reparatory (curative), rather than preventive. See BOUTONNET, supra note 25, at 6.
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I have chosen the law of negligence as the typical representation for the common law, because negligence is the
most general tort and representative for the common law approach on torts during the past two centuries. For French
law, fault based liability is the typical example, yet much of what is discussed in this sub-chapter can apply for strict
liability as well.
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In the common law, from this factual determination the judge can establish the elements of duty and breach of
duty, whereas in the civil law, this factual pattern helps to establish fault or le fait générateur.
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The common law splits the element of causation in two: (a) cause in fact and (b) legal cause. DOBBS, supra note
13, at 407-08.
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For prevention, the static check-list approach needs to be substituted with a purposive,
dynamic system, where the law of torts intervenes progressively from the moment a risk is
introduced, until the last manifestation of damage. Prevention must assess dangers and anticipate
damage, and it must be flexible enough to do so without infringing on individual freedom.
Even traditional tests for the imposition of compensatory remedies can hardly be said to
be static, except in some of our representations of it (like the one presented above). The static
check-list approach can be challenged even from within its own structure. The element of
causation introduces a form of dynamic representation in the law of torts. Causation links A to B,
because the damage element must be causally linked to the act reproached to the defendant,
meaning that the act is the cause, and damages are the effect.

As a matter of convention, one generally uses the terms “cause” and “effect” in order to
distinguish the earlier and the latter members of a pair of events which are related in a particular
manner:555 the earlier one triggers the latter.
Causation itself is therefore an emergent concept; it is derivative from a concept more
fundamental to science: Time. If B is the effect of A, then necessarily A precedes B. In a
dynamic sequence, the arrow of causation is but a segment of the arrow of time, linking two
interrelated events.
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The philosopher David Hume described this relationship as “a matter of constant conjunction” (event A’s causing
event B is simply a matter of event B always occurring if A does). Dowden, supra note 547, at §2.
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Time itself is a concept which we employ for the purpose of ordering events.556 The most
common mental representation we have of time is a straight line or an arrow: linear time.557 The
linear representation of time is particularly useful when ordering causally related events. The
concept of linear time has been employed in the law of torts, although without much notice,
because this is the only way we can make sense of elements related by causation. 558 We order
and understand the elements of negligence causally. Yet, doctrinal analysis so often ignores the
dynamic of fact patterns. Causation has become almost incomprehensible, both in the civil law
and in the common law, either because of multiple standards,559 or because it is broken down as
a hybrid between fact and policy,560 instead of what it is in its nature, a dynamic temporal
relationship between interrelated events.561
Every tort can be placed in a temporal segment. The beginning point is the act of the
tortfeasor (t1) and the endpoint is the last manifestation of damage suffered (t2). For some facts
generative of responsibility, the timeframe is relatively short. For others, however, the timeframe
can stretch for months and years. Traditionally, the decision-making process was supposed to
take place after the occurrence of the tortious event and the manifestation of damage (t3).

556

Id. (Introduction).
Id. at §3-d.
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Which should come as no surprise; on a more general level, Immanuel Kant argued that our reason creates the
linear representation of time, because our inner intuition cannot give shape to the “relation of representations” (
representations which themselves stem from our mind). IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 77 (Norman
Kemp Smith trans., Mcmillan & Co. 1965).
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The civil law, for instance, has imagined a good number of alternative theories explaining the standards for
causation, like “the theory of equivalence between conditions”, “The theory of proximate cause”, “The theory of
adequate cause”, etc. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 211, at 188-96. The common law also uses multiple tests
for causation. See DOBBS, supra note 13, at 409-17.
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Particularly in American common law theory. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 407-08.
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That means that when discussing legal causation, scientific causation is always the starting point. Of course, that
does not mean that the two are one and the same, because the reverse is not true: not every causal relationship in the
scientific sense has legal relevance, i.e., not all factual (scientific) causal relationships qualify as legal causation.
Radé, supra note 69, at 113.
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During the 20th century courts started to deal with situations where they would have to
make a decision from somewhere within the temporal segment. Taking just French law as an
example for this evolution (in order to illustrate this particular point), some of the first cases
dealing with this problem involved the recognition of future damage.562 Initially, future damage
was recognized only when the plaintiff was able to prove that the future damage is certain to
occur.563 This created the illusion that future damage is a reality of the present, and therefore the
structure and the analysis did not change. This fiction proved to be more and more paralyzing
with the passage of time. Issues involving loss of a chance564 and the compensation of future
damage which is only probable, and not certain, compelled courts to change their approach and
employ compensatory remedies based on probabilistic calculations.565 One such example is
provided by a case involving the compensation of damages for contracting HIV due to
defendant’s negligence.566 At the moment of trial the plaintiff was infected with the HIV virus,
but had not developed AIDS at that point. The Court of Cassation in France had to imagine a
mechanism which would take into account the probable evolution of the virus. The court
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VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 211, at 84-85.
Id. citing Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters], June 1, 1932.
564
For a general discussion on loss of a chance, see VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 211, at 87-103; DOBBS, supra
note 13, 434-41.
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VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 211, at 87-103, at 103.
566
Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2 e civ., July 20, 1993, RTD Civ. 1994, at 108 (obs.
Patrice Jourdain); For a similar solution regarding professional malpractice (notary), see Cour de Cassation
[Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 1 e civ., Fevruary 29, 2000, RTD Civ. 2000, at 576 (obs. Patrice
Jourdain);
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ingeniously decided to order compensation for HIV in a lump sum immediately due, and
separately, compensation for AIDS under a suspensive condition [the obligation would be
enforced only if and when the plaintiff reached stage IV (AIDS)].567

The idea of ex-post judicial intervention has been going through a process of erosion,
which began in the area of compensation. Preventive remedies are the next step in this process.
The decision-maker is simply given more tools in order to actually break the normal chain of
causation and prevent the occurrence of damage. Preventive remedies are more advanced
methods of enforcing the age-old legal duty to take precautions in order to avoid harm to legally
protected interests.
Preventive remedies are characterized by the fact that the decision-making process is
situated somewhere on the causation segment, between the first act which introduces the risk of
harm and the last manifestation of harm (between T1 and T2, at T3). Even Quia Timet
injunctions, which can be issued before “a cause of action has yet risen,”568 require proof of
some initial act which created a risk of harm.569
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Cour de Cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] 2 e civ., July 20, supra note 566.
Oliphant, The Nature of Tortious Liability, supra note 170, at 1-2.
569
Fear of damage alone is never sufficient. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant introduced (in the past) or
can control (in the present) a risk which is substantially certain to occur in the future. See supra p. 95.
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The interposition of the decision-maker in the causation timeline makes the proceedings
where preventive sanctions or remedies are sought rather complex. In addition to past and
present facts which need to be presented, the key point in these proceedings is risk assessment.
Risk assessment implies both a calculation of probabilities for the occurrence of future harm, and
it is a process that implies balancing the interests of the involved parties and the interests of
society as a whole.
Understanding the temporal position of decision-makers and the purposes of preventive
remedies might shed some light over the methods which need to be employed in order to identify
a proper standard for them. Having already seen that, historically, the law of torts began with
punishment, it then centered on compensation, and there are indications that in the future it might
get more and more preoccupied with prevention, the evolution of the law of torts practically
placed the judge closer and closer (in time) to the source of harm.
Chronologically, the first steps which the law must take to protect an interest or a right
must be preventive steps. It is only where prevention has failed, or was not feasible, that the next
class of remedies comes into question.570
If damage is foreseeable, can be avoided with low costs, and the infringement of the
defendant’s freedom is minimal, by all means, preventive action is recommended and should be
570

BOUTONNET, supra note 25, at 6 (referring to the precautionary principle).
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imposed. But where one cannot foresee the consequences, or the costs of prevention are
relatively high, or the infringement of defendant’s freedom is unacceptable, the analysis moves
to the next step. Events must be permitted to take their natural course, and if damage occurs, the
plaintiff must now look for a cause of action in order to obtain compensation, or else bear the
loss himself.
For a great number of interests, the law does not need to intervene preventively, or
preventive intervention should be realized at a later stage, when the probability of harm and the
extent of the damage are calculated with more precision. However, for the safeguard of interests
which are fundamental in our society (like human life, health, and environmental stability) the
law can intervene sooner, and the degree of uncertainty under which de decision is made can be
higher.
C. The Hand formula and other risk assessment tools
In order to determine when it is permissible, feasible and necessary for the justice system
to intervene preventively, a balancing test is needed which involves identifying the interests at
stake and quantifying their value.
For preventive remedies, a test is needed which necessarily implies the use of risk
assessment techniques. Using fault as a foundation for the imposition of preventive remedies is
justifiable because the duty to take precautions, which is enforced by way of preventive
remedies, is intrinsic to fault571 (the duty to take precautions can be seen as equivalent or at least
substantially overlapping with the general duty of care). The only problem which might hinder
the use of fault-based analysis in such cases is the fact that fault has made a career in the area of
retrospective analysis and has been so well adapted to compensatory remedies. For that reason,
in cases of direct prevention, fault must be enriched with prospective tools. Such tools are to be
571

Viney, supra note 16, at 156.
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found in risk assessment techniques, as well as cost-benefit and risk-utility analysis.572 Since
what is reproached to the defendant is the introduction of a risk, the judge must decide whether
or not the risk is worth taking, and whether or not society can tolerate that risk at one particular
moment in time, a judgment which requires prospective analysis.
In the search for default techniques of risk assessment in fault-based liability, the Hand
formula might supply the necessary prospective view needed in order to adapt fault based
analysis to the use of preventive remedies.
Risk assessment is probably the most complicated issue in cases of preventive
intervention. Generally when the risk of harm is appreciated at a lower value than the cost of
taking precautions (in order to avoid that risk), a reasonable person would not intervene
preventively, and therefore neither should the courts. This was the idea encapsulated by Judge
Learned Hand in his famous formula.573 If the burden of precautions is greater than the injury
suffered multiplied by the probability of occurrence, the law should not intervene, because the
defendant did not have a duty (obligation) to take precautions. 574 The mathematical formula is
very simple:
B < PL; where B is the burden of precautions, P is the probability of harm, and L is the
injury.575
The Hand formula is quite a wonderful default tool for risk assessment calculations in
cases involving prevention and can serve as a unifying standard for direct prevention.
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On risk-utility analysis and the Hand Formula, see DOBBS, supra note 13, at 340-48.
“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.” United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
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In fact, the Hand formula is not only good for risk assessment in cases where preventive
remedies are sought; it is actually more objective in its preventive use, as opposed to its use as a
standard for duty in cases of compensation.576
The Hand formula has intrinsic biases when applied as a general standard for the duty
element in cases involving compensation precisely because the decision-making process is
placed at a different moment than the one when the formula is calculated. The Hand formula is
rarely, if ever, based on exact numbers. But what ruins its ex-post objectivity is not the usual
imprecision of the formula (which can be corrected or tolerated); it is the temporal displacement
of the decision-making process. The Hand formula is used at the time of the trial in order to reanalyze a decision made when the defendant introduced a risk of harm. Judges don’t actually
apply the formula. The reproach made to the defendant is that he ignored what the Hand
formula’s result was at the time the tort was committed (more precisely, at the time when the risk
of harm was introduced).577 Tortfeasors rarely make risk assessment judgments prior to the
occurrence of harm. The rare situations where this happens usually involve decisions made by
corporations.578 Most negligence cases involve simple acts of inadvertence. One might wonder,
if the tortfeasor has made the risk assessment calculation, and then ignores the results, isn’t this
closer to an intentional act, or at least gross negligence, rather than simple negligence?
576

Judge Learned Hand and the tort literature analyze the Hand formula as a retrospective tool, as a standard for the
duty element in cases involving compensation. Even as such, it is clear that linking fault based liability to the Hand
formula is meant to create a shift towards prevention and economic efficiency within the traditional default rules of
liability. Id.: “the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of
three variables . . . .” (emphasis added); See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022,
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(8th ed., Wolters Kluwer 2011). RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 129 (Aspen Publishers 1999); DOBBS, supra note 13,
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Even in such cases, risk-benefit calculations might not be followed. One rather famous example is the refusal of
the California Court of Appeals to apply the risk-benefit analysis in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. because the riskbenefit analysis did not favor consumers. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 802, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 377 (Ct. App. 1981). Of course, it should be kept in mind that this was a products liability case, not a regular
negligence case.
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Moreover, even if an actor were to make the initial risk assessment judgment, he would normally
be biased, generally placing more value on the benefits of the act and minimizing the value of the
risk of harm generated onto others. One would think that the initial bias would be corrected by
the objective determination of the court ex post. That is quite false. The fact that the Hand
formula is an objective standard does not eliminate the risk of biased determinations. Ex-post
decision-making creates a bias into the probabilistic element of the formula. Judges make
determinations based on the Hand formula after the harmful effects of an act can be measured,
thus creating this new bias, a bias benefiting the victim. When the probability of harm is
assessed, it would come as no surprise to find it inflated due to a simple reason: damage has
occurred! Because this is an ex-post review and damage has occurred, the natural tendency is to
consider that under the consequences of the case, the probability of such harm to ensue was high.
This is like trying to decide, in a soccer match, if it was a good decision to shoot from a distance
or pass the ball, after the ball went over the post.
If used in risk assessment calculations, the Hand formula would be free of such biases.
As a risk-assessment technique, the natural moment to apply the formula is ex ante, before the
risk becomes a certainty—therefore the probabilistic element of the formula would be
determined at a moment when its calculation can be done with a higher degree of objectivity.
But is the Hand formula sufficient? First of all, the Hand formula has one essential
weakness: it cannot be calculated with precision.579 At most, decision-makers can approximate
with some degree of tolerance the extent of the potential damage, the percentage of probability
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In the words of Judge Posner: “Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula does not yield mathematically
precise results in practice; that would require that B, P, and L all be quantified, which so far as we know has never
been done in an actual lawsuit. Nevertheless, the formula is a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are
relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the relationship among those factors.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d at 1026.
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for such damage to occur, and even the benefits which would be obtained from the activity.580
Other mechanisms might be used in conjunction with the Hand formula to correct this problem.
The maxmin model would suppose making a determination of a best case scenario and a worst
case scenario in order to determine intervals or a spectrum which can be brought closer to the
best case scenario with the help of a remedy.581 The precautionary principle could also be used in
cases of uncertainty. The precautionary principle would make the decision-maker “err on the side
of caution”,582 which means that, in case of insufficient evidence for determining that the
benefits of some activity surpass the risk of harm, the decision-maker would rather do something
to protect the environment or human health, instead of putting them at risk, and err on the side of
what is usually an economic interest. The inquiry should not stop at this point, however. One
interest that should not be forgotten in cases applying preventive remedies is the interest of
society as a whole. The Hand formula takes into consideration the interests of the parties
involved, but also has within it the flexibility to include the interests of society. Public policy
arguments are routinely brought before courts in cases involving preventive remedies.583
The emphasis on the conflict between the parties and, to a large extent, the adversarial
system, can contribute to a phenomenon named “system neglect.”584 System neglect is basically
the ignorance of the full consequences of legal intervention, and occurs every time a single
problem is placed in view, leaving some of the effects of a decision out of the equation. 585 The
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interaction between human beings among themselves, as well as the interaction with our
resources, environment, and the systems we have put in place, requires a multi-lateral risk
assessment calculation, taking into account the indirect effects of decisions, alongside direct
effects. Courts must and generally do take into account the interest of the public in many
situations when preventive measures are sought, and not just the interests of the parties,586 and
must also try to anticipate what the effect of a particular case will have if similar cases are all
decided the same way. Some civil codes, like the Swiss civil code, require judges to decide new
cases as if they were legislators.587 This is of particular importance in cases involving preventive
remedies, particularly borderline cases applying the precautionary principle. System neglect can
spring not only from emphasizing the rights and interests of the parties, but also from focusing
on only one particular issue, and failing to see the systemic ramification of decisions. For
Professor Sunstein, this is the core of “systemic neglect”: the fact that people “tend to assume
that a change in a social situation will alter the part at issue, but without altering other
parts.”588,589 The French decisions regarding the electro-magnetic emissions of relay antennas590
need to be addressed systemically as well. Courts, before ordering the removal of those antennas,
must carefully consider the effects of such a decision if it were to be applied uniformly across the
586
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territory. The same people complaining about their effects might have a change of heart if made
aware that removing relay antennas from the proximity of residential areas would increase their
mobile service costs immensely, and they might not have national coverage anymore.
Another great challenge posed by the issue of prevention in the law of torts is
understanding uncertainty. No preventive decision can ignore the level of uncertainty inherent to
any risk assessment technique. Moreover, every time a judge makes a decision in the law of torts
he does so in a climate of uncertainty. This happens because tort actions are inherently factdependent. Judgment is passed only after a mental recreation of an event or a set of events.591
When trying to recreate past events, as it happens in the vast majority of tort actions, the farther
the event is in the past, the bigger the uncertainty is.592 In cases of prevention, the same
relationship can be expressed as applied to future events. All other things being equal, there is
greater uncertainty when predicting an event which is bound to happen in the far future, than if it
is bound to happen in the immediate future. For that reason, at early stages, remedies should be
exploratory (like imposing on the defendant the obligation to produce independent and reliable
scientific studies, appoint an expert or a commission of experts in risk assessment, etc), less
591

On the limits of our knowledge and the controversy surrounding the deterministic or non-deterministic nature of
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intensive (limiting an activity in order to reduce the risks, rather than forbidding action
altogether), or denied until a future moment when risk assessment is possible or more accurate in
its results. With the passage of time, more information, and a calculation of risk which implies
less uncertainty, judges can apply more aggressive remedies, like imposing positive or negative
obligations to act in a specific manner to the defendant.

T(0)
Δu(-1)

Δu(-2)

Δu(+1)

Δu(+2)

T(-1)
T(-2)
T(+1)
T(+2)

If T(0) is the moment when the decision-making process takes place, the degree of
uncertainty (Δu) increases as the events which are under scrutiny (the past events which the court
is trying to find, or the future ones which it tries to anticipate) go deeper into the past or into the
future.
Awareness as to how uncertainty is bound to influence the risk assessment calculations
when preventive remedies are sought, explains the variation of standards between the different
preventive remedies described in Chapter IV. The degree of uncertainty is lower if the remedy is
close to the moment when damage is supposed to occur and higher when the remedy is remote to
such a moment. This does not change the fact that the default risk assessment technique is still
the basic Hand formula. For instance, the standard for both the permanent and the interlocutory

140

injunction should be calculated according to the Hand formula when preventive measures are
sought. In fact, Judge Posner explicitly admitted that the “Leubsdorf-Posner” formulation is the
procedural equivalent of the Hand formula.593 However, when a preventive remedy is sought,
both the permanent and the interim injunction are made in a climate of uncertainty. The benefit
of a full record diminishes uncertainty, but does not eliminate it. That is why it is not enough for
the “Leubsdorf-Posner” formula for interlocutory injunctions to calculate the probability of
winning or losing at trial and the irreparable harm suffered by one party or the other, 594 because
in order to anticipate, even as a probability, what the court will decide at trial would mean to
anticipate the level of uncertainty existent at a future decision-making moment, which itself, as a
future event, cannot be determined with certainty. It would be much easier simply to make a
normal risk assessment calculation based on the Hand formula (calculating the value of the
activity on the one side, and the probability of future damage, multiplied by the extent of
damage), whilst taking into account the existent degree of uncertainty. The decision itself is
provisional (non-definitive) precisely because the degree of uncertainty at the moment when an
interim injunction is requested is higher, by comparison, with a decision after a full trial. The
focus under this unified standard will, as a consequence, be not on the final decision, but on the
right decision.595
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D. Placing limits on preventive intervention
1. Relational limits—supervening administrative or legislative regulation
The law of torts, because it devises default rules of liability, from one point of view,
makes the judiciary the first preventive decision-making body, but from another point of view,
the last. The gap-filling capacity of the law of torts creates this seemingly dual way to intervene.
Judges are placed at the forefront whenever the problem requiring preventive intervention is
novel. Novel issues fall through the gaps, and solutions must be found at the level where the
citizen first looks for justice. However, whenever special legislation is passed or an
administrative body has taken up the challenge to regulate and make decisions for preventive
purposes, judges will have to defer to the entity more suited for specific intervention.
In France, the necessity to defer to the administration when the administrative bodies
have made a decision, we have seen,596 is much more than a mere problem of efficient
administration of prevention. The relay antenna cases have shown that this can become a
problem of separation of powers, 597 in a legal system where the line of separation between the
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary is quite prominent. 598 In U.S law, we have seen that
there is also a general practice of deferring to the administration, when the administration has
better information and better resources to make a decision.599 Besides this matter, the U.S. also
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presents a peculiar feature when it comes to the intervention of federal administrative agencies,
who, in some circumstances, can preempt state intervention.600
2. Foundational limits—freedom and preventive intervention
Responsibility as a whole is justified by ideas of freedom and power, and civil liability,
while born out of the same scope of preserving and maximizing human freedom, also finds its
effects limited by the same ideas. The use of coercion, and therefore the employment and the
strength of preventive remedies, are limited by creating a double limitation601 on the decisionmaker:
(1) A preventive remedy can only be imposed on the one who has breached his duty to
take precautions, and the breach needs to be proved. The onus of decision-making and preventive
intervention is, as a rule, on the actor, not the court. Courts can order preventive intervention
only in the presence of fault, i.e., when the actor failed to take the reasonable precautions
required under the circumstances.
(2) The preventive remedy must not place an undue burden on the defendant, and it must
be proportional602 to the risk which was generated.603
3. Epistemological limits—knowledge and uncertainty
As stated before, no preventive decision can ignore the level of uncertainty inherent to
every risk assessment technique. Also, applying preventive remedies presupposes the

600

Feikema v. Texaco Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1416.
See supra p. 43: “If preventive remedies are coercive in nature that means that their application can only proceed
after the imperative of prevention is put in balance with the imperative of preserving the individual freedom of the
actor subject to sanction. The actor’s freedom of choice gives rise to his responsibility, but his own personal
freedom will also justify limits being put on the effects of his responsibility. The law must find the right measure, in
its effects, for responsibility.”
602
Cyril Sintez also describes measures of direct prevention as having a proportional character. Sintez, supra note
25, at 53.
603
See Kennaway v. Thompson, [1981] Q.B. 88 (the court found that the defendant’s power boat racing was a
nuisance but did not totally prohibit the activity; the court simply limited the number of motor racing events allowed
to be held every year and ordered the defendant to keep the noise levels under 75 decibels at all times).
601

143

anticipation of future events. The Hand formula, the maxmin model, or the precautionary
principle all seem extremely attractive as theoretical models, but more often than not they are not
easy to implement in practice for a variety of reasons. All these models involve calculations
based on certain variables which need to be identified and assessed with as much precision as
possible, and that involves considerable effort, cost and, maybe paradoxically, time.
The reaction to uncertainty in judicial practice has traditionally been one of nonintervention, again leaving the decision-making process on the actor. The court will only involve
itself in the decision-making process and sanction the author for his failure to correctly assess
risks at a point in time when such failure becomes calculable, or obvious.
The precautionary principle invites a different approach. In cases that fall within the
narrow scope of the precautionary principle (catastrophic and irreversible harm to essential
human values), the decision cannot wait for uncertainty to dissipate and uncertainty will not
excuse the lack of intervention for the protection of fundamental values. However, even in cases
like this, intervention must be proportional and the facts need to be analyzed thoroughly. The
blind application of the precautionary principle can indeed become paralyzing and absurd, as
some of its critics fear.604
Moreover, uncertainty also limits the application of preventive remedies in a very
particular way. Because, with the passage of time, levels of uncertainty tend to become more and
more reduced as the present moves closer to the anticipated effect from the future, preventive
remedies can intervene progressively. As already stated, at early stages, remedies should be
exploratory (like imposing on the defendant the obligation to produce independent and reliable
scientific studies, appoint an expert or a commission of experts in risk assessment, etc), less
intensive (limiting an activity in order to reduce the risks, rather than prohibiting it altogether), or
604
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refused until a future moment when risk assessment is possible or more accurate in its results.
With the passage of time, more information, and a calculation of risk which implies less
uncertainty, judges can apply more aggressive remedies, like imposing positive or negative
obligations to act in a specific manner to the defendant.
Out of the challenges decision-makers meet when applying preventive remedies,
probably the most important is understanding and embracing uncertainty.605 The law of torts is
connected to facts, it is connected to the world, and it is connected to people. Uncertainty is a
great part of our world as we know it, and not knowing is, whether we like it or not, a reality
derived from our human nature. So often we kid ourselves that we know much about something,
or worse, all about everything. Ignoring uncertainty or choosing an easy way out of our problems
only creates more problems. The best proof of this is given by the extreme approaches taken on
the precautionary principle.606 Total rejection or the over-stretching of the precautionary
principle are in equal measure ways of abandoning reason for foolishness, either because of
stubborn wishful thinking or because of unreasonable fear. The cases involving relay antennas,
discussed at length above,607 show this type of perverted application of the precautionary
principle. The precautionary principle need not be applied in a context of utter ignorance,
without any effort to assess, based on scientific data, the risks involved in a particular case. The
principle is not supposed to be paralyzing, and it should definitely not encourage a fear of
everything which is modern, or which we do not understand completely.608 We live in a

605

See Farber, supra note 215, at 959.
See Cour d’appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Versailles, supra note 195; For studies rejecting of the
precautionary principle in all its forms see the studies published in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (Julian Morris ed., Butterworth Heinemann 2000), supra note 533.
607
Supra Ch. IV, Part B.1.
608
The precautionary principle usually involves choices between values that are cherished in our society. All
interests must carefully be weighed before arriving at a decision. Eliminating one risk might create another, and in
these kinds of circumstances keeping the status quo might be just as harmful as making a change. That is why the
precautionary principle must not be a paralyzing principle. It must be a principle of action, but an action which
606

145

technological world, and by no means must we take this as a negative. Scientists are today's great
explorers and innovators. The pinnacle of human adventure today is scientific discovery.609
Through science we can see galaxies millions of light years away. Through science we broke the
frontier of sound, gravity and atomic forces. It was the immense power of our minds that brought
us to the point we reached today, a point where man wields incredible power, and as time passes,
such power is more than likely to continue to grow. In this brave new world, legal science must
also play its part.

stems from careful research. The best solution can be reached only through an intense study of uncertainty and the
introduction of new analytical tools. If uncertainty cannot be eliminated, decision-makers must use any tool at their
disposal in order to reach the best decision in the given circumstance.
609
le Tourneau, supra note 14, at no. 242.
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Chapter VII
Final Remarks

Throughout this study, the problem of direct prevention has been analyzed from the
following angles: etymology (Chapter II), philosophy (III), jurisprudence (IV), doctrinal
perceptions (V), and analytical tools (VI). Attempting to link all these elements into a cohesive
whole, the result was a model that follows the actor, on two plains simultaneously: as to the
facts, and as to the law. It is a citizen centered view; a model that begins with movement and
relational concepts and a dynamic sequence with two key moments: an act which is
simultaneously a breach of a preexisting duty and an infringement of a right (the breach of the
duty to take precautions) and the decision-making process (when the decision-making power is
forfeited due to this failure and, consequently, empowers the court to engage in risk assessment
and offer a solution). When ordering preventive remedies, courts engage in two types of
judgments: one that is retrospective—deciding if the actor breached his duty to take precautions;
and one that is perspective—deciding whether and how to intervene in order to avoid future
probable harm.
The study of direct prevention is only at the beginning of the road and the topic is one of
fascinating implications. The debate that follows this area of tort law might have far-reaching
effects. Indeed, the entire perception we have on tortious liability might find itself reinvented
through the study of prevention.610 One of the major anticipated changes proposed herein is the
reassessment of our understanding of liability as a concept, 611 and this is one of the topics that
would merit further attention in legal literature. Unfortunately, the subject would have been too
610
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vast and too challenging to integrate in this thesis, which has a much narrower topic: direct
prevention. The overall scope was to promote a purposive and dynamic approach in the
application of preventive remedies.
Limited as to its scope, this endeavor was also limited as to the jurisdictions which were
selected for doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis. The choice of jurisdictions for the comparative
part of the paper was made in the hope that the joint experience of the three legal systems taken
under scrutiny would open up new avenues for reflection. A sort of trans-systemic body of
knowledge can be obtained by the merger of the individualistic philosophy, thinking and
mechanisms developed in the common law with the focus on collectivism from the civil law.
This can be done, particularly because the practical solutions offered within each legal system
are quite similar functionally, and differ only in exceptional cases.612
Ideally (or perhaps as a matter of utopia), for prevention, the resultant would be a legal
system where each person seeking justice is treated as an individual and protected as such, but
without forgetting that each person is but a member of a social body, and that court decisions
must strike a perfect balance between all the interests involved in each particular case, by
weighing efficiency with freedom and by placing the common good above all other policy
considerations.
An inspiration for this form of comparative approach was found in Professor Reimann’s
vision for a vertical, multidimensional approach to comparative law,613 where comparative law is
not just a method,614 but also “a field of substantive knowledge.”615 The historical context would
612
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favor it: we pride ourselves today on a global perception of society, with openness to diversity
and unprecedented social, economic and political interconnectivity. It is a context that favors
progress, and that encourages us to learn from each other, to learn from the things that we have
in common and from the things that set us apart, for the betterment of the society we live in.
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